Abstract
Kenya's
2013 election was supremely important, but for a reason not normally
highlighted or discussed. Uhuru Kenyatta and William Ruto's run for
president and deputy president as International Criminal Court (ICC)
indictees was a key strategy to deflect the court and to insulate
themselves from its power once they won the election. The paper
maintains that the strategy entailed a set of delaying tactics and other
pressures to ensure that the trials would not take place until after
the election when their political power could be used to maximum effect
to halt or delay them. However, unlike in 2007–08, the 2013 election did
not result in mass violence. The Kenyatta–Ruto alliance united former
ethnic antagonists in a defensive reaction to the ICC. The analysis has
implications for theories seeking to explain why countries ratify and
comply with treaties. It develops an alternative political economy
argument to account for outliers like Kenya and has implications for
international criminal justice and democracy in Kenya.
