The Newly Emerging Arctic Security Regime

By the end of the Cold War, the Arctic entered into an era of substantial demilitarization and cooperation[1]. Both the US and Russia dissipated their Arctic forces, albeit the US remained the most military capable Arctic power[2]. Following the two superpowers, the other Arctic nations all took immediate steps to utilize the “peace dividend”.[3] Mutual reduction of the deployed forces and the elimination of the Arctic based exercises were at the forefront of their agenda.[4] 

During the 90s the Arctic affairs were monopolised by low politics issues, such as environmental protection and fishery patrols.[5] In fact, joint policies such as the Arctic Military Environmental Cooperation Program (AMEC)[6] among Norway, Russia and the US were launched as a result of the growing international environmental concern over the abandoned Russian nuclear submarines.[7] Cooperation among the Arctic nations was also broadened both by the establishment of the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy and the Arctic Council.[8]

However, at the dawn of 2000s tensions began to rise again in Arctic. The Polar states developed national policy statements regarding security in the broader Arctic sea region and begun the rebuilding of their northern military capabilities. It is noteworthy that while they all reaffirm their commitment to support cooperation in the region, they simultaneously indicate that they will take all the necessary actions to defend their interests, unilaterally if need be. The contradiction in terms is that while publicly the Arctic nations declare their willing to cooperate in a peaceful Arctic, the significant increase of their military expenditures suggests otherwise.[9]

Undoubtedly, there is no immediate danger of conflict in Arctic. Nevertheless, the re-emergence of the Arctic combat capabilities in the region begs the question why? “Are the Arctic states simply developing the means to protect their Arctic interests as climate change makes the region more accessible? Or is it possible that they are beginning to see the need to develop capabilities for a future Arctic that faces less cooperation and more conflict?” To this end it is of great importance to examine the security policies and actions taken by each of the Polar nations.[10]

CANADA

Throughout the 90s Canada was of the main proponents of the cooperative model in Arctic affairs. Issues of low politics such as environmental protection, trade and fisheries were at the frontline of the Arctic agenda. However, since mid - 2000s Canada is refocusing on traditional security topics, in particular, the defence and foreign policy review. The latter was launched by the then Prime Minister Paul Martin, which led to a set of policy papers on defence, diplomacy, sustainable development and international trade that underlined the necessity to enhance Canada’s ability to protect its Arctic territories.[11]

During the 2005-2006 Conservatives campaign, Stephen Harper made the building up of Canada’s military capability a campaign issue. He promised to rebuild Canada’s Arctic forces, including a commitment to invest in a “new Arctic national sensor system to listen for submarines in Canadian waters”, as well as to build “three heavy-duty, armed icebreakers”.[12] Following its election victory in 2006 to the present, the Conservative government is developing plans to strengthen Canada’s northern security capabilities. In fact, in May 2008 launched the Canada First Defence Strategy[13] for the modernization of the Canadian Forces.[14]

The First Defence Strategy is based on an extensive and rigorous analysis of the risks and threats that the state of Canada is to face in the years to come, and its government's defense plan, as well. “Through stable and predictable defence funding, including balanced investments across the four pillars upon which military capabilities are built - personnel, equipment, readiness and infrastructure - the Strategy will increase the size of the Forces and replace their core capabilities. It also presents unprecedented opportunities for Canadian industry in its reach for global excellence”.[15]

Following the First Defence Strategy, on 26^th July 2009, the Canadian government released the Northern Strategy.[16] This policy is based on four pillars: i) exercise Canada’s Arctic sovereignty; ii) protect Canada’s environmental heritage; iii) promote social and economic development; and iv) improve and develop Northern governance; The Northern Strategy is designed to assert Canada’s sovereignty over its resource – rich Arctic territories, while addressing the need for jobs, housing and a clean environment in the region.[17] Regarding its first pillar the policy anticipates the: build of six to eight Arctic Offshore patrol vessels and a deepwater resupply port in Nanisivik; build a large icebreaker; improve national coastal protection and surveillance, including in the North (Northern Watch and RadarSat II; Polar Epsillon[18]); expand protected areas in the Northwest Territories; expand the Rangers; create a Northern Reserve Unit based in the Arctic; and develop an army Arctic training base in Resolute.[19]

