Why Russia Will Send More Troops to Central Asia

Russia is making a concerted effort to increase its military and security presence throughout Central Asia, just not for the reasons it would have you think. Though the Kremlin is concerned with the threat of spillover violence from Islamist militancy in Afghanistan — its purported motive for deploying more troops — it is far more alarmed by what it sees as Chinese and Western encroachment into lands over which it has long held sway. It is this concern that will shape Moscow's behavior in Central Asia in the years to come.

Central Asia’s Cheap Oil Double Whammy

The prolonged slump in oil prices is causing plenty of wailing and gnashing of teeth from Oran to Ottawa. But for countries in the Caucasus and Central Asia, the oil swoon has been coupled with Russia’s economic implosion to create a particularly ugly economic outlook. That raises concerns about the region’s stability — even as it opens the door for a bigger role there for China.

The 50 percent drop in crude prices since last summer alone would be enough to spell pain for countries such as Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan that rely heavily on fossil fuel exports for government revenues. Kazakhstan last week trimmed its budget — which had been based on oil at $80 a barrel — while Azerbaijan may have to revise downward similarly rosy spending plans later this summer. Azerbaijan already had to dip into its oil fund for the first time since it was created 15 years ago. Kazakhstan’s sovereign wealth fund is looking to borrow fresh money due to the oil collapse.

Re-Examining the Threat of Central Asian Militancy

Following the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan and the rise of the Islamic State in the Middle East, concerns are growing about a rise in Islamic militant attacks in Central Asia this year. Leaders of Central Asian states such as Tajikistan and Uzbekistan have warned of the risk of various militant groups filling the security vacuum in Afghanistan and directly threatening the region. However, it is rising economic and political pressures in Central Asia that could precipitate an increase in indigenous militancy and pose the greatest threat to stability in the region in the coming years.

Central Asia is no stranger to Islamic militancy. After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the region experienced significant political upheaval as five new countries emerged that had no previous history of independent statehood within their Soviet-made borders. The countries also experienced major economic dislocations and an explosion of nationalist and religious sentiment that had been suppressed during the Soviet era.

Central Asia: The Complexities of the Fergana Valley

A recent border dispute in the Fergana Valley, the core of Central Asia, highlights the growing tensions in the strategic and contested region. Kyrgyz and Uzbek border patrol units were removed from the Ungar-Too area in Kyrgyzstan's Jalal-Abad region Oct. 2, after a two-week standoff over an alleged Uzbek border incursion into the area. Such incursions, coupled with ethnic tensions and sporadic violence, have become increasingly common in the Fergana Valley region, which is split between Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan.

The valley has long been the population and agricultural heartland of Central Asia. It has also been one of the most unstable areas in the region since the collapse of the Soviet Union due to several factors, including diverse and interspersed populations, complex borders, dwindling resources and religious extremism.

China's Ambitions in Xinjiang and Central Asia: Part 1

In mid-September Chinese President Xi Jinping rounded out a 10-day tour of Central Asia that included state visits to Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, as well the G-20 summit in St. Petersburg and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit in Bishkek. At each stop, the new president made hearty pledges of financial support and calls for further diplomatic, security and energy cooperation. In Turkmenistan, Xi inaugurated a natural gas field. In Kazakhstan, he agreed to invest $30 billion in energy and transportation projects. In Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, he made similar promises to increase investment and cooperation in the coming years.

Xi's tour can be examined as part of China's struggle to reduce its exposure to security risks and supply disruptions off its coast by developing new overland transport routes for goods, energy and other natural resources. China's eastern seaboard, and the maritime realm beyond it, have dominated Chinese political, economic and military planning in recent decades, and in many ways it will continue to do so for the foreseeable future. The coast will remain central to China's role in the global economy, facilitating the flow of Chinese goods to overseas markets, as well as the imports of seaborne energy and raw materials relied upon heavily by coastal provinces to feed their oversized manufacturing bases.

Central Asia and Afghanistan: A Tumultuous History

Contrary to popular perception, Central Asia is not likely to see an immediate explosion of violence and militancy after the U.S. and NATO drawdown from Afghanistan in 2014. However, Central Asia's internal issues and the region's many links with Afghanistan -- including a web of relationships among militant groups -- will add to the volatility in the region. 

Why Has the Arab Spring Skipped Central Asia (So Far)?

During his official visit to Uzbekistan in January, Lamberto Zannier, Secretary-General of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, discussed the human rights situation in the country with government and civil society representatives. Uzbekistan is not the only Central Asian country that periodically appears on the radar screen of human rights organizations and faces criticism from international organizations and western governments. Nor is it the only country in the region that faces socio-economic challenges similar to those of many Arab Spring countries. In fact, soon after the uprisings began in 2011, academic papers began to ask ¹ if the uprisings would spread to the region.

While there are socio-economic similarities between North Africa and Central Asia, most conclude that the historical circumstances and prevailing conditions are significantly different, making revolution unlikely. So, have the governments of the region been successful in thwarting a “Central Asian Spring,” are we comparing the incomparable, or is this just the calm before the storm?