The Sahel stretches from the Atlantic to the Red Sea, touching on 13 countries from Senegal to Eritrea. Turmoil is spreading across the region, putting European security interests at risk, yet Brussels is scrambling to respond. As the EU prepares for a new military mission to the Central African Republic (CAR), it should review its Sahel policy. The EU needs a more integrated approach to the broader Sahel if it is to deal with the humanitarian and security crises emanating from the region.
In 2013, the chaos in Mali revealed to Europeans that the Sahel, in spite of its geographic distance,was connected with the EU’s neighbourhood. France’s robust military intervention was followed by an EU training mission to help Mali’s armed forces, and eight member-states are contributing to a UN mission there. In spite of a successful presidential election, Mali’s problems remain: reconciliation between the northernTuareg groups and the government in Bamako is moving slowly, and as UN troops replace theFrench, militant groups threaten to return.
But Mali’s troubles are part of a broader pattern of volatility afflicting the Sahara and the Sahel. From the Mediterranean to the equator, states in northern and central Africa face lawlessness and conflict. The Sahel acts as the region’s transmission belt for instability, affecting the countries in and around it. Trafficking in arms, drugs, contraband and people is rife. In the north, the collapse of post-Gadhafi Libya has created a de facto division of the country; east Libya’s self-proclaimed ‘government of Cyrenaica’is blocking oil exports, starving Libya’s treasury and driving up oil prices. Its ungoverned southforms a refuge for militant Islamist groups. Northern Nigeria faces increasing sectarian tensions, triggered by the terrorist group Boko haram. In January, they killed 30 people in a bomb-attack in the country’s north-east. Nigeria’s violence regularly spills into Cameroon. Towards the east, the CAR is a new flashpoint. As
the crisis in South Sudan remains, it may affect its neighbours.
In the wake of Libya’s collapse and the chaos in Mali, Chad is emerging as one of the Sahel’s
kingmakers. In 2013, its government gave crucial military support to France in northern Mali. Butin the CAR, Chad backed the (Muslim) Seleka rebels who pushed out President François Bozizé,precipitating a conflict that now threatens to spin out of control. The UN has warned of genocide. At the crossroads between the Sahel, the Great Lakes and the horn of Africa – and rich in natural resources – the country could draw in other actors including militant Islamists or the Lord’s Resistance Army, a cult-like terrorist group. France has a large military presence in the region, including 1,600 troops in the CAR. Paris, however, says its forces are insufficient and is increasingly frustrated, perceiving itself as Europe’s only
fireman. In December, other leaders dismissed France’s proposal that they should support its intervention with EU funds. Despite initial reluctance, a humanitarian emergency has forced the EU to act. It is planning to send up to 600 troops to the capital Bangui. Deployed for six months, they will protect the city and its airport (where tens of thousands have sought refuge) and support humanitarian relief operations. France will provide the majority of the forces, along with Belgium, Greece, Estonia, Poland and possibly Sweden.
This limited mission alone will not solve the CAR’s problems, but it will make the EU somewhat
responsible for the country’s fate. It may also convince policy-makers that they should update
the EU’s approach to northern and central Africa. Despite having four other missions in northern Africa – in Mali, Niger, South Sudan and Libya – the EU does not have a coherent approach to promoting security in the broader Sahel-Sahara region. The EU’s ‘Sahel strategy’ focuses on only five countries; Mali, Niger, Mauritania, Burkina Faso and Chad. It does not take sufficient account of the importance of interaction between coastal Arab states of the Maghreb, the arid, landlocked interior and the borderlands of central Africa; and the way in which instability in one of these regions can destabilise the others.
A forthcoming update of the EU’s strategic framework will include Algeria and Morocco; two
states that are crucial to the region’s politics but whose mutual distrust is a complicating factor.
But Brussels must do more. Libya should be an integral part of the strategy, along with central
African countries. Nigeria should also feature: the EU agreed on a security dialogue with Abuja
in 2012, but no meetings have taken place.
A central problem is fragmentation in EU external policy structures. The broader Sahel-Sahara region is covered by multiple senior EU officials. The EU special representative for the Sahel focuses mostly on Mali and its neighbours; the Maghreb falls under the EU special representative for the southern Mediterranean; while Sudan, South Sudan and the CAR are covered by yet another EU special representative and a senior official for the Great Lakes. Besides, most of the resources the EU could use in the region are controlled by the Commissioner for Development, not the External Action Service. The High Representative Catherine Ashton, should take the lead to ensure efforts in the broader Sahel are better co-ordinated. The Sahel will produce more strategic surprises, so the EU should be prepared.