According to the Canadian Minister of National Defence Mackay, Canada’s long-term defence strategy would grow on 2009 $19-billion annual defence budget to $30 billion by 2027. Over that time, the total budget approaches $490 billion in defence spending, including $60 billion on new equipment. However, to date little progress has been made in the implementation of the Arctic projects.[20]

In fact, the renewal of Canada’s Arctic capabilities is slow while the Canadian government at times is taking steps back[21] from its promises. For instance, after a three year re-examination on the design of the Joint Support Ships (JSS)[22], due to industry’s over budget bids [23], the Canadian government announced its final decision to acquire two support ships, with the option to procure a third. “The JSS project represents a total investment by the Government of Canada of approximately $2.6 billion. The presence of a JSS increases the range and endurance of the Canadian Navy, permitting it to remain at sea for significant periods of time without going to shore”.[24]

The Canadian government is also facing difficulty with the modernization of Canada’s air capabilities for northern use. The newly purchased CC-177s[25] are not compatible to the short surface of the northern airfields and the seventeen new CC-130Js[26] along with the fifteen new heavy lift Chinook CH-147D helicopters[27] are the only featly that the Canadian air force possesses for its northern operations. Furthermore, the Canadian air force is still determining what it needs to replace its long-range patrol aircraft CP-140/CP-140A Auroras and Arcturus[28], its CF-188 Hornet fighter aircraft[29], and its one northern-based aircraft: the CC-138 Twin Otter utility transport aircraft[30]. According to the Canada First Strategy both the CF-188s and CP- 140s will be replaced,[31] however this is highly unlikely to occur soon.[32]

Contrary to Canada’s air force upgrade, the Canadian government is rapidly proceeding with the Rangers expansion. The Canadian Rangers are the “eyes and ears” on the ground of the Canadian northern forces. The majority of them are northern aboriginals with valuable knowledge on the northern lands. Officially Canada intends to expand the Rangers to 5000 members.[33] Moreover, to complement their work, a reserve company (the Yellowknife Company) based in the Northwest Canadian Territories is being recruited. It is the only active reserve unit north of 60 and it is anticipated to recruit 100 people over time, putting it at full strength by 2019.[34]

The Canadian Northern forces are also supported by the RadarSat II[35], “Canada’s next–generation commercial Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) satellite”. The system provides “enhanced information for applications such as environmental monitoring, ice mapping, resource mapping, disaster management and marine surveillance”.[36] The Northern Watch program that was launched in 2008 to monitor any ships and submarines approaching the Northwest Passage is also back on track and is already conducting tests on new sensor capabilities.[37] Both systems significantly enhance Canada’s northern forces in the surveillance of High North providing them a vast amount of accurate and important information. 

Canada has also launched joint military exercises in Arctic. In detail, during the summer of 2002 the Canadian forces held their first joint exercise in Arctic in over twenty years. The sum of the aforementioned air, naval and land forces are involved in the scope of the Arctic exercises. At the present, these exercises take place during the summer months; however the Canadian government intends to hold the exercises outside of the summer.[38]

Overall, the Canadian government is extensively preparing ambitious and costly programs to upgrade Canada’s northern capabilities. The exercise of its sovereignty in Arctic has become its main priority. Officially Canada remains a peaceful power in the region and is willing to cooperate with its Arctic neighbours. The enhancement of its military capability results from the assertive Russian policy in the region. The Canadian government wants to show that is able to respond to any military challenge coming from its mighty neighbour. Nevertheless, delays and modifications have been noticed to the majority of its military plans, and remain to see in the future whether it will fulfil its promises or not.

DENMARK

Denmark is an Arctic power by virtue of its control of Greenland. Although it is seldom thought of as a militarily significant state, throughout the past two decades it has efficiently rebuilt its Arctic forces, especially the naval ones, into a small, but modern and combat capable army.[39]

At the policy level, in 2009 the Danish government issued the Danish Defence Agreement. It is a roadmap for the development of the Danish armed forces in the years 2010 to 2014.[40] The paper particularly states that “the primary purpose of the Danish Armed Forces is to enforce the sovereignty of the Kingdom of Denmark and to ensure the continued existence and integrity of the country”. In a special note on Greenland and Arctic it also underlines that “the melting of the polar ice-cap as a result of global warming and the resulting increased activity in the Arctic will change the region’s geostrategic significance and thus entail more tasks for the Danish Armed Forces”.[41]

