When Jean-Claude Juncker became European Commission president he pledged to do his
best to restore citizens’ trust in the European project. Juncker thinks that improving the
Commission’s standing in the EU is pivotal to delivering on this promise. In his first hundred
days in office he has taken three important steps to strengthen the Commission’s hand but he
still has to prove that he can avoid repeating the mistakes of his predecessor, José Manuel
Barroso.
Juncker did not have an easy start in Brussels. He took over the Commission’s reins when
public trust in the EU was plummeting and support for eurosceptic parties was on the rise. The
Commission’s institutional power was also in decline. During the financial and euro crises,
despite the Commission’s monopoly on proposing EU laws, the European Council became
the primary forum for EU decision-making in the area of economic governance. The
Commission was left to rubber-stamp the decisions of EU leaders and turn them into EU
legislation.
While failing to provide leadership in responding to the economic crisis, the Commission
attempted to expand its responsibilities in other policy areas (often described by British
officials as ‘competence creep’). This has irritated quite a few member-states. Poland, though
strongly pro-European, has for example felt uneasy with the idea of the Commission using
strict environmental rules to limit shale gas exploitation.
Juncker wants to transform the Commission’s unfavourable image through three steps: setting
the EU agenda rather than letting others do it for him; doing a few key things well, rather than
doing a lot of things badly; and reconnecting the Commission to the citizens of Europe.
Juncker’s first step was to reassert the Commission’s power to set the EU agenda. He knew it
would be a tall order: he became Commission president through the new Spitzenkandidaten
process, whereby the candidate nominated by the largest party group in the European
Parliament becomes Commission president. This process helped the Parliament strengthen
its political control over the Commission and its president. But Juncker, though perceived by
many as a staunch supporter of European integration, wants the Commission to be more
equidistant between the European Parliament and EU capitals. He hopes that First Vice-
President Frans Timmermans, who as Dutch foreign minister called for a better balance of
power between member-states, the Commission and the European Parliament, will help him
to achieve this objective.
Timmermans has so far tried to practise what he preaches. He presented the major objectives
of the Commission’s action plan for 2015 both to MEPs and to the Council of Ministers before
it was published, but he did not allow either side to fiddle with the content. In a letter to the
president of the Parliament and to the Italian presidency, he also declared a willingness to co-
operate more systematically with both EU ministers and MEPs over subsequent Commission
action plans. He suggested that all three institutions jointly identify strategic EU priorities for
each new legislative cycle (so called multiannual programming). The Commission would
provide more information on its intended actions but in return, Timmermans would like both the
Council and the European Parliament to fast-track key Commission legislative initiatives. This
approach is a welcome departure from the second Barroso Commission. In 2010 it concluded
an agreement with the Parliament which significantly enhanced MEPs’ influence on the
Commission’s daily business, including its work programme. This came at the expense of the
role of member-states, which were not a party to it.
Getting both MEPs and ministers around the same table to discuss the Commission’s future
plans will not be easy. Member-states would like to enter into tripartite co-operation but the
European Parliament will not like sharing hard-won powers. Timmermans should try to
convince MEPs that greater Council engagement also helps them: when EU governments
considered legislative proposals in the Council, it would be hard for them to backtrack on
commitments previously made to the Commission and MEPs.
Greater collaboration on the Commission’s multiannual work programme could also speed up
the adoption of EU laws. Although the European Parliament and the Council of Ministers have
tried to shorten the process, it still takes them on average 19 months to reach consensus on a
piece of EU legislation. They should prioritise speedier agreement on legislation which would
help the EU economy recover.
Timmermans should, however, ensure that fast-tracking key proposals does not compromise
the quality or transparency of EU law-making. Today, the Commission conducts impact
assessments to evaluate how planned legislation will affect citizens, the economy and the
environment before deciding whether to make a proposal. In negotiations on the initial draft,
member-states and MEPs often introduce substantial changes. Under time pressure, the
Council and Parliament may not always consider how changes may affect the regulatory
burden on citizens and industry. Additional impact assessments of these amendments, an
idea supported by Timmermans, could help to deliver Juncker’s promise to cut red tape in the
EU.
Juncker’s second step was to challenge the Commission’s reputation for producing
unnecessary laws. In December 2014 he presented a lean but concrete action plan for the year
to come. To the relief of many European capitals, it consisted of only 23 proposals, including
Juncker’s flagship projects like the European Fund for Strategic Investments, which aims to
deliver up to €315 billion in public and private investment in Europe. By contrast, the Barroso
Commission tabled around 130 proposals per annum in its last five years.
Juncker decided to copy the practice in member-states, whereby a newly elected government
can drop the unfinished business of its predecessor. This was a first test of the effectiveness of
the new college structure. Timmermans, who co-ordinated preparation of the work programme,
urged other vice-presidents to ditch any of Barroso’s proposals which did not coincide with
Juncker’s priorities. The new college reviewed around 450 pending proposals and set out a
list of 80 to be scrapped, or withdrawn and then resubmitted in a modified form.
