Left and right wing terrorism in Italy in the 1970’s: Lessons for Greece.

Italy for almost 15 years faced the menace of both far-right and far-left terrorism. From the late 1960’s to the early 1980’s the lethal face of terrorism brought chaos to the Italian state and intimidated society. To speak of what the 1970s represented in Italy’s political history is probably to speak of the present in Greece; the political situation that preceded those years in Italy bears resemblance to the situation that Greece faces today.

In the late 1960’s Italy faced the rise of extreme right terrorism due to a perceived threat of the rising Italian Communists. The terrorist acts were so horrific that they claimed lives of hundred of innocent civilians to promote panic. Massacres of grand scale were preferred by the extreme right to exploit the climate of chaos and political confusion in order to stage a coup and establish a fascist state. This is the notorious “strategy of tension”. At some point they blamed the left for these acts in an effort to swift public opinion and support.

The most horrible act was the bombing on 2 August 1980 at the train station in Boglona. It was the period of the year that families were going on vacation and so the train was packed with them. The roof fell onto a waiting room leading to the death of 84 and injury of 200.

On the other hand, in the early 1970’s the leftist terrorism rose partly in opposition to the right terrorism. The left wing radicals exploited the general sense of dissatisfaction after the end of “the Italian economic miracle” and escalated a robust social reaction to the economic crisis into a violent social conflict. The primary goal was the creation of a revolutionary state through struggle.

It is true that left acts were mostly symbolic and low in physical injury. They mostly used the media to challenge the readiness of the Italian state. However, the vast number of violent incidents occurring repeatedly for at least seven years on the roll bereft the left extremists from the widespread support that they enjoyed at first. Indicatively, in 1977 alone 2400 acts of violence occurred. The group's most infamous act was the kidnapping of the former Christian Democrat Prime Minister Aldo Moro, who was trying to reach a "historic compromise" with the Communists. The kidnappers after 54 days killed Moro. 

The Social Political and Economic Background

Needless to say the Italian political world was not innocent. The Italian Social Movement (ISM) was a neo-fascist party, which made it to the parliament for the most period of the post-war era. A party that condemned the democratic system and constitution was the fourth most powerful party in the parliament for the whole 15 years of terrorism, even though there were accusations that ties between MSI and radical groups existed. Thus, the right wing Christian Democratic Party (DC) (the leading party of the post war period) exploited the dynamics of MSI, so that the exclusion of the Italian Communist Party (PCI) from the government could be guaranteed. Practically, the DC was sympathetic and soft with MSI because MSI in the 1960’s was the sole backer of the DC government.  In parallel, DC implied links between terrorists and the communists and socialists.   

In a similar pattern, the left wing found far right terrorism to be politically in its favour. They either blamed the right for tolerating right wing terrorism or talked directly about state sponsored violence. Both of the two adversaries deeply influenced by the Cold War environment, were caught in a spiral of antagonism that favoured the polarization of the Italian political life. This opposition formed a political culture that cultivated radical expectations and in some sense boosted extremism. Most importantly, the trap was that they both failed to realize the threat to security by radicalism and perceived terrorists’ intentions as unserious.

A famous saying is that “Italian politics are cursed for endless combinations between politicians”. Indeed, for over thirty years there were almost 37 political coalitions. Unfortunately, it was the kind of coalitions that produced weak governments because of the lack of a cooperative political culture. Every entity prioritized their short-sighted interests. Most obviously, the political system was fairly unstable and therefore unable to absorb the violent labyrinth.  

The massive help from abroad, the Marshal Plan, and the modernization of the production base skyrocketed the Italian economy to the most rapidly European growing economy between 1950 to 1963. The Italian “economic miracle” fuelled people expectations and made them optimistic for the future. However, the major financial world crises of the 1970’s interrupted this pace and highlighted the pathologies of the growing economy. Inflation was sharp, unemployment was high, taxation was intolerable and the country enters recession two times during the 1970’s.

Revenue inequality between North and South as well as the primitive economic infrastructure and the delayed economic unification simply added oil to the fire. What also happened was that the Press was littered with scandals associating the politicians to the corrupt part of the intelligence and business world.