To this end, although the Danish Government remains vocal in its support for cooperation in the region, it simultaneously enhances its military presence in Arctic with the establishment of an Arctic task force and an Arctic command[42] that will deploy Danish F-16 Fighters to Greenland.[43]

Regarding its navy forces Denmark has always maintained three small Agdlek class ice-capable patrol cutters in Greenland, which from 2008 are being replaced, on a one by one basis, by the Knud Ramussen class offshore patrol vessels. The latter apart from fisheries inspections and environmental protection tasks, is designed to have combat capabilities.[44]

Furthermore, with the Danish Defence Plan (2005 – 2009) the Royal Danish Navy (RDN) was granted with three new large frigate patrol ships, which replaced the old corvettes of the Niels Juel class. These new large ships are able to travel through ice up to one metre thick and they are designed to have extensive weapons systems such as surface to surface missiles, anti-air and anti-ship capabilities. In fact, “the new ships will have a state-of-the-art ability to participate in air defense, strike and artillery support missions”.[45]

Another significant asset for the RDN is the four Thetis class frigates built by the Svendborg Shipyard.[46] Thetis is a multi – role frigate used for fishery protection, surveillance, air-sea rescue, anti-pollution and ice reconnaissance. It is also ice-strengthened and posses extensive armament capabilities.[47]

The new Danish military capabilities in the Arctic have badly affected the Canada - Denmark friendly relations, as well as their long-term dispute over Hans Island.[48] In fact, with the commissioning of Thetis, the Danish Government deployed her to Hans Island to land troops to strengthen the Danish claim. “The Canadian Government responded in July 2005 by flying its Minister of Defence, Bill Graham, to land on the island with Canadian troops. At this point both governments recognized that the issue was escalating and met in New York in September 2005 and agreed to avoid any further military activity. Both sides now inform each other of any action that they plan to take in regards to the island”.[49]

The Hans Island incident illustrates that even in circumstances involving allied states the addition of new military capabilities can often escalate tensions. Although, officially the Hans Island has little or no natural resources and it is almost insignificant to both states, the military enhancement of Denmark has triggered rivalry over its control.[50]

The Danish Navy has also built fourteen Flyvefisken class (SF 300) multi – role vessels. Flyvefisken class is “based on a modular concept – using a standard hull with containerised weapon systems and equipment, which allows the vessel to change role quickly for surveillance, surface combat, anti-submarine warfare (ASW), mine countermeasures / minehunter, minelayer or pollution control”.[51] The newest asset of the RDN is the two Abasalon class vessels (combat support ships). “The ships can be equipped for naval warfare, land attack, strategic sealift missions or as a command platform. They can also be configured as hospital ships or for emergency disaster relief. HDMS Absalon (L16) was launched in February 2004 and commissioned into the Royal Danish Navy in July 2004. The second of class, Esbern Snare (L17), was launched in June 2004 and commissioned in February 2005.”[52]

Denmark is also planning the modernization of its Air Force capability; however the Danish parliament has not made a decision yet. The purchase of 56 JSF Lockheed Martin F35 Lightning II jets that was to replace the 46 Danish F-16 aircrafts in 2009 is being postponed, since the Danish Defence Minister Søøren Gade announced that there was no need to rush the decision because the replacement was not needed until 2020.[53] 

The effective and systematic upgrade of the Danish Arctic Combat forces indicates the importance of High North to Denmark. Its assertive Arctic security policy and its military intervention in Hans Island clearly show a remarkable growth of the Danish military strength, and give to Denmark a slight strategic advantage over the respective Canadian Arctic forces. Like Canada, the Kingdom of Denmark is taking diplomatic initiatives to promote cooperation in Arctic (Ilulissat Declaration), while it is simultaneously preparing to defend its Arctic interest in the military field, if need be.

