What factors are driving the new debate on ballistic missile defences?

Today there are few issues that are as thorny as that of ballistic missile defence (BMD). After years of living under the threat of that almost invincible weapon -the nuclear armed missile- BMD appears to be set to turn the technological cycle in favour of defence, with the potential therefore of turning the deterrence doctrine on its head and forcing countries to completely re-evaluate their options. The concept itself is far from new, and spans more than fifty years of research with frequent gaps and hiccups in between. The Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty –signed in 1972-, the US’s withdrawal from the Treaty –in June 2002-, and a series of political, technological, and strategic factors from 90’s to 10’s have shaped the whole BMD debate, which seems to point to the fact that BMD has reached a stage of maturity where even its most strident opponents accept that some sort of defence effort would continue for the foreseeable future.[1]

The aim of this assignment is to examine the current debate on BMD and underline the factors that are driving it, presenting simultaneously a vast array of stances. In order to successfully accomplish this aim, the paper will first try to give the main points of the ABM Treaty, which strongly influenced the discussions throughout the first decade of the current BMD debate. Thereafter, the current BMD debate will be presented, divided into three periods-presidencies (Clinton-90’s, Bush-00’s, Obama-10’s) where throughout each one, both within USA and globally, different strategies on BMD have been applied in an effort to deter any perceived-threat from a ballistic missile attack and ensure both US National and International security. In the final part, an evaluation on BMD debate will be made, which highlights the continuity and similarity of the factors driving the debate, though the different policies that have been followed by each presidency.  

                              I.      The ABM Treaty

 The ABM Treaty was negotiated as part of an effort to control the US-USSR offensive arms race. By limiting defensive systems, both sides aimed to reduce the need to build more or new offensive weapons to overcome any defence that the other might deploy. Thus, without effective national defences, each superpower remained vulnerable, even at reduced or low offensive force holdings, to the other's nuclear weapons, deterring either side from launching an attack.[2] Under the above concept the ABM Treaty:

Ø      Banned the deployment of strategic capable defence with nation wide coverage with the exception of one limited regional system for each country. Such a deployment area could not hold more than 100 ABM launchers and 100 interceptors;

Ø      Guarded against a rapid breakout from its limits by providing several years notice of any effort at breakout. This it did by prohibiting the development, testing, and deployment of any ABM components that are sea, air based or mobile (which can be rapidly relocated to provide nation wide coverage). The prohibition on radar -except at one site, and that too facing outward- also prevented a rapid breakout, since construction was to take several years;

Ø      Made several guarantees against circumvention. Thus the Parties undertook not to give non-ABM missile launchers or radar the capabilities to counter strategic ballistic missiles or their elements and agreed not to test such equipment ‘in an ABM mode’. Thus air defences or any kind of defences could not be tested against strategic missiles. It also ruled out the use of other technologies based on other physical principles capable of substituting for ABM interceptors, launchers and radar being subject to negotiation; and

Ø      Prohibited the transfer of ABM systems outside national territory, and an agreed Statement (g) further banned the transfer to third parties of technical descriptions or blueprints of ABM system or components.[3]

Nevertheless, the treaty originally permitted both countries to deploy two fixed, ground-based defences of 100 missile interceptors each. One defence could protect the national capital, while the second could be used to guard an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) field. Overall the ABM Treaty might not a panacea to the US-USSR strained relations, but beyond any doubt it proved to be a decisive factor in the effort to deter a military conflict between the two superpowers.

                           II.      The BMD Debate in 90’s

The debate in 90’s within US took place under the concept of a limited National Missile Defence (NMD), which -as McNamara noted in the 60’s- could be quickly moved up to a full-fledged missile defence. In detail, the BMD debate is mainly characterized by the tension between the world view of the Republicans and the Democrats, with the former accused of drifting towards a dangerous unilateralism. On the other hand, the Democrats backed by the arms control lobby chose the path of engagement and interaction with China and Russia, sharing and working on technology advance (under severe security limitations). The most dangerous group at that time seemed the ‘reasonable opposition’ who while apparently was trying to save the ABM Treaty, in fact did everything to scuttle it. The proposal from this camp for boost phase intercepts (either by air, land or sea) from various bases around the world was dangerously offensive in its content. This group had inputs at various levels of policy making, where they had pushed for a ‘saving’ of the ABM Treaty combined with an expansion of the deterrent.[4]