The societal indignation took many forms; demonstrations, strikes, sabotage even criminal activities. Indeed, the support from the political system to radical expectations and extremism was a boomerang. The healthy social movements were dragged into violence and extremism. The gap between society’s expectations and gratification also justified and legitimized violence in the eyes of the Italian society. 

It was only reasonable that the widespread 1968 student revolt influenced Italy too. The Italian students’ activism challenged the archaic educational system and awakened the workers. It is not by chance that Renato Curio, the founder of the Red Brigades, started as a member of radical organizations that comprised both militant workers and militant leaders.

Then again, during this period there were many states that shared similar social characteristics withItaly but they did not dissent to violence. It seems most likely that the twenty years that had passed after the defeat of fascism were not enough to ingrain the democratic values to the Italian society.Italy’s political culture revealed propensity to polarization and extremism.   

It was not until the political system decided to take a responsible turn that the Italian society realized the utopia of extremism on both sides. The “historic compromise” of PCI and DC was able to absorb the consequences of the social transformation. DC dismissed the ankylosis of the Cold War politics and PCI abandoned the rhetoric for struggle and revolution. Both of them were progressively forming and alliance to combat extremism while committing themselves to the initiation of emergency measures such as more supervision of the security and intelligence services, special prisons and special courts. It is worth remembering that the defeat of terrorism was both political and “military”.

Lessons for Greece

The 1970’s are still with us in Greece this time. The disintegration of the political system after the economic crisis left a power vacuum that was partly filled in by a neo-fascist electoral party the Golden Dawn (GD). Even though there is significant indication that GD is a crime organization almost ten percent of Greek people admit their support to the party. On the other hand, Greek intelligence services admit that there are also left radical organizations that seem to be responsible for violent incidents that have been occurring around the country since the burst of the crisis.

Most disappointing is the fact that the two biggest electoral parties (SYRIZA and Nea Dimokratia) are dragging themselves into a vicious cycle of accusations against one another for sympathy to radical organizations. What they have not realized yet is that their mania with gaining short-lived impressions and short-sighted political gains polarizes further Greek society and mutes the voices for moderation.

The economic crisis is being painfully felt by the Greeks as Greece enters its sixth year of recession. Unemployment has escalated to almost thirty percent, the wages are in free-fall, the social safety net is shattered and the social fabric is falling apart. The non-progressive unbearable levels of taxation has fuelled Greek society with feelings of injustice and revenge while numerous corruption scandals involving the political system has siphoned off moderation from a big proportion of Greek society. Certainly, the painstaking consequences of chronic illegal immigration have offered a scapegoat to the radical right and an outlet to the vindictive feelings of an oppressed part of the society.

Yesterday two young members of the Golden Dawn were shoot to death, some weeks before there was the first murder of a Greek civilian by a member of the Golden Dawn and some months before five immigrants have lost their lives during racist episodes. Well, all the components are there; the players too. What is worth asking is whether Greece will find itself trapped in a spiral of violence like Italy was in the 1970’s.  

It can not go unnoticed that the social and psychological traumas of recession are similar between the two periods. In both cases, the “brutality” of citizen’s poverization made its mark to the political scene; it opened a breach to the system of power and revealed that “the emperor had no cloths on”. As in the case of Italy in Greece the growing political polarization distorts reality and disorientates society away from the solution of moderation and political “refinement” through democracy.

Of course, there are differences between the two cases that allow for glimpses of hope that Greececan take a different turn. The absence of Cold War politics is a significant factor that implies that parliamentary parties could reach the desirable “historic compromise” soon enough to avoid a dissent to violence. As for the political culture, almost forty years (a generation) has passed from the Greek junta allowing for the new generations to embrace democratic principles.  Thus, an important accelerator (for the better or the worse) is how the situation in Greek economy will unfold.

Nobody knows what the future will bring, what is necessary though is for all parts to realize that political and strategic illusions is their basic enemy. 

 by Elpiniki Karakosta