NORWAY

Norway has also turned its attention to the High North due to the huge energy resources lying on the Arctic seabed. What especially characterizes the Norwegian economic, environmental and security policy interests in the region is that they are closely liked with the Norway – Russia relations. Norway is meticulously working to maintain a friendly and cooperative relationship with Russia, but is deeply concerned about the increasingly assertive Russian policy in Arctic. To this end, Norway has launched a nuanced set of policies to maintain its friendly relations with Russia while at the same time builds up its Arctic Military Force.[54]

In October 2005, the Norwegian Government issued The Soria Moria Declaration on International Policy. According to the paper “the Government regards the Northern Areas as Norway’s most important strategic target area in the years to come”. It also underlines that the energy and environmental policy challenges that Arctic faces have attracted the attention of other states in the region. Thus, it is of high priority for the Norwegian government to consolidate the economic, environmental and security policy interests of Norway in Arctic.[55]

In addition the paper suggests the Norwegian government to conduct dialogues on the Northern Areas with the other Arctic states; strengthen the Norwegian Defence presence and exercise of sovereignty in the North; strengthen the co-operation with Russia; and promote increased co-operation in areas such as trade, petroleum, fisheries, environmental protection, and education.[56]

In December 2006 the Norwegian Government’s High North Strategy followed asserting that Norway will continue to build good neighbourly relations with Russia, as well as reaffirming the vital role of the presence of the Norwegian armed forces in the High North for meeting Norway’s national security needs and maintaining its crisis capacity. [57]

Beyond no doubt, both the policy statements clearly indicate that Norway believes in and promotes cooperation with Russia and the other Arctic nations, since it identifies no immediate threat to its security; however it still sees a need to ensure its military capability in a region of massive transformations.[58] The latter choice is a result of the fear of Norwegian officials that the Norway – Russia relation could deteriorate in the future.[59]

The latest policy statement arrived in June 2008, when the Norwegian government decided to issue the Norwegian Defence 2008 policy. According to the paper “the principal objective of Norwegian security policy is to safeguard and promote national security policy interests. This is best achieved by contributing to peace, security and stability both in areas adjacent to Norway and in the wider world. Nationally Norway must be in a position to uphold its sovereignty and sovereign rights and to exercise authority in order to safeguard our interests”.[60] Furthermore, within the section of the Areas of Government Focus the paper identifies “the northern regions are Norway’s prime area for strategic investment”.[61]

Beyond the policy statements compilation Norway is actively moving into a substantial modernization of its Arctic Force. In detail, it has contracted five Aegis class frigates, more strongly directed at Anti – Submarine warfare. “The first vessel, F 310, Fridtjof Nansen, was launched in June 2004 and commissioned in April of 2006. A second vessel, F 311, Roald Amundsen, was launched in May 2006, and the third, F 312, Otto Sverdrup was launched in May 2006. Two more are under construction”. Their armament consists of two triple mounts of Mk-46 torpedoes, an eight cell VLS on the forward deck carrying 32 Evolved Sea Sparrow Missiles, and a 76mm rapid fire, dual purpose main gun. [62]   

In February 2001 the Norwegian Royal Navy (NRN) launched its largest ship, a Coast Guard icebreaker and offshore patrol vessel KV Svalbard (W303). It carries Bofors 57mm and 12.7mm guns and is NBC (nuclear, biological, chemical) protected with constant overpressure.[63] Another asset of the NRN is the six contracted Skjold class missile patrol. “The first-of-class ship, KNM Skjold (P960), was commissioned in April 1999. The Norwegian government approved the build of five more Skjold Class vessels in June 2002.” Skjold is armed with short-range surface-to-air missiles and additional advanced armament capabilities. All vessels are planed for delivery by the end of 2010.[64]

The above purchases of the NRN identify its fears that it may be soon in a hostile Arctic aerospace-maritime environment. In fact, the newly Norwegian Arctic capabilities clearly exceed those required for fisheries or environmental protection; they are designed to fight and guard the Norwegian northern territories.[65]

In support of the above claim Norway is also invests a substantial amount of its wealth to enhance and modernize its Arctic Capable Air Force. In detail, in a more than three billion dollar contract[66], Norway has purchased 48 Lockheed Martin - Led F-35 Lightning II (Joint Strike Fighter) from the US to replace its old F-16s fleet.[67] The F-35 is a stealthy, supersonic multirole fighter, is especially designed for highly dangerous special operations, such as tactical bombing, air defence missions and close air support.[68]