Another important actor shaping the internal debate was the arms control lobby. The lobby comprised members basically drawn from the universities and think tanks, backed by a few scientists was the most vociferous in arguing against the dilution of the ABM Treaty. The scientists were propounded various methods by which any serious missile power would have been able to circumvent defensive measures with surprising ease.[5] Moreover, others were pointed to the dangers of Russia energising her own ABM defence, and the effects this could have had on Chinese and European arsenals. Another worth-mentioning factor was the came up of various ‘policy alternatives’ that were outlined as measures that could allow the missile defence process -for it was nothing less- to stop short of abrogating the Treaty. In particular, an eminent scholar Spurgeon M. Keeny was advocating that the US should aim for full integration of Russia and eventually China into the sensing and information management network necessary to support any NMD deployment, where while they would not have had command authority over the system, they would nonetheless have been able to use this information for their own missile defence.[6]

Meanwhile, the collapse of the USSR enhanced the need to re-negotiate the ABM Treaty, since the treaty was designed to deal with issues that had been radically transformed. The negotiation with Russia was a tortuous one, and caused Congress to stake out the claim that US security was being held hostage by Russian intransigence.[7] Expectations of Russian 'concessions' reflected a dangerous readiness to subject US’s security interests to a Russian veto.[8]

In fact, it was not until 1995 that an understanding was reached with Russia on the contentious ‘double restrictions’ (interceptor and missile speeds)[9] where the US agreed to a demonstrated interceptor velocity of 3km/sec against missiles with a velocity higher than 3km/sec. This however made the Navy's programme non ABM compliant, a result that immediately led to NMD proponents like the Heritage Foundation making a ‘finding’ that the Navy system was in fact the cheapest.[10]

In February 1995, Senator Thurmond introduced the ‘Ballistic Missile Revitalization Act’, which accused the Administration of bargaining away not only strategic systems but also the ability of the US to defend her troops.[11] This was followed by the presentation on April 6, 1995, of the ‘Theatre Missile Act’,[12] which prohibited funding for any programme that would apply the ABM Treaty or any limitation or obligation under the Treaty, to Research and Development, to Theatre Missile Defence upgrades, or components.[13]

However, the scene of the debate definitely changed, when the US’s National Security Commission’s report affirmed that North Korea flight-tested a three-stage Taepo Dong 1 missile (ICBM) over Japan -August 31, 1998- long before anyone had thought. It is noteworthy that the US’s annual National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) noted –November 1995- that "no country, other than the major declared nuclear powers will develop or otherwise acquire a ballistic missile in the next 15 years that could threaten the contiguous 48 states and Canada”.[14] A new NIE released in 1999 concluded: “We project that during the next 15 years the United States will most likely face ICBM threats from Russia, China, and North Korea, probably from Iran, and possibly from Iraq”.[15] Key Democrats like Bob Kerry (D-Nebraska) -who had earlier been responsible for breaking a START logjam by endorsing unilateral US cuts- changed position, calling for NMD as a trade-off for deep cuts in nuclear forces.[16] The revised intelligence assessments all but ended official debate about whether the rogue-state missile threat was sufficiently imminent to warrant deployment of limited NMD, and led President Bill Clinton to sign the Missile Defence Act of 1999. According to the Act: “It is the policy of the United States to deploy as soon as is technologically possible an effective National Missile Defence system capable of defending the territory of the United States against limited ballistic missile attack (whether accidental, unauthorized, or deliberate)”.[17] However, President Clinton emphasized that the act did not represent a decision to deploy NMD, and that any such decision would be based on a continuing assessment of the threat, the technical readiness and estimated cost of the NMD system, and the impact of deployment on US’s arms control and non-proliferation objectives.

Assessing the whole debate on BMD in 90’s, it appears that three factors -the threat level, the technological maturing, and the progress in arms control- played a key role in its development. As long as, the three of them were in a low level the debate was balancing between unilateralism and multilateralism. As soon as, the level of threat rose, the necessity of a new action plan became the new field of the debate. Those three factors will continue in shaping the debate in 00’s where the Bush administration brought sweeping changes.