Juncker’s approach deserves some credit. The Commission is right to drop proposals which
do not contribute to boosting growth, jobs and investment. The European Commission
decided, for example, to withdraw a proposal on the tax treatment of motor vehicles belonging
to EU migrants who change their residence permanently, tabled in 1998 and stuck ever since.
The Commission should instead focus on more pressing dossiers like the digital single market
package, designed to ease access to cross-border digital services.
But Timmermans included among the 80 proposals to be withdrawn some on which member-
states and MEPs have only recently started working. For example, he decided to ditch the so-
called ‘circular economy package’, which aims to encourage recycling and efficient use of
resources. He promised to come up with new, “more ambitious” proposals. Timmermans may
thereby have pleased business representatives, who complained that the package hindered
competitiveness, but he has annoyed MEPs and environment ministers. They are worried that
the Commission’s better regulation agenda boils down to deregulation, and that environment
and climate protection aims will become victims of Timmermans’ crusade to cut red tape.
But member-states and the European Parliament also fear that Timmermans may have just set
a dangerous precedent: if an incoming Commission asserted the right to drop any unfinished
legislation inherited from its predecessor, regardless of what stage it had reached, it would
effectively gain a right to veto legislative negotiations. Timmermans should table new
proposals on recycling and resource efficiency as soon as possible. If he can reconcile the
divergent interests of business and environmentalists, he will give more substance to his
‘better regulation’ portfolio.
Juncker’s third and perhaps most important step was to challenge EU citizens’ preconceptions
about the Commission. His other steps will mean little if the institution he runs does not restore
its standing in the eyes of the public. EU citizens are more openly contesting the new powers
given to the Commission by member-states, including the right to review the draft budgets of
eurozone countries. Anti-establishment movements are gaining popularity by promising to
block the ‘diktats of Brussels’. The recent electoral victory of the left-wing Syriza party in
Greece could fuel similar movements across Europe.
Juncker hopes that making the Commission less technocratic and more political in the way it
acts will help him improve the Commission’s image. He wants his commissioners to stand up
to EU leaders, who under pressure from Eurosceptic voices at home, criticise EU decisions to
which they had previously agreed. One of the first manifestations of this approach was
Timmermans’ announcement of a new partnership with national parliaments. National
parliamentarians have often complained that their concerns about unnecessary laws fall on
deaf ears in Brussels. When in 2013, 14 parliamentary chambers raised a ‘yellow card’ to
object to the proposed creation of a European Public Prosecutor’s Office, the Barroso
Commission did not discuss parliamentarians’ concerns about the proposal and pushed
ahead with legislation. Timmermans has urged his fellow commissioners to engage more
actively in debate with national MPs. This would mean listening to parliaments’ doubts about
Commission proposals and taking on board constructive ideas on how to improve EU action.
Commissioners should also visit the parliaments of eurozone countries to discuss the
Commission’s opinions on draft national budgets. After all, it is up to parliamentarians whether
they take the Commission’s suggestions on board when they adopt the budgets.
Juncker also hopes that more direct interaction between his college and the press will narrow
the gap between Brussels and EU citizens. He has therefore put communication policy under
his direct supervision and reduced the number of spokespersons, who will now have
responsibility for briefing on the Commission’s policies rather than speaking on behalf of
individual commissioners. In Barroso’s time, it looked as if spokespersons represented
individual commissioners rather than the institution as a whole, and when commissioners
disagreed, the result was confusion. Juncker wants his Commission to speak in public with
one voice. He also believes that since the commissioners are “the best advocates of
Commission policies”, they should talk more often to the media themselves.
Building a more ‘political’ Commission may at times be difficult to reconcile with the
Commission’s responsibility to represent the general interest of the European Union. Given
growing tensions between creditor and debtor countries on how the eurozone should be
governed, the Juncker college should make every effort to strike the right balance between the
interests of different member-states. The determination of Greece’s Syriza-led government to
walk away from previous agreements, and the equal insistence of Germany and its northern
allies that Greece should stick to its obligations, will make it hard for the Commission to find
common ground. If Juncker can help to reconcile feuding EU members-states without leaning
towards any of them, he will have taken an important step towards restoring the Commission’s
credibility in the eyes of all EU citizens.
