By David Marsh, MarketWatch
LONDON (MarketWatch) — A central bank’s ability to intimidate the
financial markets through active, targeted intervention is directly
proportional to its ability to deliver on promised action.
Exactly as in the Cold War.
Imagine if Harry S. Truman, Dwight D. Eisenhower or John F. Kennedy
threatened the Soviet Union with nuclear retaliation in the event of
intrusion on NATO territory. The next day, the president is called to
order by his defense secretary who says deploying nuclear weapons is
illegal. The deterrent would lose all credibility. Very likely, West
Germany would have been overrun in the 1950s or 1960s by the Red Army.
We see certain parallels here with the European Central Bank. In the
battle over the euro, Europe is far from speaking with one voice. The
ECB Governing Council may decide in coming weeks, by majority vote, to
purchase large quantities of government bonds issued by troubled euro
states. This requires that Spain or Italy request an official European
rescue program and agree to additional reforms and savings.
As soon as the bond purchases are announced, Jens Weidmann, the
Bundesbank president, could announce that he disagrees with the
conditionality, the volume and the principle of the purchase program.
The Bundesbank may of course go along with the action, out of “European
solidarity”, but this would be under sufferance, and the German central
bank would reserves the right permanently to pass critical comments.
At home and abroad, there would be a negative political reaction. The
result: reduced effectiveness, higher risk, lower confidence. Just the
opposite of what the ECB had in mind. Probably, the mere threat that the
Bundesbank might act in this way would be enough to stop the program
occurring.
Europe's week ahead: Carrefour, Jackson Hole
The annual economic symposium at Jackson Hole takes place in the coming week where Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke and ECB President Mario Draghi will speak. Investors will also be looking out for earnings results for retailers Carrefour and Hermes. Sara Sjolin and Nina Bains report.
This may be what Weidmann has in mind. Why else would he give an
interview with the German news magazine Der Spiegel published Monday —
its cover story titled “The Revolt of the Bundesbank” – in which he
intensifies confrontation with ECB President Mario Draghi and the ECB
Council.
Weidmann seems to have come to the conclusion that the polarization of
the dispute in the last few weeks leaves him with no other choice but to
go on the offensive and appeal to German and international public
opinion (and the financial markets) over the head of the Governing
Council. We are now in uncharted territory. Neither during the time when
the Bundesbank was running the D-Mark (and Europe), nor since the euro
was formed, have we been in a situation like this before.
In his Der Spiegel interview, Weidmann re-emphasizes a Big No to ECB
bond purchases. “Such a policy is, for me, practically the same as state
financing through the printing press. In a democracy, such a
far-reaching mutualization of risks should be decided by parliaments and
not by central banks … We should not understate the danger that central
bank financing can lead to dependency like a drug.”
He also says the planned conditionality for the bond program actually
puts independence at risk, since it creates “agreed actions between the
state-owned rescue funds and the central banks… This gives rise to a
link between fiscal and monetary policy.” There is a Weidmannesque Catch
22 here — ECB bond purchases with conditionality are ruled out because
they infringe independence; without conditionality, they are ruled out
on the grounds of moral hazard.
All this is topical because of the celebrated July 26 “do what it takes
to preserve the euro” speech by ECB President Mario Draghi. It is
acknowledged at the highest level that Draghi would have been more
accurate had he said the ECB would do what it takes so long as others
did what it takes. But this would have sounded a lot weaker. It would
have introduced a note of bargaining in interactions with governments
that the ECB (like Weidmann) wishes to avoid. The Draghi speech that has
caused so much fuss was not scripted but contains key words and phrases
that had all been used before.
Erroneous belief on financial markets that the speech represented a
concrete plan has been fed further by rumors that central bankers are
examining upholding ”ceilings” for yields of countries like Spain and
Italy.
This is despite opposition from within the ECB (not just from Germany)
on the grounds that “target zones” in the fixed-income market are even
more complicated and dangerous than for exchange rates. Press leaks over
bond market ceilings may have been launched by opponents of the scheme
who are seeking to bury it under subsequent denials.
For all its plurality and diversity of opinion, in the field of
geopolitics, the U.S. during the years of superpower confrontation would
never have caused such confusion.
In monetary policy in a much smaller nation like Switzerland, where the
National Bank since September 2011 has been running its own campaign,
using “unlimited” intervention, against the overvaluation of the Swiss
franc, there is a relatively strong consensus in favor of these
measures.
The U.S. and Switzerland are intact countries with intact constitutions.
Europe is not an intact unit. This explains why the ECB should be
acting with assurance and sovereignty — and why it cannot. Weidmann’s
weekend interview is actually helpful because it shows the limits of
what the ECB can really do.
David Marsh is chairman of the Official Monetary and Financial Institutions Forum
http://www.marketwatch.com/story/internal-discord-leaves-ecbs-threats-toothless-2012-08-27?link=sfmw
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