Whenever a Japanese coast guard patrol close to the Senkaku Islands scans the horizon these days, Chinese ships are likely to appear in the lens. Virtually every day for the past two weeks Beijing has sent maritime surveillance vessels into waters close to the disputed archipelago. A very public exercise in displaying its fury over Japan’s move to nationalise some of the islands, which Tokyo controls but Beijing also claims sovereignty over.
A Japanese coastguard vessel shadows a Chinese patrol ship near the disputed Senkaku islands
On Tuesday Japan’s defence ministry said seven Chinese warships were sailing in waters close to Okinawa, not far from the disputed archipelago.
This dangerous game of cat and mouse is the latest example of China’s bickering with other nations near and far. It is a state of affairs that illustrates that the new leaders of the Communist party who take power after its congress in November will inherit a country ill at ease with its place in the world.
Earlier this year, Beijing was in a stand-off with the Philippines over Scarborough Shoal, a spit of sand in the South China Sea, and before that with Vietnam and the Philippines over fishing and drilling rights in those disputed waters.
Beijing is at odds with Washington as well. Xi Jinping, the vice-president who is widely expected to take over as party chief and state president after Hu Jintao steps down, warned the US in September to keep out of the Japan dispute.
More than 20 years ago, Deng Xiaoping, the architect of China’s market reforms, advised: “Hide your brightness, bide your time”. The economic miracle sparked by his reforms has helped transform the country into a global power, a role in frequent collision with Mr Deng’s maxim.
“We are the 800-pound gorilla in the room,” says Zhu Feng, a security and international relations expert at Peking University. “China needs to undergo a process to change and deal with that. We are learning to be a great power.”
China’s size, growing influence and military power have raised fear and suspicion among its neighbours. The expression of nationalist sentiment and expansionist views domestically has fed such fears and undermined Beijing’s official assurances that its rise will not pose a threat to anyone.
The disconnect between official rhetoric and more hostile comments often found in state media – an editorial in the Global Times in July questioned Japanese sovereignty over the prefecture of Okinawa – has led many foreign observers to suspect a split between a “moderate” civilian leadership and more “hawkish” military.
However, there is little evidence for that.
“Even within an organisation generally seen as possessing ‘hardline’ preferences, such as the [People’s Liberation Army], different points of view can be identified,” says Taylor Fravel, an expert on Chinese foreign policy and security at MIT. “Whether one is a hawk or not might depend on the specific issue at stake. I see very little difference between the preferences of civilian and military leaders on sovereignty disputes, as this is an issue over which there is broad agreement at a strategic level.”
But the ruling Communist party has yet to come up with a doctrine to replace Mr Deng’s formula.
“There is a debate at the top,” says June Teufel Dreyer, a professor at the University of Miami. “Some leaders, typically in the more developed coastal provinces, argue that China must assert its interests in a more straightforward way, for example to get its hands on the resources it needs to power its economy. Others say the country must continue to give priority to domestic development and solving internal social challenges.”
Analysts say whatever Mr Xi’s personal preferences, he will have to balance all interests carefully and drastic change in China’s foreign policy is therefore unlikely.
“China’s response to the incident at Scarborough Shoal and over the Senkaku / Diaoyu Islands suggests an enhanced ability to co-ordinate the now numerous actors in executing China’s foreign policy,” says Mr Fravel. “This suggests that China has enhanced the capacity of the state to support its foreign policy goals when compared with say 10 or 20 years ago.”
Still, the party is searching for better ways to explain those goals to the outside world.
One idea floated in the run-up to the party congress is for Li Keqiang, expected to succeed Wen Jiabao as premier, to take on responsibility for the South China Sea issue.
Leaders are also discussing a proposal to create a new vice-premier post in charge of foreign policy. Senior party members said Wang Huning, a 57-year-old law and international relations expert who has lived in the US, is seen as a candidate. So far, the foreign policy portfolio is not represented on the politburo, the 25-member body whose standing committee represents the pinnacle of China’s political power. A senior party member said the latest proposal would elevate foreign policy to the politburo level and “give it the weight it deserves in our current situation”.
By Kathrin Hille
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