                       III.      The BMD Debate in 00’s    

One of the most characteristic arguments on the BMD, during the Bush Presidency, was Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld’s characterization of the ABM Treaty as “ancient history”.[18] In contrast to the importance attached to the Treaty by the Clinton administration, officials from the incoming Bush administration viewed it as an anachronism, believing the Treaty would hold back their plans for an advanced missile defence programme. In particular, in a speech on 1 May 2001 President Bush declared that it was time to move beyond the old paradigm of “mutually assured destruction” that had dominated superpower relations during the Cold War, to tackle new threats that were emerging and to stem the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). In order to achieve this, he said it was necessary to “move beyond the constraints” of the ABM Treaty.[19]

As a consequence, when the Bush administration took office, the negotiations with Russia on revising or adapting the ABM Treaty failed to find a solution, and on 13 December 2001 President Bush announced that his Government had given Russia formal notice of its intention to withdraw from the Treaty in six months, as required under Article XV (2) of the Treaty. In a statement, President Bush said: “I have concluded the ABM Treaty hinders our government’s ability to develop ways to protect our people from future terrorist or rogue-state missile attacks.” He went on to say that the decision to withdraw from the treaty would not undermine Russian security or damage the new relationship with Russia.[20]

In December 2002 the Bush administration announced its plans for the deployment of an integrated, multi-layered BMD capacity. Those proposals were built upon plans for a NMD system that was initially set out by the Clinton administration in 1999.[21] Particularly, the initial proposals envisaged a three-stage deployment of a ground-based midcourse system and supporting elements designed to intercept an incoming missile while still in space[22]. The system was to use a method known as ‘hit-to-kill’, using kinetic energy rather than an explosive warhead to destroy the incoming missile on impact.[23]

In addition to the deployment of a midcourse interceptor system, largely intended to defend the continental US, the Bush proposals also: “envisaged the eventual deployment of an inherently more complex, fully integrated[24] and multi-faceted system capable of defending the US homeland, globally deployed US forces and US allies against a ballistic missile attack at any point during the three phases of the incoming missile’s trajectory, and against all types and ranges of ballistic missile”.[25] As part of that direction, the US’s Missile Defence Agency (MDA) considered several European sites where it could base a missile defence capability to provide additional US protection and could provide a regional defence for its European allies against a missile launch from Iran. The Department of Defence (DoD) approached both Poland and the Czech Republic about basing elements of its proposed European missile defence system. In May 2006, the Czech government sent a formal letter to the United States to request that the United States consider placing missile defence assets in the Czech Republic. DoD had completed site selection and begun site design for the European Interceptor Site in Poland and the European Midcourse Radar Site in the Czech Republic. Thus, in 2008, the United States, Poland, and the Czech Republic signed bilateral Ballistic Missile Defence Agreements that formally approved the basing of the European Interceptor Site and the European Midcourse Radar Site. [26]

However, criticisms over the proposed ballistic missile defences in Europe argued that testing of the system was insufficient to verify that it would function as intended.[27] DoD’s plans for long-term operations and support were incomplete, making the transition and transfer of the BMD elements from the MDA to the services difficult.[28] In light of those concerns, Congress placed limitations on the use of funds for the acquisition or deployment of missiles at a European site until the Secretary of Defence certifies that the proposed interceptors have demonstrated a high probability of working in an operationally effective manner and the ability to accomplish the mission.[29]

Moreover, the deployment of the BMD sites in Europe had been the subject of debate in the parliaments of both Poland and the Czech Republic, and the Russian government had adamantly protested US’s plans in those countries. In fact, whilst seeking to reaffirm Poland’s credentials to US, both the government’s of former Polish Prime Minister Kaczynski and the current government of Donald Tusk[30] had consistently made it clear that any approval of the US plans would have been based on tangible improvements in the country’s national security[31], given that participation in this programme was likely to impact on Poland’s already tenuous relationship with Russia. A number of commentators had also argued that merely housing an interceptor site could make the country a potential target. On that basis domestic opposition in Poland was high, in particular among the general public, until the 2008 Russia-Georgia conflict.[32] The situation in Czech Republic appeared no difference at all, since 68% of the public opinion, in late 2007, was against the idea of hosting part of US BMD system.[33] In June 2007 demonstrations were held in Prague over the possible health, safety and environmental dangers that the base may pose, while a significant number of the general public reportedly objected to the concept of basing foreign troops on Czech soil so soon after decades of Soviet domination.[34] Nevertheless, the public opinion’s reactions, like in Poland before, soon appeased on the dawn of the Russia-Georgia conflict.[35]

