The euro crisis reflects the failure of a
dead-end policy. The German government lacks the courage to move beyond
a status quo that has become untenable. This is why, despite extensive
rescue programs and countless crisis summits, the situation of the
eurozone has steadily deteriorated over the past two years. In the wake
of its economic crash, Greece faces the prospect of leaving the
eurozone, which would have incalculable knock-on effects for the other
member countries. Italy, Spain and Portugal are all in the grip of a
severe recession, which is driving up unemployment. The economic
downturn in these problem countries is making the fragile situation of
the banks even more precarious, and the growing uncertainty about the
future of monetary union is undermining the confidence of investors, who
are increasingly reluctant to buy bonds issued by the problem
countries. Rising interest rates for government bonds, coupled with the
steadily deteriorating economic situation, are hampering the processes
of consolidation – which were never going to be easy in the first place.
This self-reinforcing destabilization is largely the product of ad hoc
crisis management strategies, which have barely begun to address the
challenge of consolidating the European institutions. The fact that the
attempts to deal with the crisis over the years have been characterized
by a hand-to-mouth incrementalism that has only made things worse serves
to highlight the lack of political creativity.
However, the justification for taking a
major step forward on European integration does not derive solely from
the current eurozone crisis, but also from the need to curb the evil
practices of the shadowy parallel universe that the investment banks and
hedge funds have built up alongside the real economy of goods and
services. This requires our politicians to get a grip and take control
again. The measures needed to bring back proper regulation are obvious
enough. But they are not being applied, firstly because an
implementation of these measures at a national, state level would have
counterproductive consequences, and secondly because the regulatory
agenda that emerged from the first London G20 summit in 2008 would
require globally coordinated action, which for the present is rendered
impossible by the political fragmentation of the international
community.
A major economic power like the EU, or
failing that the eurozone, could become a standard-bearer for the way
forward here. Only a significant consolidation of European integration
can sustain a common currency without the need for a never-ending series
of bail-outs, which in the long term would strain the solidarity of the
European national populations in the eurozone on both sides – donor
countries and recipients – to breaking point. This means, however, that a
transfer of sovereignty to European institutions is unavoidable in
order to impose effective fiscal discipline and guarantee a stable
financial system. At the same time we need closer coordination of
financial, economic and social policies in the member countries, with
the aim of correcting the structural imbalances within the common
currency area.
The Current Problems
The escalation of the crisis shows that
the strategy previously pushed through by the German government in
Europe is based on a false diagnosis. The current crisis is not a crisis
of the euro. The euro has shown itself to be a stable currency. Nor is
the current crisis a debt crisis specific to Europe. Compared with the
USA and Japan, the EU – and within the EU the eurozone – has the lowest
level of debt of all three economic regions. The crisis is a crisis of
refinancing affecting individual countries within the eurozone, and is
primarily due to an inadequate institutional underpinning of the common
currency.
The deepening of the crisis makes it
clear that the solutions tried so far have all been found wanting. So
the fear is that monetary union in its present form cannot survive much
longer without a fundamental change of strategy. The starting point for a
change of direction in our thinking is a clear diagnosis of the causes
of the crisis. The German government seems to assume that the problems
have basically been caused by a lack of fiscal discipline at the
national level, and that the solution is primarily to be sought in a
rigorous policy of spending cuts by individual countries. At the
institutional level the Germans want this approach to be underpinned by
stricter fiscal rules in the first instance, supplemented by bailout
funds that are quantitatively limited and subject to conditions –
thereby forcing the countries concerned to adopt policies of extreme
austerity, which have weakened their economies and driven up
unemployment.
In actual fact the problem countries
have so far failed to limit their refinancing costs to a manageable
level, despite extensive structural reforms and a policy of spending
cuts that are unusually severe by international standards. The events of
the last few months point to one conclusion: that the German
government’s diagnosis and therapy have been too one-dimensional in
conception from the beginning. The crisis has not come about just
because individual countries have behaved badly, but is due in large
measure to systemic problems. These cannot be solved by greater efforts
at the national level; they require a systemic answer.
The current instability of the financial
markets is driven by the risk that an individual country might become
insolvent, and that risk can only be eliminated, or at least limited, by
collective guarantees for government bonds issued within the eurozone.
There are concerns that this could create disincentives, and these
should be taken very seriously. The only way to allay these concerns is
to ensure that collective guarantees are combined with strict collective
control over national budgets. This means, however, that the degree of
fiscal control necessary to underpin collective guarantees is no longer
achievable within the context of national sovereignty via contractually
agreed rules.
The Alternative Options
There are only two coherent strategies
for dealing with the current crisis: a return to national currencies
across the EU, which would expose each individual country to the
unpredictable fluctuations of highly speculative foreign exchange
markets, or the institutional underpinning of a collective fiscal,
economic and social policy within the eurozone, with the further aim of
restoring to policy-makers their lost capacity for action in the face of
market imperatives at a transnational level. And looking beyond the
current crisis, the promise of a “social Europe” also depends upon this.
Only a politically united core Europe offers any hope of reversing the
process – already far advanced – of transforming a citizens’ democracy
built on the idea of the social state into a sham democracy governed by
market principles. For this reason alone – because it leads on to this
broader perspective – the second option deserves preference over the
first.
