Old Powers Re-emerging in the Wider Black Sea

Dr. Marat Terterov

 

The current outlook and the changing dynamics of the Wider Black Sea security.

The Black Sea is located between Europe to the West, the former-Soviet Union territories and Asia Minor to the North and South respectively, and the Caucasus to the East. Referred to as Pontus Euxinus in antiquity, the Black Sea has played an important economic and political role in the wider-region within which it is located. Its geopolitical importance has survived, losing none of its significance during our present time. According to some, it is still, just as in the Nineteenth Century, the door to the heartland of Eurasia, the domination of which has eternally played a role in the struggle for global hegemony.

Developments over the last decades have dramatically reshaped the strategic landscape of the Wider Black Sea (WBS) area against older regional historical patterns. These include not only the end of the Cold War, in which the WBS region was at the forefront, but also the processes of globalization and European integration, which are collectively driving the region into a wave of major economic, political, and strategic changes. Furthermore, the accession of Bulgaria and Romania to NATO and the European Union (EU) have also had a major impact on the regional power structure.

Experts have noted the rise of the region's "old powers", Russia and Turkey, while arguing that prominent “external actors”, namely the United States and the EU, are seeing their roles increasingly reduced to mere monitors of the situation, in spite of investing limited resources in support of their regional interests. While it can be argued that Russia and Turkey have for centuries served as the “gatekeepers” of power-politics in the WBS, their newfound zest for asserting their power in the region and beyond – particularly in the last decade or so – has resulted in medium-sized littoral countries, such as Bulgaria, Romania and Ukraine, having to re-consider their options in the new geopolitical environment. These trends go further down the power-chain, with smaller local regional actors including Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Moldova, which are all directly involved in the “frozen conflicts”, re-balancing their policies against those of the key regional actors, with a view to placing themselves in tune with any potential wave of geopolitical change in the highly fluid and dynamic regional environment.

Regionalism in the Wider Black Sea (WBS) has been hampered by the lack of consensus over its geographical definition, as well as by political, security, economic, and cultural differences among regional states, which undermined the development of a regional identity. The lack of regional strategic leadership was also obvious and it has been related to a large extent to the current shifts in the global and regional patterns of power.

In addition, just like other parts of Eurasia2, the WBS is facing the spectrum of a renewed East-West geopolitical competition underpinned by three evolving challenges: 1) a growing ideological gap between Russia and the West; 2) the chronic persistence of the protracted conflicts in the South Caucasus and in Moldova- Transnistria; 3) the dilemma of post-Soviet states: European vs. Eurasian integration. Moreover, the neighbouring Middle East is simmering. Basically, all regional actors have the potential to spark or to be dragged into a new war in the Middle East whose spill over effects may swiftly encroach the WBS.

In a region where – due to its strategic significance – a comprehensive regional dialogue and cooperation between all local and external actor-stakeholders is now arguably more necessary than ever, tacit (and occasionally belligerent) powerpolitik appears to be winning the order of the day.

The WBS region is at a turning point: is it to remain a closed Nineteenth Century type of regional space dominated by the two "old powers re-emerging" which would make and enforce arbitrary political and security arrangements? Or will it move into the Twenty First Century by opening itself up to free trade, the knowledge revolution and democratic development? Against this complex and deeply worrying regional background, could the EU, Turkey and Russia share rather than compete for power in the WBS? How would such an EU-Turkey-Russia power sharing likely impact on the evolving challenges in Eurasia?

Bridging the Ideological Gap between Russia and the West

The aftermath of what most international observers deemed as flawed Russian parliamentary elections at the end of 2011 has deepened the gap between the West and Russia in sustaining the Euro-Atlantic values, in particular democracy, individual rights and freedoms. According to the "Freedom in the World 2013" report, recently published by the Freedom House, "Russia took a decided turn for the worse after Vladimir Putin's return to the presidency. Having already marginalized the formal political opposition, he pushed through a series of laws meant to squelch a burgeoning societal opposition". Under his lead, Moscow would have imposed measures severing new penalties on unauthorised political demonstrations, it would have restricted the ability of NGO's to raise funds and conduct their work, and it would have placed new controls on the internet. For example, the US Agency for International Development (USAID) was forced out of Russia while the ability of foreign broadcasters to reach Russian audiences was seriously hampered. Moreover, in retaliation to the so called Magnitsky Act, passed by the US Congress, which imposed visa and asset restrictions on Russian human rights abusers, Moscow banned the adoption of Russian orphans by families from the United States.