At the same time, the Bush administration had gone to great lengths to underline the importance of co-operation on BMD, and by doing so, was seeking tacit approval from the European members of NATO. Despite the American overtures, Europe was split in two groups. On the one hand, were some of the pro-European Alliance members (Germany, France) that reportedly remained sceptical of the Bush Administration’s proposals, albeit relatively privately – “the basis of their concern had largely been over the operational capability of the system and whether ties between NATO and Russia were being unnecessarily compromised, for a system that had not been satisfactorily fielded and had proven expensive[36]”-, while on the other hand, the UK, Denmark and the Central and Eastern European states had openly expressed their support for the plans.[37]

Another important actor of the BMD debate, Russia was openly hostile towards the US plan, apparently viewing it as part of a wider pattern of US expansionism and unconstrained action, and warned that it would lead inevitably to a new arms race.[38] Moscow had rebuffed US assurances that the system was entirely defensive in nature and was neither designed, nor able, to counter Russia’s extensive strategic nuclear deterrent. It also had declined Washington’s earlier offer to collaborate on missile defence testing and radar-data sharing.[39]

Moving a step further, in February 2007, the then Russian President Vladimir Putin hinted during a speech at a security conference in Munich that, were the US to proceed with deployment of its missile defence system, Russia might respond by pulling out of the 1987 Treaty on Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF)[40]. He, also, stressed Russia’s continued observance of the limits imposed on strategic nuclear weapons systems, but noted that, with other states in Asia and the Middle East acquiring intermediate-range missiles, only the US and Russia were prevented from developing them.[41] In fact, in October 2007, Russia sought to address that problem by proposing the globalisation of the obligations of the INF treaty. However, that initiative failed to attract support and Russia proposed a new international agreement based on the INF Treaty at the UN Conference on Disarmament in February 2008.[42]

Russia, of course, was not the lone country strongly opposing to the Bush administration’s plans. China, following the Russian footsteps, was strongly opposing[43], raising the US’s fear for a boost of the Chinese nuclear and ICBMs forces, in the near future. In addition, concerns were expressed that “the US NMD would be likely to generate a negative shift in China’s assessments of motives, because it would be impossible for the United States to demonstrate that its NMD was directed against rogue states and not China”.[44]

Contrary to the circumstances, as the BMD debate in Europe and around the globe was on fire, technological advancements by rogue states, once again, changed the field of the debate. In particular, North Korea after the Taepo Dong 1 missile tests in 1998, conducted flight tests of the Taepo Dong 2 missile, in 2006 and 2009 respectively. Despite the most recent launch’s failure in its stated mission of orbiting a small communications satellite, it successfully tested many technologies associated with an ICBM. Following North Korea, in August 2008, Iran launched its Safir Space Launch Vehicle (SLV) with what it claims was a dummy satellite. Furthermore, in February 2009, Iran used the Safir-2 SLV to place the domestically produced Omid satellite. Both countries have a large arsenal of short, medium, and intermediate range ballistic missiles, which threaten US forces and its allies in the region, however, have yet to demonstrate an ICBM-class warhead.[45]

Under the above advancements and the 2009 Obama election in the US presidency, all concerns raised throughout 00’s both within the US and abroad, were set aside, as a short ‘Republican break’ in the BDM debate history. The Bush administration’s plans were scrapped and the idea of a regional BMD capability in Europe that could be surged on relatively short notice during crises or as the situation may demand, came into the frontline of the debate.  

