Παρ’ όλο που η Διζωνική, Δικοινοτική Ομοσπονδία (ΔΔΟ) αποτελεί όντως ένα ιδιόμορφο πολιτειακό μοντέλο ομοσπονδιακού χαρακτήρα καθώς δεν συναντάται ούτε στο Συνταγματικό Δίκαιο ούτε στην Επιστήμη της Πολιτειολογίας, ως μορφή δημοκρατίας φέρει όλα εκείνα τα χαρακτηριστικά που την εδράζουν στο «συναινετικό μοντέλο» (consociational model). Επιπλέον, φέρει όλα τα γνωρίσματα που την κατηγοριοποιούν στην θεσμική ρύθμιση και το ομοσπονδιακό είδος της «εθνo-ομοσπονδίας» (ethnofederalism). Συνεπώς, παρ'όλο που η ΔΔΟ –σε περίπτωση εφαρμογής της- θα καταστεί ένα ιδιότυπο sui generis πολιτειακό σχήμα, σαν πολιτική διευθέτηση θα ενέχει συγκεκριμένη συνταγματική αφετηρία αλλά και δοσμένο θεωρητικό πολιτειακό πλαίσιο.
Τετάρτη, 30 Δεκεμβρίου 2015
In a new CER policy brief, 'The EU Energy Union: More than the sum of its parts?' Dieter Helm
looks at how an Energy Union built around EU-wide gas and electricity networks will help
produce cheaper, greener and more secure energy for Europe
Alongside the Strategic Defence and Security Review, UK airstrikes in Syria may be a signal of renewed British involvement in international affairs – but the continued risk of Brexit hangs over the country’s relations with its allies.
Τετάρτη, 16 Δεκεμβρίου 2015
There will be no agreement on David Cameron’s reform plans at the European Council summit on December 17th-18th. But Donald Tusk, president of the European Council, will try to help Cameron bridge the gap between the UK and other member-states, possibly setting the stage for a final deal in February.
Παρασκευή, 11 Δεκεμβρίου 2015
Image by European External Action Service
The participation of Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad-Zarif in the Vienna talks in October is a reluctant US-Saudi recognition of Iran’s importance in any future roadmap for the Syrian crisis. Since the Islamic revolution of 1979, and especially after the outbreak of popular protests in the Arab world, the two regional powers along the Persian Gulf have been jostling for influence and domination in Bahrain, Yemen and, above all, Syria. The move also signals a belated Saudi-Western recognition of the Iranian role and influence in resolving the four-year old crisis. With over 200,000 deaths the crisis has emerged as the witnessed the largest destruction and human suffering since the Iran-Iraq war.
There isn’t one war, the West versus Isis. Not even after last month’s terrorist attacks in Paris. There are layers of Middle Eastern conflicts, all linked to international intervention, of which the most intractable are heightened by the Sunni-Shia divide.
The Iranian revolution of 1979 established the world’s first officially Islamic regime, but being exclusively Shia, it resurrected memories of the age-old conflict between Sunni and Shia. On coming to power, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini demanded that the Muslim holy sites of Mecca and Medina be managed collectively. In Saudi Arabia this demand was seen as an intolerable challenge. (A young Sunni jihadist, Khaled Kelkal, involved in bombings in France in 1995, said he thought “Shiism was invented by the Jews to divide Islam” (1).) Violence against Shia by Saudi Wahhabis is nothing new: in 1802 the sack of Karbala (now in Iraq) led to the destruction of Shia shrines and tombs including that of the Prophet’s son-in-law Hussein, and the killing of many of the city’s inhabitants.
Τετάρτη, 9 Δεκεμβρίου 2015
Δευτέρα, 7 Δεκεμβρίου 2015
EU foreign policy co-operation gives the UK a chance to persuade 27 other countries to support British aims – but Britain’s success depends on the UK showing more interest.
Since the Maastricht Treaty established the European Union’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) in 1992, successive British governments have seen CFSP as an important tool to achieve national foreign policy goals. Were they right, or would Britain’s foreign policy be more effective outside the EU? One way to judge is to compare some of the priority objectives of the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) with the EU’s foreign policy goals, for example on Iran, Russia, Somalia and international organisations.
In the wake of the Paris attacks and the renewed threat to Europe’s security, Camino Mortera-Martinez highlights a difficult trade-off for the EU: how to tackle cross-border crime without invading citizens’ right to privacy.
In a new policy brief: "Big data, Big Brother? How to secure Europeans’ safety and privacy", Mortera-Martinez urges the EU to:
Τετάρτη, 2 Δεκεμβρίου 2015
“I can still see it very clearly, I have not forgotten,” says Títos Patríkios. “The Athens police firing on the crowd from the roof of the parliament in Syntagma Square. The young men and women lying in pools of blood, everyone rushing down the stairs in total shock, total panic.”
And then came the defining moment: the recklessness of youth, the passion of belief in a justice burning bright: “I jumped up on the fountain in the middle of the square, the one that is still there, and I began to shout: “Comrades, don’t disperse! Victory will be ours! Don’t leave. The time has come. We will win!”
Τρίτη, 1 Δεκεμβρίου 2015
If the UK quits the EU, it will be because British politicians have pandered to anti-immigrant sentiment rather than addressing the supply-side failures that drive it.
If Britain votes to leave the EU it will be because of hostility to immigration. It will not be because of the threat of eurozone caucusing, the role of national parliaments vis-a-vis the European Parliament, regulatory threats to the City of London or concerns over the competitiveness of the EU economy. Disillusionment with the EU has risen in the UK because membership has become synonymous in many voters’ minds with uncontrolled immigration. Why has immigration, in particular EU immigration, become so toxic an issue in the UK that it could cost the country its membership of the Union?