Written by Rem Korteweg
Senior Research Fellow, CER
sourche: http://www.cer.org.uk/sites/default/files/publications/attachments/pdf/2014/bulletin_94_rk_article3-8331.pdf
In 2013, the chaos in Mali revealed to Europeans that the Sahel, in spite of its geographic distance,was connected with the EU’s neighbourhood. France’s robust military intervention was followed by an EU training mission to help Mali’s armed forces, and eight member-states are contributing to a UN mission there. In spite of a successful presidential election, Mali’s problems remain: reconciliation between the northernTuareg groups and the government in Bamako is moving slowly, and as UN troops replace theFrench, militant groups threaten to return.
But Mali’s troubles are part of a broader pattern of volatility afflicting the Sahara and the Sahel. From the Mediterranean to the equator, states in northern and central Africa face lawlessness and conflict. The Sahel acts as the region’s transmission belt for instability, affecting the countries in and around it. Trafficking in arms, drugs, contraband and people is rife. In the north, the collapse of post-Gadhafi Libya has created a de facto division of the country; east Libya’s self-proclaimed ‘government of Cyrenaica’is blocking oil exports, starving Libya’s treasury and driving up oil prices. Its ungoverned southforms a refuge for militant Islamist groups. Northern Nigeria faces increasing sectarian tensions, triggered by the terrorist group Boko haram. In January, they killed 30 people in a bomb-attack in the country’s north-east. Nigeria’s violence regularly spills into Cameroon. Towards the east, the CAR is a new flashpoint. As
the crisis in South Sudan remains, it may affect its neighbours.
In the wake of Libya’s collapse and the chaos in Mali, Chad is emerging as one of the Sahel’s
kingmakers. In 2013, its government gave crucial military support to France in northern Mali. Butin the CAR, Chad backed the (Muslim) Seleka rebels who pushed out President François Bozizé,precipitating a conflict that now threatens to spin out of control. The UN has warned of genocide. At the crossroads between the Sahel, the Great Lakes and the horn of Africa – and rich in natural resources – the country could draw in other actors including militant Islamists or the Lord’s Resistance Army, a cult-like terrorist group. France has a large military presence in the region, including 1,600 troops in the CAR. Paris, however, says its forces are insufficient and is increasingly frustrated, perceiving itself as Europe’s only
fireman. In December, other leaders dismissed France’s proposal that they should support its intervention with EU funds. Despite initial reluctance, a humanitarian emergency has forced the EU to act. It is planning to send up to 600 troops to the capital Bangui. Deployed for six months, they will protect the city and its airport (where tens of thousands have sought refuge) and support humanitarian relief operations. France will provide the majority of the forces, along with Belgium, Greece, Estonia, Poland and possibly Sweden.
This limited mission alone will not solve the CAR’s problems, but it will make the EU somewhat
responsible for the country’s fate. It may also convince policy-makers that they should update
the EU’s approach to northern and central Africa. Despite having four other missions in northern Africa – in Mali, Niger, South Sudan and Libya – the EU does not have a coherent approach to promoting security in the broader Sahel-Sahara region. The EU’s ‘Sahel strategy’ focuses on only five countries; Mali, Niger, Mauritania, Burkina Faso and Chad. It does not take sufficient account of the importance of interaction between coastal Arab states of the Maghreb, the arid, landlocked interior and the borderlands of central Africa; and the way in which instability in one of these regions can destabilise the others.
A forthcoming update of the EU’s strategic framework will include Algeria and Morocco; two
states that are crucial to the region’s politics but whose mutual distrust is a complicating factor.
But Brussels must do more. Libya should be an integral part of the strategy, along with central
African countries. Nigeria should also feature: the EU agreed on a security dialogue with Abuja
in 2012, but no meetings have taken place.
A central problem is fragmentation in EU external policy structures. The broader Sahel-Sahara region is covered by multiple senior EU officials. The EU special representative for the Sahel focuses mostly on Mali and its neighbours; the Maghreb falls under the EU special representative for the southern Mediterranean; while Sudan, South Sudan and the CAR are covered by yet another EU special representative and a senior official for the Great Lakes. Besides, most of the resources the EU could use in the region are controlled by the Commissioner for Development, not the External Action Service. The High Representative Catherine Ashton, should take the lead to ensure efforts in the broader Sahel are better co-ordinated. The Sahel will produce more strategic surprises, so the EU should be prepared.
Written by Rem Korteweg
Senior Research Fellow, CER
sourche: http://www.cer.org.uk/sites/default/files/publications/attachments/pdf/2014/bulletin_94_rk_article3-8331.pdf
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