                       IV.      The BMD Debate in 10’s

In September 2009 President Obama scrapped earlier plans for Poland and the Czech Republic and launched a new plan, which inaugurates a new era on the BMD debate, in 10’s. Under the new plan: “the United States would rather place ship-based SM-3s[46] in the North and Mediterranean seas in 2011, and mobile land-based SM-3s in Central Europe by 2015. In October 2009 US Vice-President Joseph Biden visited Romania, Poland, and the Czech Republic to promote the new plan. Warsaw and Prague have already expressed their support, but Romania is the first country to take what appears to be a formal commitment. The Romanian Supreme Defence Council’s decision thus marks a ‘first step’ in implementing the Obama administration’s revised missile defence plan to protect against short- and medium-range missiles that could be launched from Iran”.[47]

 The official Russian reaction, was welcomed the US BMD announcement, although never offered any major reciprocal concessions. In particular, the Russian President Dmitry Medvedev said that “Russian officials would now ‘be more attentive to’ US’s security concerns, but he insisted that Moscow would not engage in ‘primitive compromises or exchanges’. Russia’s envoy to NATO, Dmitry Rogozin, warned Russians against becoming ‘overwhelmed with some kind of childish euphoria’ following Obama’s announcement. Prime Minister Vladimir Putin said that he wanted to see if ‘this very right and brave decision will be followed by others’, implying that, when it comes to pressing the fabled ‘reset button’, Russian leaders expect most of the resetting to occur in Washington”.[48]

In the spirit of the latter comments, the homologation of the New START Treaty and Protocol -April 08, 2010- came as a response to Vladimir Putin’s concerns. The Treaty launches radical strategic offensive reductions that both countries will have to run, within seven years from the date the Treaty enters into force[49]. One of the most impressive points of the Treaty was the 74% reduction in warheads from START I, to 1,550 warheads for each side.[50] Beyond any doubt, the Treaty is a step forward to mutual trust, since its limitations on ICBMs, SLBMs, as well as their launchers is an answer to the perennial Russian and European fears, regarding the intentions of the US National Missile Defence system and its deployment in the European continent.

Nevertheless, the new phase of the current BMD debate is still in progress. The positive essence of the New START Treaty still flows in the atmosphere of debate and remains to see whether the US and Russia will continue the on site inspections[51], which have proved successful so far. Factors, such as technological advancements and threat level, were from the beginning and throughout the current debate decisive for its progress and they would continue to be in the future. Although, in our effort to underline the ‘driving factors’ of the debate, it would be of importance to understand the different political views (unilateral-multilateral point of view) between Republicans and Democrats in US, since from 90’s to 10’s, their succession in US office played a key role in the progress of the current debate.

                           V.      Conclusion   

Although the new debate on BMD has gone through radical changes since 90’s, it is important to underline the continuity of its driving factors. In fact, factors such as the different political views within the US and abroad, the advancements in ballistic missiles technology, the level of threat, the fear of action and counteraction, the public opinion, the financial cost and above all the willingness to apply the BMD -following either a multilateral or unilateral strategy- were always the same and decisive in each of the three presidencies.

The new US administration, as well as the Russian President Medvedev signing the New START Treaty confirmed their will to put the Russia-US relation in a new era of mutual trust and cooperation, ending the traditional Russian-American bras de fer. In that effort Europe appears united, setting scepticisms on the BMD aside. As long as, Iran and North Korea appear unwilling to comply with the international law, the BMD will always be in order, uniting the western community under the common threat.      

BY PANAGIOTIS I. PSYLLOS AND ELPINIKI KARAKOSTA

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[1] Kartha, Tara (2000) Ballistic missile defences: The debate in the United States, Strategic Analysis, UK: Routledge, Vol.24, Issue.1, P.65.

[2] Kimball, Daryl and Collina, Tom, The Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty at a Glance, Arms Control Association Website, Available at: http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/abmtreaty                 Accessed on: 2010-05-21.

[3] The ABM Treaty, May 26, 1972, US Department of State website, Available at: http://www.state.gov/t/vci/trty/101888.htm Accessed on: 2010-05-21.

[4] Kartha, Tara (2000) Ballistic missile defences: The debate in the United States, Strategic Analysis, UK: Routledge, Vol.24, Issue.1, P.86-7.