Written by Agata Gostyńska
Agata Gostyńska is a research fellow at the Centre for European Reform.
sourche: http://www.cer.org.uk/insights/junckers-three-steps-improve-commissions-standing-eu?utm_source=All+website+signups+as+of+21+March+2014&utm_campaign=20e5877a7f-insight_GM_crops&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_c3be79867d-20e5877a7f-301763949
best to restore citizens’ trust in the European project. Juncker thinks that improving the
Commission’s standing in the EU is pivotal to delivering on this promise. In his first hundred
days in office he has taken three important steps to strengthen the Commission’s hand but he
still has to prove that he can avoid repeating the mistakes of his predecessor, José Manuel
Barroso.
Juncker did not have an easy start in Brussels. He took over the Commission’s reins when
public trust in the EU was plummeting and support for eurosceptic parties was on the rise. The
Commission’s institutional power was also in decline. During the financial and euro crises,
despite the Commission’s monopoly on proposing EU laws, the European Council became
the primary forum for EU decision-making in the area of economic governance. The
Commission was left to rubber-stamp the decisions of EU leaders and turn them into EU
legislation.
While failing to provide leadership in responding to the economic crisis, the Commission
attempted to expand its responsibilities in other policy areas (often described by British
officials as ‘competence creep’). This has irritated quite a few member-states. Poland, though
strongly pro-European, has for example felt uneasy with the idea of the Commission using
strict environmental rules to limit shale gas exploitation.
Juncker wants to transform the Commission’s unfavourable image through three steps: setting
the EU agenda rather than letting others do it for him; doing a few key things well, rather than
doing a lot of things badly; and reconnecting the Commission to the citizens of Europe.
Juncker’s first step was to reassert the Commission’s power to set the EU agenda. He knew it
would be a tall order: he became Commission president through the new Spitzenkandidaten
process, whereby the candidate nominated by the largest party group in the European
Parliament becomes Commission president. This process helped the Parliament strengthen
its political control over the Commission and its president. But Juncker, though perceived by
many as a staunch supporter of European integration, wants the Commission to be more
equidistant between the European Parliament and EU capitals. He hopes that First Vice-
President Frans Timmermans, who as Dutch foreign minister called for a better balance of
power between member-states, the Commission and the European Parliament, will help him
to achieve this objective.
Timmermans has so far tried to practise what he preaches. He presented the major objectives
of the Commission’s action plan for 2015 both to MEPs and to the Council of Ministers before
it was published, but he did not allow either side to fiddle with the content. In a letter to the
president of the Parliament and to the Italian presidency, he also declared a willingness to co-
operate more systematically with both EU ministers and MEPs over subsequent Commission
action plans. He suggested that all three institutions jointly identify strategic EU priorities for
each new legislative cycle (so called multiannual programming). The Commission would
provide more information on its intended actions but in return, Timmermans would like both the
Council and the European Parliament to fast-track key Commission legislative initiatives. This
approach is a welcome departure from the second Barroso Commission. In 2010 it concluded
an agreement with the Parliament which significantly enhanced MEPs’ influence on the
Commission’s daily business, including its work programme. This came at the expense of the
role of member-states, which were not a party to it.
Getting both MEPs and ministers around the same table to discuss the Commission’s future
plans will not be easy. Member-states would like to enter into tripartite co-operation but the
European Parliament will not like sharing hard-won powers. Timmermans should try to
convince MEPs that greater Council engagement also helps them: when EU governments
considered legislative proposals in the Council, it would be hard for them to backtrack on
commitments previously made to the Commission and MEPs.
Greater collaboration on the Commission’s multiannual work programme could also speed up
the adoption of EU laws. Although the European Parliament and the Council of Ministers have
tried to shorten the process, it still takes them on average 19 months to reach consensus on a
piece of EU legislation. They should prioritise speedier agreement on legislation which would
help the EU economy recover.
Timmermans should, however, ensure that fast-tracking key proposals does not compromise
the quality or transparency of EU law-making. Today, the Commission conducts impact
assessments to evaluate how planned legislation will affect citizens, the economy and the
environment before deciding whether to make a proposal. In negotiations on the initial draft,
member-states and MEPs often introduce substantial changes. Under time pressure, the
Council and Parliament may not always consider how changes may affect the regulatory
burden on citizens and industry. Additional impact assessments of these amendments, an
idea supported by Timmermans, could help to deliver Juncker’s promise to cut red tape in the
EU.
Juncker’s second step was to challenge the Commission’s reputation for producing
unnecessary laws. In December 2014 he presented a lean but concrete action plan for the year
to come. To the relief of many European capitals, it consisted of only 23 proposals, including
Juncker’s flagship projects like the European Fund for Strategic Investments, which aims to
deliver up to €315 billion in public and private investment in Europe. By contrast, the Barroso
Commission tabled around 130 proposals per annum in its last five years.
Juncker decided to copy the practice in member-states, whereby a newly elected government
can drop the unfinished business of its predecessor. This was a first test of the effectiveness of
the new college structure. Timmermans, who co-ordinated preparation of the work programme,
urged other vice-presidents to ditch any of Barroso’s proposals which did not coincide with
Juncker’s priorities. The new college reviewed around 450 pending proposals and set out a
list of 80 to be scrapped, or withdrawn and then resubmitted in a modified form.