Norway has also launched the Cold Response military exercises, which from the spring of 2006 take place on a yearly basis in northern Norway. These are joint exercises with invited Partnership for Peace countries that involve approximately 9000 soldiers, sailors, marines and airmen. Although the aim of these exercises is to promote cooperation among the participants, it also gives an opportunity to the Norwegian forces to operate on a large scale in extremely tough weather conditions.[69]

Since the early 2000s Norway has invested a considerable amount of its GDP to finance the cost of its Arctic Force modernization. It is noticeable that most of its programs are purchased from the US, a fact that demonstrates Norway’s need to strengthen its ties with the superpower, since the Russian military presence, in the High North, is becoming increasingly assertive. Despite Norway’s public stance that there is no immediate military threat in the region and the directive of its policy statements to promote cooperation among the Arctic nations, the concern of its Officials regarding the future of the Norway – Russia relations gradually increases, putting pressure to the Norwegian government to purchase more military technical equipment.     

RUSSIA

In terms of military power Russia is perhaps the most powerful Arctic nation. By the end of the Cold War, the collapse of its economy at mid-90s and the slash of its military capabilities Russia became a friendly and harmless player in the Arctic affairs. However, both its economic (early 2000s) and military recovery, due to massive energy (oil and gas) exports,[70] blurred once again the Arctic security scene. In fact, Russia sees itself as a recovering world power, as well as assumes the Arctic and its energy reserves as a vital space to its development and dominance in the world energy exports.[71]  

In an effort to map the above assumptions, the Russian government, under president Putin issued an array of policy statements. In 2002 the Putin administration launched the Armament Program 2002-2010[72] aimed at weapons research and development in 2002 to 2005 and procurement by the end of the decade. The main objectives of the Program were the stable development of its defense – industrial complex; the optimization of the defense – industrial complex’s composition and structure; the preservation of scientific – technological potential of the defense – industrial complex; the optimization of the state participation’s share in defense – industrial complex organizations’ capital; and the conjugation of state defense order’s resources.[73]

On 17^th December 2008, the Medvedev administration approved the Principles of Russian Policy in the Arctic up to 2020. The paper identifies the following as Russia's national interests: “the use of Russia's Arctic zone as a strategic resource base to assist the state in the social-economic development of the country; the preservation of the Arctic as a zone of peace and cooperation; the conservation of the unique ecological systems of the region; and the use of the NSR as an integrated national shipping lane for the Russian Federation”. [74]

The main objectives of this paper are spelled out in four areas, socio-economic security, military security, environmental security and international cooperation. In detail, it aims to expand the resource base of Russia’s Arctic zone; maintain the required combat capabilities to protect its interests in the region; preserve and protect Arctic’s natural environment; and ensure mutually beneficial cooperation (bilateral and multilateral) with the other Arctic nations.[75]

Like the other Arctic states, Russia by its policy statements publicly declares its intention for cooperation in the region and preservation of a peaceful Arctic. However, the possibility of the western allies to join their forces, in order to ensure the lion’s share from the Arctic resources and impede Russia from its territorial rights, pushes the Russian government to rebuild its Arctic capabilities.

Focusing on the rebuilding of the Russian Arctic force, the Russian government has purchased under the 2007-2015 Program (GPRV-2015)[76] “five Project 955 Borey nuclear-powered strategic ballistic missile submarines equipped with new Bulava ballistic missiles, two Project 885 Yasen nuclear-powered multipurpose submarines, six Project 677 Lada diesel-electric submarines, three Project 22350 frigates and five Project 20380 corvettes”.[77] Furthermore, Russia has upgraded its seven Delta IV class nuclear submarines fleet, which now operate the Sineva ballistic missile system and can carry ten 100KT warheads.[78]

In April 2007 the Russian Navy launched the largest and most powerful icebreaker in the world, the nuclear-powered 50 Years of Victory,[79]  while in October 2009, the Russian Deputy Minister of Defense Vladimir Popovkin also announced the purchase of two heavy nuclear-powered missile cruisers (TAKR) to be restored in the active fleet.[80]

Earlier this year the chief of the Russian Security Council, Nikolai Patrushev, announced that “Russia will create several infrastructure hubs along the Northern Sea Route in the Arctic to be used as temporary stations for Russian warships and border guard vessels”. The plan is in line with Russia’s Arctic doctrine, approved in 2008, which outlines its aimed at maintaining Russia’s role as a “major Arctic nation”.[81]

