Τουσκ: Απειλή για την Ευρώπη η εξάρτηση της Γερμανίας από το ρωσικό φυσικό αέριο

 "Η εξάρτηση της Γερμανίας από το ρωσικό αέριο μπορεί να περιορίσει ουσιαστικά την κυριαρχία της Ευρώπης. Είμαι πεπεισμένος γι' αυτό", δήλωσε ο Τουσκ ενώπιον των δημοσιογράφων, δύο ημέρες πριν επισκεφθεί τη Βαρσοβία η γερμανίδα καγκελάριος Άγγελα Μέρκελ. "Για μένα, το ζήτημα της Ουκρανίας είναι ζήτημα που αφορά το μέλλον και την ασφάλεια της ΕΕ", δήλωσε ο πολωνός πρωθυπουργός επισκεπτόμενος μια στρατιωτική βάση στη βόρεια Πολωνία. Ο Τουσκ τάχθηκε υπέρ "μιας διόρθωσης της ενεργειακής πολιτικής" της ΕΕ. "Θα συζητήσω γι' αυτό πολύ ανοικτά με την κα Μέρκελ, επισημαίνοντας πως οι σημερινές αντιλήψεις που αφορούν την κλιματική πολιτική και την πολιτική στο φυσικό αέριο υπάρχει κίνδυνος να αποτελέσουν απειλή για την ασφάλεια και την κυριαρχία ολόκληρης της Ευρώπης", επέμεινε.

Geopolitical Turmoil Takes its Toll on ExxonMobil

ExxonMobil had a pretty rotten week. On March 5 it announced that it would reduce capital expenditures this year, after having “peaked” in 2013. Its 2014 spending will hit $39.8 billion, down 6% from $42.5 billion last year. While that may seem like a good thing (cutting costs), investors apparently didn’t like the idea – its stock price dropped 2.7% during midday trading as a result, ending the day as the biggest decline on the Dow Jones Industrial Average. Investors are growing concerned that ExxonMobil may be running out of good projects to invest in. Exxon’s production was down by 1.5% in 2013 from a year earlier, and the firm believes it will only remain flat through this year. Meanwhile Exxon’s costs on a per barrel basis are rising. It cost them $11.48 to produce a barrel of oil equivalent in 2013, sharply up from $9.91 in 2012.

The eurozone's ruinous embrace of 'competitive devaluation'

The euro was supposed to put an end to competitive currency devaluations, and with it ‘unfair competition’. But this has not been the case. Germany was often portrayed (wrongly) as the victim of other countries’ competitive devaluations before the introduction of the euro. But contrary to received wisdom, Germany’s real exchange rate – which takes into account differing inflation trends in Germany and its trading partners – did not rise in the run-up to the introduction of the single currency. And it has fallen steeply during the 15 years of the euro’s existence. This has handed German firms a competitive advantage of the kind the euro was supposed to eradicate. What is more, Germany is not under pressure to do anything about it. In fact, other eurozone countries are being encouraged to follow suit.

The European Commission compiles so-called ‘harmonised competitiveness indices’ for eurozone economies (see chart one). These are the member-states’ real exchange rates in anything but name. They show that Germany’s fell by almost 20 per cent between the beginning of 1999 and the end of 2011, before edging up a bit in 2012-13. The main reason for the decline in the country’s real exchange rate was very low wage increases and hence weak inflation. Spain’s (and to a lesser extent) Italy’s real exchange rates rose rapidly over the early part of the 2000s but have fallen sharply since 2008: Italy’s is now barely higher than in 1999, whereas Spain’s is up around 9 per cent. France’s real exchange rate is actually lower now than in 1999 (or in terms of the Commission’s analysis), its ‘competitiveness’ has improved. In short, the eurozone’s imbalances have less to do with its Latin members allowing costs to get out of hand than they do with Germany engineering a beggar-thy-neighbour cut in costs.