If we wish to avoid both a return to
monetary nationalism and a permanent euro crisis, then we need to do now
what we failed to do at the time of the euro’s launch: we need to begin
the process of moving towards political union, beginning with the core
Europe of the 17 EMU member countries.
We believe that we should be entirely
open about this process. It is simply not possible to retain the common
currency without also espousing the idea of collective responsibility
and redressing the institutional deficit in the eurozone. The proposal
by the Council of Economic Experts to set up a collective debt
redemption fund has been rejected by the German government, but its
appeal lies precisely in the fact that it puts an end to the illusion of
continuing national sovereignty by openly establishing the principle of
collective responsibility. It would, however, make more sense to
mutualize eurozone debt within the Maastricht criteria – so up to the 60
% threshold, rather than above that level.
As long as European governments fail to
state clearly what they are really doing, they will continue to
undermine the already weak democratic foundations of the European Union.
The battle cry of the American War of Independence – “No taxation
without representation” – has a new and unexpected resonance today: once
we create scope in the eurozone for policies that result in
redistributive effects across national boundaries, European legislators
who represent the people (directly through the European Parliament and
indirectly through the Council) must be able to decide and vote on these
policies. Otherwise we would be violating the principle that the
legislator who decides how public money is to be spent is one and the
same as the democratically elected legislator who raises taxes to fund
this spending.
No Political Communitarization through the Back Door
Nevertheless the historical memory of a
unification of the German Reich that was forced upon many parts of the
country for dynastic reasons should serve as a warning to us. The
financial markets must not now be pandered to with complicated and
untransparent structures, while governments meekly accept the imposition
on their peoples of a centralized executive power that takes on a life
of its own above their heads. Before it comes to that, the people
themselves must have their say. As the representative of the biggest
donor country in the European Council, the Federal Republic should take
the initiative and table a resolution for summoning a constitutional
convention. This is the only way to bridge the unavoidable time gap
between the immediate economic measures that are due to be put in place,
but which can still be revoked in the meantime, and the retrospective
legitimation that may be required. If the results of the referenda are
positive, the peoples of Europe could regain, at a European level, the
sovereignty that was stolen from them by “the markets” a long time ago.
The strategy of treaty change is
designed to bring about the establishment of a politically unified core
European currency area, which other EU countries – in particular Poland –
would be allowed to join. This calls for clear thinking about the
political make-up of a supra-national democracy that would allow
collective government without assuming the form of a federal state. The
European federal state is the wrong model, demanding more solidarity
than the historically autonomous European nations are willing to
contemplate. The consolidation of the institutions that is now required
could be guided by the principle that a democratic core Europe should
represent the totality of citizens from the EMU member states, but each
individual citizen in his or her twin capacity as a directly participating citizen of the reformed Union on the one hand, and an indirectly participating member of one of the participating European nations on the other.
It is not out of the question that the
Federal Constitutional Court will seize the initiative from the
political parties and announce a plebiscite to amend the constitution.
That would mean that the parties could no longer avoid taking a position
on the choice of options that has been kept in the dark until now. A
joint initiative backed by the SPD, CDU and Greens to set up a
constitutional convention, the results of which could be voted on at the
same time as the plebiscite on the constitution (but not before the end
of the next parliamentary term), would not then be an unrealistic
prospect. This would be the first time that Germany has conducted a
public debate of this kind, in which opinions are formed and decisions
taken about the different political options for Europe’s future: and we
believe there is a good chance that in the course of this debate an
alliance of political parties would be able to persuade a majority of
the electorate of the advantages of a political union.
A broad Public Debate is needed
The four-year crisis has brought all
kinds of issues to the fore and focused the attention of national
publics on European questions as never before. One result has been the
awakening of an awareness of the need to regulate the financial markets
and correct the structural imbalances within the eurozone. For the first
time in the history of capitalism a crisis triggered by the most
advanced sector, the banks, could only be resolved by governments
getting their citizens, in their capacity as taxpayers, to stump up for
the losses incurred. At this point a barrier between systemic processes
and real-life processes was broken down. The citizens are rightly
outraged. The widespread feeling of injustice derives from the fact that
faceless market processes have assumed a directly political dimension
in the popular perception. This feeling is combined with a sense of
rage, suppressed or otherwise, at one’s own impotence. To counteract
this we need a new politics of self-empowerment.
A discussion about the purpose and aim
of the unification process would present an opportunity to broaden the
focus of public debate, which has hitherto been confined to economic
issues. The awareness that global political power is shifting from the
West to the East, and the sense that our relationship with the USA is
changing, combine to present the synergetic benefits of European
unification in a new light. In the postcolonial world the role of Europe
has changed, and not just with reference to the dubious reputation of
former imperial powers, to say nothing of the Holocaust. Future
projections backed by statistical data indicate that Europe is headed
for further change, destined to become a continent of shrinking
population numbers, declining economic importance and dwindling
political significance. The peoples of Europe must learn that they can
only preserve their welfare-state model of society and the diversity of
their nation-state cultures by joining forces and working together. They
must pool their resources – if they want to exert any kind of influence
on the international political agenda and the solution of global
problems. To abandon European unification now would be to quit the world
stage for good.
A German version of this column appeared in the FAZ. Translated by Allan Blunden.
http://www.social-europe.eu/2012/08/the-case-for-a-change-of-course-in-european-policy/?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+social-europe%2FwmyH+%28Social+Europe+Journal%29
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