[5] Lewis N. George, Postoi E. Theodore and Pike, John, Why National Missile Defence Wont Work, Scientific American, August 1999, P. 36-42.

[6] Kartha, Tara (2000) Ballistic missile defences: The debate in the United States, Strategic Analysis, UK: Routledge, Vol.24, Issue.1, P.87.

[7] Text of letter from Senate majority leader Bob Dole (signed by eight Republican leaders) to President Bill Clinton, February 6, 1995, Comparative Strategy, Vol.14, Issue.3, July to September 1995, P.321.

[8] Text of letter from the office of Senate Majority Leader Bob Dole (signed by 13 Republican Senators) to President Clinton, March 8, 1995, Comparative Strategy, Vol.14, Issue.3, July to September 1995, P.321.

[9] Fact Sheet-Joint Statement Concerning the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, May 10, 1995, Available at: http://www.whitehouse.gov/                                    Accessed on: 2010-05-22.

[10] Defending America, The Heritage Foundation website, Available at: http://www.heritage.org/ Accessed on: 2010-05-22.

[11] Congressional Record, Introduction of Bills and Joint Resolutions, February 10, 1995, US Senate, P.S2494, Available at: http://www.senate.gov/legislative/common/briefing/leg_laws_acts.htm Accessed on: 2010-05-22.

[12] Congressional Record, Theatre Missile Act, April 6, 1995, US Senate, P.S5494, Available at: http://www.senate.gov/legislative/common/briefing/leg_laws_acts.htm Accessed on: 2010-05-22.

[13] Ibid.

[14] Prepared statement of Richard N. Cooper, chairman, National Intelligence Council, before the House National Security Committee, February 28, 1996, Assessments of the 1995 NIE, Central Intelligence Agency, Independent Panel Review of Emerging Missile Threats to North America during the Next 15 Years, OCA 96-1908, December 23, 1996, Available at: http://www.fas.org/irp/threat/missile/oca961908.htm Accessed on: 2010-05-22.

[15] National Intelligence Council, Foreign Missile Developments and the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States through 2015, September 1999, P.2, Available at: http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/nie/nie99msl.html Accessed on: 2010-05-22.

[16] Kartha, Tara (2000) Ballistic missile defences: The debate in the United States, Strategic Analysis, UK: Routledge, Vol.24, Issue.1, P.82.

[17] National Missile Defence Act of 1999, Public Law 106-38. Available at: http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nspd/nspd-23.htm Accessed on: 2010-05-22.

[18] Myers Lee, Steven, Bush Candidate for Defence Sees Immediate Bid to Raise Spending, New York Times, January 12, 2001, P.1.

[19] Speech by President George W. Bush at the National Defence University, Washington, May 1, 2001, Acronym Institute website, Available at: http://www.acronym.org.uk/bush1.htm                       Accessed on: 2010-05-22.   

[20] Bush announces US’s withdrawal from ABM Treaty, December 13, 2001, US Department of State website, Available at: http://usinfo.state.gov/topical/pol/arms/stories/01121302.htm                  Accessed on: 2010-05-22.   

[21] Details of these proposals are set out in Library Research Paper RP03/28, March 26, 2003, Ballistic Missile Defence, House of Commons Library website, Available at: http://www.parliament.uk/documents/commons/lib/research/rp2003/rp03-028.pdf                     Accessed on: 2010-05-22. 

[22] There are already a number of international treaties and instruments with jurisdiction over space activities, but they do not adequately cover the challenges posed by space-based weapons and missile defence. Though some prohibit or restrict the deployment of weapons or use of force in outer space, the provisions are limited in scope and coverage. None of the existing legal instruments unequivocally prevents the testing, deployment and use of weapons other than nuclear, chemical and biological, in outer space. Nor does any relevant legal instrument cover the use of force or threat of use of force against a country's assets in outer space. The placement of nuclear weapons in space is prohibited under the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, but nuclear-warheads on missile defence interceptors launched from the ground into space are not prohibited. See: Space Without Weapons, The Acronym Institute, Available at: http://www.acronym.org.uk/space/index.htm Accessed on: 2010-05-23.  