Juncker’s approach deserves some credit. The Commission is right to drop proposals which
do not contribute to boosting growth, jobs and investment. The European Commission
decided, for example, to withdraw a proposal on the tax treatment of motor vehicles belonging
to EU migrants who change their residence permanently, tabled in 1998 and stuck ever since.
The Commission should instead focus on more pressing dossiers like the digital single market
package, designed to ease access to cross-border digital services.
But Timmermans included among the 80 proposals to be withdrawn some on which member-
states and MEPs have only recently started working. For example, he decided to ditch the so-
called ‘circular economy package’, which aims to encourage recycling and efficient use of
resources. He promised to come up with new, “more ambitious” proposals. Timmermans may
thereby have pleased business representatives, who complained that the package hindered
competitiveness, but he has annoyed MEPs and environment ministers. They are worried that
the Commission’s better regulation agenda boils down to deregulation, and that environment
and climate protection aims will become victims of Timmermans’ crusade to cut red tape.
But member-states and the European Parliament also fear that Timmermans may have just set
a dangerous precedent: if an incoming Commission asserted the right to drop any unfinished
legislation inherited from its predecessor, regardless of what stage it had reached, it would
effectively gain a right to veto legislative negotiations. Timmermans should table new
proposals on recycling and resource efficiency as soon as possible. If he can reconcile the
divergent interests of business and environmentalists, he will give more substance to his
‘better regulation’ portfolio.
Juncker’s third and perhaps most important step was to challenge EU citizens’ preconceptions
about the Commission. His other steps will mean little if the institution he runs does not restore
its standing in the eyes of the public. EU citizens are more openly contesting the new powers
given to the Commission by member-states, including the right to review the draft budgets of
eurozone countries. Anti-establishment movements are gaining popularity by promising to
block the ‘diktats of Brussels’. The recent electoral victory of the left-wing Syriza party in
Greece could fuel similar movements across Europe.
Juncker hopes that making the Commission less technocratic and more political in the way it
acts will help him improve the Commission’s image. He wants his commissioners to stand up
to EU leaders, who under pressure from Eurosceptic voices at home, criticise EU decisions to
which they had previously agreed. One of the first manifestations of this approach was
Timmermans’ announcement of a new partnership with national parliaments. National
parliamentarians have often complained that their concerns about unnecessary laws fall on
deaf ears in Brussels. When in 2013, 14 parliamentary chambers raised a ‘yellow card’ to
object to the proposed creation of a European Public Prosecutor’s Office, the Barroso
Commission did not discuss parliamentarians’ concerns about the proposal and pushed
ahead with legislation. Timmermans has urged his fellow commissioners to engage more
actively in debate with national MPs. This would mean listening to parliaments’ doubts about
Commission proposals and taking on board constructive ideas on how to improve EU action.
Commissioners should also visit the parliaments of eurozone countries to discuss the
Commission’s opinions on draft national budgets. After all, it is up to parliamentarians whether
they take the Commission’s suggestions on board when they adopt the budgets.
Juncker also hopes that more direct interaction between his college and the press will narrow
the gap between Brussels and EU citizens. He has therefore put communication policy under
his direct supervision and reduced the number of spokespersons, who will now have
responsibility for briefing on the Commission’s policies rather than speaking on behalf of
individual commissioners. In Barroso’s time, it looked as if spokespersons represented
individual commissioners rather than the institution as a whole, and when commissioners
disagreed, the result was confusion. Juncker wants his Commission to speak in public with
one voice. He also believes that since the commissioners are “the best advocates of
Commission policies”, they should talk more often to the media themselves.
Building a more ‘political’ Commission may at times be difficult to reconcile with the
Commission’s responsibility to represent the general interest of the European Union. Given
growing tensions between creditor and debtor countries on how the eurozone should be
governed, the Juncker college should make every effort to strike the right balance between the
interests of different member-states. The determination of Greece’s Syriza-led government to
walk away from previous agreements, and the equal insistence of Germany and its northern
allies that Greece should stick to its obligations, will make it hard for the Commission to find
common ground. If Juncker can help to reconcile feuding EU members-states without leaning
towards any of them, he will have taken an important step towards restoring the Commission’s
credibility in the eyes of all EU citizens.
Written by Agata Gostyńska
Agata Gostyńska is a research fellow at the Centre for European Reform.
sourche: http://www.cer.org.uk/insights/junckers-three-steps-improve-commissions-standing-eu?utm_source=All+website+signups+as+of+21+March+2014&utm_campaign=20e5877a7f-insight_GM_crops&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_c3be79867d-20e5877a7f-301763949
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