Not only had Russia gone in the wrong direction in terms of sustaining the values of democracy and individual rights and freedoms, but it would have also projected a negative influence beyond its borders within the post-Soviet republics: "With Russia setting the tone, Eurasia (consisting of the countries of the former Soviet Union minus the Baltic states) now rivals the Middle East as one of the most repressive areas on the globe. Indeed, Eurasia is in many respects the world's least free sub-region, given the entrenchment of autocrats in most of its 12 countries."

Russia and the West seem to be readying to embark on another ideological competition similar in many respects with that during the Cold War. The difference is that Moscow is now supporting a sort of a mixture of state-based nationalism and autocratic traditionalism to counter Western support for democracy and individual freedoms across Eurasia. Others bluntly call the current Russian dominant ideology as anti-Americanism.

Whatever its roots and motivations, "the clash between the Russian oligarchic model of economic and political control and a Western-style democratic system produces structural instability in the Eastern part of Europe, which may prove a strategic challenge for the EU and the transatlantic security system."5 Although the author of this statement was specifically referring to Bulgaria, a similar judgment may be applicable to each and every post-Soviet state, as well as to Eurasia as a whole, given the common heritage of political culture within the former communist bloc.

In a certain way, Turkey is sharing a somewhat comparable situation with Russia regarding the compatibility of its (Islamic) values with the European democratic values. While the early 2000s provided hopes for the supporters of democracy, and individual rights and freedoms in Turkey, tightly linked to the strong drive towards Europeanization, recent years have seen a reversal of that trend. "Turkey has experienced marked deterioration on some central pillars supporting a balance of power, such as the media and the judiciary." The Turkish commitment to democratic principles and to European integration has significantly declined among most of the political forces, as well as in the public opinion. Moreover, it has become increasingly clear that Turkish leaders do not consider themselves as Western, neither in terms of managing domestic affairs, nor on foreign policy matters. But the huge distinction between Moscow's and Ankara's attitudes against the West is that while Moscow pursues almost every time conflicting positions against the West, Ankara proved itself more pragmatic: in contrast to Russia, Turkey is "a power with which the West can work. [...] [although] whenever Turkey and the West do cooperate, it will be because their interests happen to align rather than as a result of shared values".

Consequently, while separate EU-Turkey and Turkey-Russia power sharing built upon targeted cooperation opportunities may work, on a case by case basis, the EU-Turkey-Russia power sharing will never work as long as the EU and Russia remain at odds on ideological matters, specifically against sustaining democracy, and the individual rights and freedoms. Conversely, in case the political will to share power in the WBS in a EU- Turkey-Russia format would prevail, the growing ideological gap between Russia and the West might be gradually bridged by pragmatic ways to harmonize European and Russian political and human values. A comparative study of the Russian, and European (EU) models of governance, respectively, might facilitate identifying elements of convergence and ways to downscale the possible elements of divergence between the two governance models. Turkish experience in harmonizing European and Islamic identities in its own governance system might be an inspiring case study in that regard.

"OLD POWERS RE-EMERGING IN THE WIDER BLACK SEA: SECURITY AND REGION-BUILDING STRATEGIES IN EUROPE’S EASTERN NEIGHBORHOOD"

 THE EUROPEAN GEOPOLITICAL FORUM
BRUSSELS, WWW.GPF-EUROPE.COM
EGF Research Paper

Dr. Marat Terterov, Director, The European Geopolitical Forum;
Mr. George Vlad Niculescu, Head of Research, The European Geopolitical Forum;
Director of Programs, Centre for East European and Asian Studies
Brussels, April 2013

http://gpf-europe.com/upload/iblock/c4a/old_powers_re-emerging_final.pdf