[23] The limitation of this type of system is that an interceptor missile requires great precision in order to be successful.

[24]All capabilities would be integrated by a command, control, battle management and communications network that would allow BMD sensors to share missile tracking data with any other system component.  

[25] Taylor, Claire and Jones, Stephen, (2008), Ballistic Missile Defense: Resent Developments, House of Commons Library, P.8-9.

[26] GAO, Report to Congressional Requesters, Ballistic Missile Defense: Actions Needed to Improve Planning and Information on Construction and Support Costs for the Proposed European Sites, US Government Accountability Office, P.9. GAO-09-771, (Washington DC: August 2009) 

[27] GAO, Defence Acquisitions: Production and Fielding of Missile Defence Components Continue with Less Testing and Validation Than Planned, GAO-09-338 (Washington DC: March 13, 2009).  

[28] GAO, Missile Defence: Actions Needed to Improve Planning and Cost Estimates for Long-Term Support of Ballistic Missile Defence, GAO-08-1068 (Washington DC: September 25, 2008).  

[29] Duncan Hunter National Defence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009, Pub. L. No.110-417, §233, October 14, 2008, Available at: http://www.dod.gov/dodgc/olc/docs/2009NDAA_PL110-417.pdf Accessed on: 2010-05-23.    

[30] Polish elections took place in October 2007.  

[31] The major sticking point in the negotiations was the question of U.S. assistance for Poland’s military ‘modernization’, mainly in the form of PAC-3 air defence. During President Tusk’s visit to Washington DC in March 2008, however, President Bush declared, “Before my watch is over we will have assessed [Poland’s] needs and come up with a modernization plan that’s concrete and tangible”. See: Bush, Poland’s Tusk Discuss Missile Shield Plans, Agence France Presse, March 10, 2008, Available at: http://afp.google.com/article/ALeqM5ijewlq0MyR6bdFVVVsPW9RqOGadg      Accessed on: 2010-05-23.

[32] According to an opinion poll conducted by GfK Polonia in August 2006 more than six in ten Poles were opposed to the establishment of a US missile defence base on Polish soil. In a separate poll conducted by SMG/KRC in February 2007 public opposition to the missile defence plans was 50%, while 36% of respondents supported the proposals. Six in ten Poles oppose US missile base in Poland, Survey, Agence France Presse, August 10, 2006, Available at: http://www.defencetalk.com/six-in-ten-poles-oppose-us-missile-base-in-poland-survey-7115/ Accessed on: 2010-05-23. Also: The poll, by GfK Polonia published in Rzeczpospolita in August 2008, suggested that 58% of those surveyed now supported the plans, while 37% opposed them, Polish support for missile deal soars, Topix, August 18, 2008, Available at: http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/26269478/ Accessed on: 2010-05-23.    

[33] US and Czechs Sign Missile Defence Deal, Reuters, July 8, 2008, The Epoch Times website, Available at: http://www.theepochtimes.com/news/8-7-8/73153.html Accessed on: 2010-05-23.    

[34] Podelco, Grant, Bush says missile defence plan aimed at true threats, not Russia, Radio Free Europe, June 5, 2007, Available at:  http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1076922.html                           Accessed on: 2010-05-23.  

[35] In an opinion poll conducted by Factum Invenio in September 2008 and reported in Mlada fronta Dnes, suggested Czech public opinion on the missile defence shield plans may be shifting after 38% of respondents agreed with the proposals, up 13 points from a previous poll in October 2007. The number of respondents opposed to the plans had also decreased from 68% to 55%. Czech opinion shifting on missile shield, Angus Reid Global Monitor, October 11, 2008, Available at: http://www.angus-reid.com/polls/view/31989/czech_opinion_shifting_on_missile_shield Accessed on: 2010-05-23.   

[36] Defending Europe from Missile Attack, European Security Review, Number 33, May 2007, Available at: http://www.isis-europe.org/pdf/2007_artrel_26_missiledefence.pdf

Accessed on: 2010-05-23.  

[37] Taylor, Claire and Jones, Stephen, (2008), Ballistic Missile Defense: Resent Developments, House of Commons Library, P.32-33.  

