Arab Islamists and the Turkish model

It has become quite fashionable these days to be cynical about the prospects of democracy in the Arab world.

Many international observers argue that the Arab Spring has turned into an Islamist winter. They focus on the violent clashes in the streets of Tunis and Cairo, the frustration about unmet expectations of more jobs and especially the authoritarian practices of the ruling Islamists. Others, like former German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer, mainly look at the current human catastrophe in Syria and claim that the bright hope of a new Middle East has vanished. In the same article, Fischer also lists the rise to power of Islamist forces in Tunisia and Egypt as one of the negative developments that have made him pessimistic about the immediate future of the region. I guess Fischer, generally speaking a well-informed and nuanced analyst, did not read a recent article on the website of the leading US magazine Foreign Affairs in which several academics make the convincing claim that Islamists are not the obstacle in the democratization of Tunisia and Egypt but the lack of strong institutions is. The article is based on surveys among thousands of Tunisians and Egyptians conducted at the end of last year. The results indicate why Islamist parties did well in the last elections (ideological affinity coupled with effective campaigning) but also debunk the myth that Tunisia has fared better than Egypt after the uprisings because Tunisians are less religious than Egyptians. According to the researchers, “It is not religiosity but the relative strength of state institutions that accounts for post-Arab Spring differences between Tunisia and Egypt.” Compared to Tunisia, most of Egypt’s institutions are weak and have been routinely undermined by entrenched interests. Examples mentioned are the Egyptian army and its huge role as an economic actor and the constant interventions of the judiciary, characterized by the authors as “divisive and destabilizing.” Their conclusion: “Egyptian democracy is undermined by the inability of institutions to address citizen’s demands and the impulse of powerful actors to interfere, not by the divide between Islamists and secularists. … The fundamentals of democracy, which the United States and other outside powers must support, are institutions, rule of law, economic growth and the constraint of undemocratic players. The factor that most distinguishes Tunisia from Egypt is not the prevalence of moderate Tunisians versus radical Egyptians but, rather, the differences in institutional capacities.” Last year, right after the election victories of Al-Nahda in Tunisia and the Freedom and Justice Party (FJP) in Egypt, there was a lively debate on the question as to whether Turkey or the Justice and Development Party (AKP) could be considered as some sort of model for these new ruling parties. Apart from its booming economy, the existence of strong institutions and the coexistence of a secular state and a majority Muslim society, seemed to make Turkey an attractive point of reference. Since then, that discussion has died down because the new rulers have others things on their mind and skeptics have dismissed the usefulness of such modeling. Last week, Ahmet Kuru, a visiting fellow at the Brookings Doha Center, made an effort to revitalize the argument by publishing a paper under the title “Muslim Politics without an ‘Islamic’ State.” In his reasoning Kuru builds on the difference between “assertive secularism,” the form of secularism we know from France and Kemalist Turkey, and “passive secularism,” practiced in countries like the US, the Netherlands and Senegal. Kuru has written a lot about this distinction in the past and now tries to show that the fact the AKP is actively promoting a new version of passive secularism in Turkey, makes the party extremely interesting for Arab Islamists. According to Kuru, the pragmatic AKP approach, favoring a secular state, could bring important dividends for moderate Arab parties as well. It would distinguish them from radical Salafis on the one hand and allow them to strengthen elected institutions on the other. Let’s hope Tunis and Cairo keep following developments in Turkey closely, and most importantly, Ankara remains on the right track. more at http://www.todayszaman.com/columnistDetail_getNewsById.action?newsId=308582