Obama has no choice but to punish Assad for using chemical weapons. The trick is to deal him a strong enough blow to deter further use of WMD, strong enough to also be felt in Tehran, but soft enough to keep Assad's regime intact.
A U.S. Air Force B-2 bomber readies for action. Obama has no choice but to punish Assad for using chemical weapons.
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Photo credit: AFP |
Something has to happen, because Syrian President Bashar Assad will not get away scot free this time. He has been fooling everyone and butchering for too long, enjoying an almost impossible combination of events and circumstances that has allowed him to bury more than 100,000 of his own people already (that's an average of more than 100 people per day!) and somehow remain in power. The weakness and indecisiveness displayed so far by the Obama administration, coupled with the U.S.'s growing conflict with Russia and the world's relative disinterest in Syria (which lacks any natural resources of any interest) have all made the Syrian president believe that he will get away with it, again. The world's fear that radical, uncontrollable groups will rise to power in Assad's stead, the ongoing conflict between Shiites and Sunnis -- and among the Shiites themselves, between the Muslim Brotherhood and Salafists -- and the other regional regimes' growing willingness to kill and die, all served to reinforce Assad's sense of security.
But as these things often do, something has gone terribly wrong. Assad, or, to be more precise, Assad's brother Maher (who oversees the main, reckless portion of the Syrian regime's efforts to brutally suppress the civil uprising), did exactly what he has already done several times before -- made use of chemical weapons. Just like in at least three previous instances, last week, Syria unleashed rockets carrying sarin gas into areas known to have high concentrations of rebels, this time in the eastern neighborhoods of Damascus. Sarin gas was selected because it is lethal, but also because it evaporates relatively quickly. The gas was even diluted before it was launched, to ensure that it would leave no trace.
But the combination of high humidity and unusual winds, coupled with the fact that Damascus is more accessible to media outlets and to the distribution of images and reports, ensured that this time the attack was impossible to conceal. Israeli experts were able to determine rather quickly and with a great degree of certainty that this was a case of chemical warfare. It is safe to assume that intelligence officials in other Western countries also arrived at the same conclusion, and for the first time since Obama adopted his famed "red line" for intervention in Syria, he had no choice but to take action.
The world means business
The disturbing question -- how is the use of chemical weapons any different than the mass murder of civilians that has been taking place in Syria so far -- has not been answered. The current shift bears testimony not only to the world's duplicity, but mainly to its inability to tell the simple truth: The gut tells us that Assad must go, but the head is afraid of the possible repercussions of Assad's demise.
This type of realpolitik, as unethical and enraging as it may be, makes it such that, according to all assessments in Israel, the U.S. and Britain (which has since decided not to partake in an attack) will most likely engage in an extremely limited action that may hurt Assad, but not topple his regime.
This joins U.S. President Barack Obama's inherent aversion to war in general. In his view, his legacy will be a civilian one (disarming the world of nuclear weapons and bestowing democracy upon the natives), not a military one. Another entanglement, especially in the Middle East, is out of the question, certainly as long as the American public continues to be wary (and justifiably so) of an involvement that could end up costing thousands of lives and trillions of American dollars that could plunge the U.S. economy into a new low, not to mention morale.
Therefore, the expectation is that the U.S. will choose a course of action that will punish Assad for using forbidden weapons, and deter him from using such means in the future, but will not unseat him. A kind of painful slap in the face (along with the confiscation of several of his favorite toys and a warning that next time he will be shipped off to boarding school) -- as though Assad were an unruly child -- while avoiding any sort of action that could actually fix the problem at the root.
It is within this framework that the Americans went searching for potential targets that would communicate a stern, but not quite lethal message. They considered chemical weapons plants and storehouses as well as the equipment used to launch these weapons; they considered the military units that were involved in last week's incident, and possibly government institutions. It is highly likely that Israeli officials were acquainted with the list; if not in the actual selection of the targets then at least in gathering the intelligence that shaped it. After all, the intelligence cooperation between Washington and Jerusalem is so close that it is almost impossible to imagine a scenario in which each side's cards are not almost entirely transparent to the other side.
Publicly, Moscow continues to back Damascus, and is even arming Assad at a faster pace while vetoing any U.N. Security Council resolutions against the Syrian regime; but has also evacuated some of its people from Syria.
The official Syrian line remains belligerent and threatening, but in actuality, it appears that Syria is hunkering down to accept the blow. Much like waiting for a hurricane, everyone has gone underground, boarding up structures and protecting doors and windows, hoping for clearer skies the morning after.
Nothing less than a knock out
Israel has been closely monitoring the developments -- internationally, regionally and internally within Syria -- while simultaneously stepping up the activity of all the intelligence sensors. As of Thursday morning, the defense establishment was of one mind, that Assad indeed plans to absorb the hit rather than spread it around and risk jeopardizing his continued reign. That is the reason that the top Israeli echelon sounds rather cool on the possibility that Israel will be attacked. "Have a glass of water," said one senior official when asked if there is any room for worry.
Despite these assessments, Israel has made sure to clearly, even explicitly inform the other side that any Syrian action against us will prompt a deadly Israeli response. When asked about the topic, one senior Israeli official said that this was done on the "off chance of less than a percent that Assad decides to go crazy." What are the actual chances that this will happen, we asked. The answer was that Assad is well aware of the balance of power. Just like us, he does not want a war.