[38] Putin’s Prepared Remarks at 43^rd Munich Conference on Security Policy, Munich Conference on Security Policy, February 10, 2007, The Washington Post website, Available at: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/02/12/AR2007021200555.html   Accessed on: 2010-05-23. 

[39] Taylor, Claire and Jones, Stephen, (2008), Ballistic Missile Defense: Resent Developments, House of Commons Library, P.26.

[40] The 1987 INF Treaty is a landmark Cold War era agreement under which the US and the then Soviet Union eliminated all their nuclear-armed ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles with ranges of between 500 and 5,500 kilometres. US Department of State website, Available at: http://www.state.gov/www/global/arms/treaties/inf1.html Accessed on: 2010-05-23.

[41] Putin’s Prepared Remarks at 43^rd Munich Conference on Security Policy, Munich Conference on Security Policy, February 10, 2007, The Washington Post website, Available at: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/02/12/AR2007021200555.html   Accessed on: 2010-05-23. 

[42] Conference on Disarmament hears address by Foreign Minister of Russia and message from Chinese Minister for Foreign Affairs, United Nations Office in Geneva press release, February 12, 2008, Reaching Critical Will website, Available at:  http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/political/cd/press08/1session/Feb12.html Accessed on: 2010-05-22.

[43] Chinese Statements on NMD, Andrew Sessler et al., (2000), Countermeasures: A Technical Evaluation of the Operational Effectiveness of the Planned US National Missile Defence System, Cambridge, Massachusetts: Union of Concerned Scientists/MIT, P.111.

[44] Glaser L. Charles and Fetter Steve, National Missile Defence and the Future of US Nuclear Weapons Policy, International Security, Vol. 26, No. 1 (Summer 2001), The MIT Press Journals, P.82, Available at: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3092078 Accessed on: 2010-05-23.

[45] So far, only Russia and China have the capability to conduct a large-scale ballistic missile attack on the territory of the United States, but this is very unlikely and not the focus of U.S. BMD. As the President has made clear, both Russia and China are important partners for the future, and the United States seeks to continue building collaborative and cooperative relationships with them.

Ballistic Missile Defence Review Report, February 2010, US Department of Defence website, Available at: http://www.defense.gov/bmdr/docs/BMDR%20as%20of%2026JAN10%200630_for%20web.pdf Accessed on: 2010-05-23.

[46] The SM-3 (Standard Missile 3) is a derivative of the RIM-156 Standard SM-2ER Block IV missile, and is the missile component of the US Navy's forthcoming theater-wide ballistic missile defence system, called NTW-TBMD (Navy Theater Wide - Theater Ballistic Missile Defence). It is an upper-tier ballistic missile defence weapon, originally planned to complement the lower-tier SM-2ER Block IV A, but the latter has been cancelled in December 2001. See: Directory of the US Military Rockets and Missiles, RIM-161, Available at: http://www.designation-systems.net/dusrm/m-161.html Accessed on: 2010-05-23.  

[47] Bonsignore, Luca, Romania Accepts US Ballistic Missile Defense Basing Plans, Defpro.daily, February 9, 2010, Available at: http://www.defpro.com/daily/details/504/ Accessed on: 2010-05-23.  

[48] Weitz, Richard, Eurasian Implications of the New US Missile Defense Strategy, Central Asia-Caucasus Institute, September 30, 2009, Available at: http://www.cacianalyst.org/?q=node/5187 Accessed on: 2010-05-23.

[49] The NEW START TREATY ratified and entered into force by both on the 5^th February 2011. Exchange of  NEW START Instruments of Ratification, US DEPARTMENT OF STATE,  February 5, 2011. Available at: http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2011/02/156047.htm Accessed on: 2012-09-24.  

[50] Phillips, Macon, The New START Treaty at a Glance, in The New START Treaty and Protocol, The White House Blog, April 8, 2010, Available at: http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2010/04/08/new-start-treaty-and-protocol Accessed on: 2010-05-23.

[51] US – Russia Commission Discusses New START Implementation, RIA NOVOSTI Website, September 21, 2011, Available at: http://en.rian.ru/mlitary_news/20120922/176148510.html Accessed on: 2012-09-24.