Life after NATO

NATO's announcement that it will pull out its 130,000 troops from Afghanistan by the end of 2014 and hand over control to Afghan security forces has been open to criticism.

On the one hand it was seen as giving hope to the Taliban, allowing them to believe that all they need do is to sit patiently and wait as Western forces withdraw. On the other, it was seen as jeopardising attempts to strengthen the Afghan state, by creating disincentives for Afghan officials to invest time and money in the country’s future.

Putting aside the fact that the date for the completion of this ‘transition’ was aimed more at Western audiences than Afghans, the hope was that setting a deadline would concentrate minds.

At present the fears would seem to have been confirmed by the slow pace of the ‘reconciliation’ process with the Taliban. Moves to allow the Taliban to open an office in Qatar have been delayed, and while a dialogue of sorts continues, no significant progress has been made over the past 12 months.

Moves by the United States to establish a longer-term presence in Afghanistan seem in part driven by the need to maintain pressure on the Taliban and stop them thinking that they can simply wait for Western troops to leave.

In relation to regional engagement with Afghanistan, however, the picture is more positive. Clearly, some countries are making contingency plans to prepare for the worst. But most appear to be taking concrete steps to ensure that worst case scenarios – the resumption of civil war, or worse still for most the re-emergence of the Taliban as the dominant political force — do not come to pass.

With Pakistan, and to a lesser degree Iran, accused by the West of aiding insurgency in Afghanistan, there has been scepticism over how far regional processes can succeed. Yet while they may have divergent aspirations for the future of Afghanistan, none of its neighbours would benefit if Afghanistan collapsed. Furthermore, countries such as China and India, which have invested substantially in Afghanistan in recent years, have benefited from the Western ‘security umbrella’. Both stand to lose economically, as well as politically, if the Afghan state were to collapse.

Local rivalries continue to affect regional approaches, and some countries, such as Uzbekistan, prefer to engage with Afghanistan bilaterally rather than multilaterally. Strained relations between India and Pakistan, and Iran and the US, stand in the way of a truly united approach. But over the past couple of years there has been a subtle shift in the perception of Afghanistan, from a country in which its neighbours should compete for influence, to a country that could itself act to build confidence.

India and Pakistan want to enhance trade ties to circumvent long-standing disputes, and Afghanistan may be the trigger for greater economic links. At present, most of India’s trade with Afghanistan travels through Iran. The more direct route, through Pakistan, is largely closed. But with an Indian purchase of the right to mine iron ore at Hajigak, in Bamyan province, the economic incentives for Pakistan to allow transit trade have increased substantially. Similarly, in April this year Pakistan, India and Afghanistan agreed the transit fee on gas from Turkmenistan, increasing the likelihood that the Turkmenistan- Afghanistan-Pakistan-India pipeline will come to fruition. If the price can be agreed for gas transit, there is little, theoretically, stopping Pakistan allowing other goods from Afghanistan to cross its territory into India.

Furthermore, Afghanistan provides a means by which the West can re-engage with Iran. At the recent Kabul Conference of the Heart of Asia Countries, Iran was critical of US plans for a longer-term presence in Afghanistan. Despite that, Iran offered to lead one of the seven confidence-building measures under discussion, namely building up education links. Along with Australia, the US offered to support this measure. And on the side-lines of the conference, William Hague, the British Foreign Secretary, held talks with his Iranian counterpart, Ali Akbar Salehi. Building up economic links between Afghanistan and its neighbours will not, by itself, solve the problem. But improved economic ties should create an environment in which Afghanistan and its neighbours can sustain their engagement. In addition, economic interaction should provide hope that if some form of political settlement can be reached, Afghanistan has a viable economic future, aside from the cultivation of opium. This, in turn, should reduce incentives for corruption among Afghan officials.

Thus far, Afghanistan appears relatively adept at balancing the economic interests of its neighbours. India’s purchase of rights to the Hajigak iron ore mines followed the Chinese purchase of a copper mine at Aynak for $3 billion in 2011. While development of the mine has been slow, China now has an economic incentive to build up Afghan infrastructure.

Afghanistan will also need to balance a range of divergent regional groupings that have expressed a desire to play an increased role in the country’s future. In June, Afghanistan was granted observer status in the Shanghai Co-operation Organization (SCO), which declared that they supported Afghanistan as an ‘independent, neutral, peaceful state free from terrorism and narco-criminality’. Afghanistan has also been a member of the South Asia Association for Regional Co-operation (SAARC) since 2007. While SAARC is frequently criticised for lethargy, caused in large part by tension between India and Pakistan, it has played a role in gradually enhancing trade links within South Asia.

Ensuring a balance between these groupings, as well as with NATO and Western countries, may prove challenging, but should not be a zero-sum game. Progress on, say, counter-terrorism or counter-narcotics under the SCO does not negate progress on the same issue in other groupings.

While there are grounds for optimism, the internal politics of Afghanistan, and in particular the slow pace of any political process, continues to give grounds for concern, and threatens to derail moves towards greater regional co-operation.

For now, there is something of a stand-off. The Taliban are refusing to talk to the Afghan government and has temporarily suspended talks about talks with the US. Meanwhile, the head of the High Peace Council, Salahuddin Rabbani, is planning to reignite an Afghan-led process with visits to Pakistan and Saudi Arabia.

This political impasse as the 2014 deadline draws ever closer gives rise to concern that differing groups will begin to re-arm. Worstcase scenarios envisage conflict between the Taliban and non-Taliban Pashtuns or between what was the Northern Alliance and the Taliban. The flourishing of localized armed militias adds to worries about future stability.

In such a context the attitude of Afghanistan’s neighbours is paramount. If they invest in Afghanistan’s future – and the recent investment summit in Delhi is a positive sign – then it becomes easier to envisage a relatively stable future.

The converse of this would involve a selffulfilling vicious circle, in which regional powers start to prop up their own proxies and Afghanistan slowly degenerates. For now, the signs are good. Whether that remains the case is likely to depend on the speed and determination with which the US and Afghan governments seek an internal political settlement.

BY Gareth Price

sourche: http://www.chathamhouse.org/publications/twt/archive/view/185089