The Syrian concern is clear: The Americans will hand them a painful slap, but Israel will not be satisfied with anything less than a knock out. Even if they manage to cause widespread destruction and loss of life for Israel, it is doubtful that Assad will live to enjoy this "achievement." In other words, in this instance, Assad is expected to employ the same logic that he used when he refrained from responding to the bombing of the nuclear reactor he had built, the assassinations of top Hezbollah commander Imad Mughniyeh and his close adviser General Mohammed Suleiman, and the multiple strikes that destroyed advanced weapons on Syrian soil over the last year (all attributed to Israel by foreign sources).
While the Syrian concern is clear, Israel's trepidation requires a bit of an explanation, certainly in light of its clear advantage. The reason is rooted in both sides of the cost/benefit equation. On the cost side, a war with Syria will inevitably involve a massive blow to the Israeli homefront (hundreds of missiles carrying large warheads, possibly even chemical warheads), resulting in many casualties. It could potentially be accompanied by attacks from Lebanon and Gaza, and could devolve into an Israeli-Arab war, forcing even the moderate states in the region to turn their backs on us. Assuming that such a war ends with a clear victory, and the Alawite clan is removed from power in Damascus, Israel will now face a new hostile regime, possibly even more extreme than its predecessor. Such a regime would undoubtedly warm itself under the glow of the only unifying light in the deeply divided Syria -- hatred of Israel.
Therefore, the current, familiar evil is better for Israel than the unknown. Publicly, the remarks are resolute, with Israel calling for the removal of the mass murderer from Damascus. But behind closed doors, in the conference rooms, the message is entirely different: The familiar Syria, deterred and vulnerable, is better for us than the unfamiliar and unexpected post-Assad Syria.
And still, there is always the chance that someone will make a miscalculation -- that at some point, someone will make a mistake that will set off a dangerous snowball effect. It could be a Syrian official (though that is highly unlikely), it could be another element loyal to the Syrian regime or to its Iranian patron -- like Hezbollah in Lebanon, or Islamic Jihad in Gaza -- ostensibly seeking to exact revenge in Syria's name, or still another, anarchist organization, like the same global jihad elements that have launched attacks against Israel from Sinai and Lebanon in recent weeks, taking advantage of the regional flare up to contribute their own match to the flame.
It is these possibilities that have prompted Israeli authorities to raise the alert levels and call up reserves units, at a small scale for now. The natural emphasis is currently on intelligence (gathering and research) and the air force (air defense units) alongside the homefront defense units. Despite the low probability of actual conflict, it is necessary to prepare, and some of these preparations are, by nature, known to the public. The inherent paradox is that such actions automatically set off an escalating domino effect: The public becomes concerned, directing its concerns at the leaders, who in turn increase the output of rhetoric directed at Damascus, which responds with its own rhetoric, which raises the chances that someone over there snaps, which raises our alert levels and preparations, which in turn raises public concern, and so on and so forth.
Therefore, it was decided in the countless cabinet meetings and security consultations that were held this week to focus all the efforts into a dual objective: deter and calm. Outwardly, project deterrence toward Syria and the other groups in the region to prevent them from doing anything brash, and inwardly, assuage the fears of the Israeli public. It is safe to assume that these fears will skyrocket as soon as the U.S. launches its assault, which will force the Israeli defense and diplomatic echelons to stress their calming message, and force the homefront to issue clear guidelines to the twice concerned citizen -- worried about the immediate day-to-day routine, but also worried about plans for the upcoming holidays.
The Russian and Iranian question
One can assume that Washington is aware of the Jewish calendar, and hopefully they will take the Jewish holidays into consideration and complete their attack before we dip our apples into honey. In any case, the Americans have their own reasons to abide by this tight timetable: On Wednesday, Obama is scheduled to travel to Sweden, and from there he heads to the Group of 20 summit in St. Petersburg. Obama, who is already at serious odds with Russian President Vladimir Putin over the asylum Russia extended to the wanted American leaker Edward Snowden, would probably prefer to avoid being on Russian soil while his country is attacking Syria. Most likely, Obama wants to arrive at the summit victorious, if only on points, after having sent a clear message to the world that despite all the ridicule and the doubts, he does abide by his own red lines after all.
Israel is hoping that this message will be received in Tehran as well. If an American attack manages to define the rules of what is and isn't allowed (or what kind of weapons are, and are not permissible), maybe the Iranian ayatollahs will draw their own conclusions regarding the Iranian nuclear program. Past experience teaches us that this hope is not very realistic, unless the American attack is so punishing and clear-cut that it leaves no doubt as to who is dictating the world order. Failing that, it will actually have the opposite effect: Iran will continue their quest and Syria will resume its mass murder, and sooner or later, go back to using chemical weapons. Then, the Americans will have to intervene again, this time with more force, and possibly even get dragged into the Middle East vortex against their will.
All these are speculations and analyses of future scenarios. In the meantime, we remain focused on the current round, which will be deemed a success -- speaking in purely selfish Israeli terms -- if Assad's strategic capabilities are targeted, and he understands the boundaries of what he can and cannot do in terms of unconventional weapons (without toppling his regime and thereby boosting extremist regional groups), and Israel is kept out of the picture. If all that happens, we can tell ourselves with satisfaction next Wednesday, on the eve of the Jewish new year, that despite all the threats and all the regional earthquakes, we managed to get through the year in peace.
BY Yoav Limor
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