Not many years ago in autumn of 2003 “a mere chemistry academy student in Moscow
managed to design a home-made bomb and to plant it in the heart of Moscow, just
a quarter mile away from the Kremlin. He claimed to be connected to radical
neo-bolsheviks, which he hardly was”.[1]
Nevertheless, an academic carrier is not necessary to manufacture a
chemical weapon. In the age of globalization where the access to knowledge is
just a web surfing, internet can provide any information. Anyone of us with
access to knowledge of chemicals or randomly could mix readily available
household products to create relatively dangerous concoctions.[2]
Beyond any doubt we live in a globalized environment,
where cooperation among states and people from every corner of this world is at
the forefront, establishing organizations such as the UN, singing treaties such
as the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and creating terrorist networks such
as Al Qaeda. The question is: bearing in mind the above do we stand a chance to
put an end in the proliferation and production of chemical weapons? Isolating
chemical weapons characteristics from Bailey’s speech: easy, inexpensive,
effective and difficult to detect, the issue of proliferation becomes dubious.
How close we are in a world without chemical weapons, taking into consideration
the forthcoming scientific and technological advancements in their production,
detection, decontamination and destruction?
The aim of this assignment is to examine the
current global chemical weapons regime and any issues surrounding it, such as
terrorism, so as to predict its future status quo. In order to successfully
accomplish this aim, the paper will first try to give an overview of what is a
chemical weapon, and thereafter to present its global legal status (CWC)
alongside with its drawbacks (issues of chemical stockpiles destruction and
national implementation of the treaty) and challenges (issues of universality
and science and technological advancements). Thereafter alternative strategies
will be presented in combating the proliferation of chemical weapons. In
addition, an attempt will be made to shed light on the issue of terrorism and
its involvement in chemical weapons proliferation. Thus, all the above will
provide us all the necessary information to evaluate the current chemical
weapons situation and verify or not Bailey’s opinion for the continuation of
the proliferation of chemical weapons.
I.
Chemical weapons
Chemicals can be traced back to the ancient times, but
chemical weapons emerged in the end of 17th century, as a product of
the modern chemical industry. According to the CWC, chemical weapon is defined “any toxic chemical or its precursor that,
through its chemical action, can cause death, injury, temporary incapacity or
sensory irritation”.[3]
The main characteristics of chemical weapons are that vary in terms of their
lethality, their complexity, the way they cause injury and death, and their
persistence (short and long term).[4]
Chemical weapons belong in the broad family of Weapons
of Mass Destruction (WMD)[5].
The main characteristic of those weapons is “their potential to generate truly
catastrophic levels of death and destruction”. Their devastating effects have
stigmatized them in the conscience of the public and helped military
professionals to foster a taboo against their use in war. A taboo, that first codified
in the 1925 Geneva Protocol[6]
and was strengthened many decades later by the 1993 CWC[7].
II.
The Chemical Weapons Convention
The CWC is a
multilateral treaty, the first its kind that bans a whole category of weapons.
In fact, it bans the production, possession, proliferation, transfer and use of
chemical weapons. It came into force on 29 April 1997 in order to regulate
the chemical weapons legal status and help the international community to deal
with the issue of proliferation and the destruction of the already existed
chemical weapons.
The CWC is
implemented by the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW).
The OPCW receives states-parties’ declarations, which detail chemical
weapons-related activities or materials and relevant industrial activities.
Thereafter, becomes its responsibility to inspect and monitor states-parties’
facilities and activities that are relevant to the convention, aiming to ensure
compliance. [8]
What is of great importance for the future production
and detection of chemical weapons is that the CWC introduces two innovations in
its body. The first one is that groups them into three schedules, based on the
risk they pose to the convention. In particular: “schedule 1 chemical and precursors pose ‘high risk’ to the convention”;
“schedule 2 chemicals are toxic chemicals that pose a ‘significant risk’ to the
convention”; and “schedule 3
chemicals are usually produced in large quantities for purposes not prohibited
by the CWC but still pose a risk to the convention”.[9] It is
worth mentioning that the CWC permits the use of herbicides in the operations
of guerrillas, as well as tear gases for riot control and subduing suspected
criminals, and also in warfare.[10] By
grouping them the CWC has a unique chance to map all the already existed
chemical weapons and anyone yet to come. This fact will light any shadows on
chemical weapons and will help the OPCW to better deal with them.
The second innovation of the convention is that it
introduces an extremely radical verification tool, the
right to request a ‘challenge’ inspection[11] of any
facility suspected of violating the treaty, without right of refusal, which is available to any
state party. The importance of this mechanism lies in its role as a deterrent,
since its very existence would certainly make difficult any effort of a
state-party to conceal non-compliant facilities.[12]
Nevertheless, challenge inspection faces three
major problems-challenges. The first one is that has not yet been used. The second
one concerns the case that a state-party A requests such an on-site challenge
inspection in facilities of a state-party B, which are located in a non- state
party and the latter is not in favor of the inspection. The same question would
arise for a challenge inspection in facilities of a non-state party A which are
located to a state-party B.[13]
The third challenge is a section in the United States’ CWC implementing
legislation, which entitles the president to “deny a request to inspect any facility in the United States in cases
where the President determines that the inspection may pose a threat to the
national security interests of the United States”.[14] The above section might be a gravestone to the viability
of the mechanism, since it is possible other states-parties to follow the same
example in the future.
BY PANAGIOTIS I. PSYLLOS
[1] Pogorely, Mikhail. Prospects For
Russia-US Cooperation in Preventing WMD Proliferation. The Journal of
Slavic Military Studies. March 2004, Vol.17, Issue 1, P.90. Available at: http://pdfserve.informaworld.com/741922_751318978_713661460.pdf
. Accessed on: 2010-04-15.
[2] Wirtz, James.
(2007) Weapons of Mass Destruction, In Collins, Allan, Contemporary Security Studies, New York :
Oxford University
[3] Thakur, Ramesh.
(2006) Chemical Weapons and the Challenge of WMD, In Thakur, Ramesh and Haru,
Ere, The Chemical Weapons Convention-
Implementation, Challenges and Opportunities, Tokyo
[4] Wirtz, James.
(2007) Weapons of Mass Destruction, In Collins, Allan, Contemporary Security Studies, New York :
Oxford University
[5] In the family
of the WMD we group chemical, biological, nuclear and radiological weapons.
[6] The Geneva
Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous, or
Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, (17 June 1925), Federation of American
Scientists website, Available at: http://www.fas.org/nuke/control/geneva/text/geneva1.htm
Accessed on: 2010-04-16.
[7] Chemical
Weapons Convention website, Available at: http://www.cwc.gov/ or OPCW website, Available at: http://www.opcw.org/chemical-weapons-convention/
Accessed on: 2010-04-16.
[8] Kimball G. Daryl and Meier, Oliver, The Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) at a Glance, Arms Control
Today, Vol.38, (March 2008). Available at: http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/cwcglance
Accessed on: 2010-04-16.
[9] Kimball G. Daryl and Meier, Oliver, The Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) at a Glance, Arms Control Today,
Vol.38, (March 2008). Available at: http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/cwcglance
Accessed on: 2010-04-16.
[10] Bismuth, Chantal, Borron, W.
Stephen, Baud, J. Frederic, and Barriot, Patrick (2004) Chemical weapons: documented
use and compounds on the horizon. Toxicology Letters, 1 April 2004,
Vol.149, Issue 1-3, P.12. Available at: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science?_ob=ArticleListURL&_method=list&_ArticleListID=1297895795&_sort=r&view=c&_acct=C000010399&_version=1&_urlVersion=0&_userid=126770&md5=62ff6b9f70be9c170f2f4731b8e0a821 Accessed on: 2010-04-16.
[11] Asada,
Masahiko. (2006) The Challenge Inspection System of the Chemical Weapons
Convention: Problems and Prospects, In Thakur, Ramesh and Haru, Ere, The Chemical Weapons Convention-
Implementation, Challenges and Opportunities, Tokyo :
United Nations University
[13] Ibid. P. 84-85.
[14] Chemical
Weapons Implementation Act of 1998, Sec 307. Available at: http://www.cwc.gov/cwc_authority_legislation_t3.html#topicSeven Accessed on: 2010-04-16.
[15] Chemical
Weapons Convention website, Article 8, Para.9, 12, 22, Available at: http://www.cwc.gov/cwc_treaty_article_08.html Accessed on: 2010-04-16.
[16] Mathews J.
Robert. (2006) The First Review of the Chemical Weapons Convention: A Drafter’s
Perspective, In Thakur, Ramesh and Haru, Ere, The Chemical Weapons Convention- Implementation, Challenges and
Opportunities, Tokyo
[17] Chemical
Weapons Convention website, Article 8, Para.22, Available at: http://www.cwc.gov/cwc_treaty_article_08.html Accessed on: 2010-04-16.
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