Regarding the Russian Air Force, it already has 40 Tu-95MS bombers and 141 Tu-22M3 bombers in service and plans to replace its old TU-95 MC Bear strategic bombers fleet with a new - generation of 16 stealth technology Tu-160 Blackjack bombers by 2025.[82]  Additionally, the Russian Defence Ministry decided to base MiG-31 long-range interceptors at the Rogachyovo Arctic base on the island of Novaya Zemlya by the end of 2012 to enhance its defence against any attack from the north.[83] Moreover, Russia has one of world’s best fighters, the MiG 1.42 (Multifunctional Frontline Fighter).[84] Nevertheless, the current global financial recession has side effects on the Russian economy causing difficulties in the modernization process of the Russian forces (suspension of the T-60s intermediate range bombers program).

Apart from the rebuilding of its Arctic Force, Russia has actively moved to the deployment of forces around Arctic in an effort to demonstrate its military power and come back in the region. Military ventures, such as that of August 2007[85], July 2008[86], July 2009[87], and July 2010[88] have become regular phenomenon in Arctic. Undoubtedly, the Russian Arctic activity raises concern to its Arctic neighbours. On the one hand the Russia government officially supports the peaceful cooperation in the region, whist on the other hand substantially increase its Arctic military Force on the fear of a potential conflict.

The launch of the above military exercises by Russia has triggered accusations from its neighbours of tensions provocation and imperialistic behaviour. However, having a closer look to the Russian Arctic policy we see nothing more than its intention to call ‘present’ in the Arctic rivalry. The Russian government is deeply concerned that its neighbors – all member states of NATO – will join their forces in order to deter Russia from its right to exploit the energy resources lying on its claimed Arctic territories. Although, such a scenario is most unlikely to take place, the Russian concern is not groundless, since NATO in its 2009 Cold Response Exercise at the North of Norway simulated a military conflict over the Arctic oil, between Midland and Northland (Russia).[89] It is such the annoyance of the Russian government from the Alliance’s presence in Arctic that the Russian Ambassador to NATO stated that “NATO has nothing to do in the Arctic”.[90] The Russian media and academic also suggest that NATO’s military activity in Arctic is dangerous for the peaceful settle of the territorial disputes.[91]     

The deployment of military forces in Arctic, both by Russia and the other Arctic states is clearly not a zero sum game. As each side increases its military activity in the north, the other side will respond in kind.[92] Each one of the Arctic players wants to be sure that is military capable to defend its interest in an open military conflict, if need be. However, unlike the Cold War period this is a different – new era away from ideological confrontations where both Russia and the other Arctic nations have made great steps to cooperation and the peaceful settle of their disputes. The newly arms race in Arctic looks more like a game of pyrotechnics than a brave new Cold War. As long as the Arctic nations assume that is to the best of their interest to cooperate the Arctic will remain out of troubles.   

UNITED STATES

The United States, after the end of the Cold War have shown little or no interest for the Arctic region.[93] The absence of a US national Arctic policy has resulted in its characterization as “reluctant Arctic power”.[94] A closer look at the US foreign and security policy, throughout the past twenty years, shows that the US does not normally think of itself as an Arctic state; however, it has currently begun to reconsider its latter stance.[95] In fact, in January 2009 President George W. Bush issued the National Security Presidential Directive 66 setting out policy towards the Arctic region.[96] In doing so he officially attested the US’ comeback in Arctic and declared the US’ intention to develop greater capabilities and capacity, as necessary, to protect its Arctic air, land and sea borders. The Directive also recommended that the Senate should endorse the US’ accession to the UNCLOS.

Furthermore, the Bush administration contributed to the modernization of the US Arctic Force. In detail, decided the upgrade of the US’s early-warning radar at Thule in Greenland, “adding missile-defence capabilities, and the creation of a missile-defence installation at Fort Greely, one of three US army bases in Alaska, as part of the worldwide missile-defence network said to be directed against rogue states but causing grave concern in Moscow”.[97] It is also noticeable that unlike the policy statements of the other Arctic nations, the 2009 US Presidential Directive in its policy section places national security and homeland security needs in Arctic as its number one priority.[98] Under the same policy lines the Obama administration, based on the work of its predecessor, is building its Arctic strategy amending it where necessary.[99]

Regarding its Arctic military capabilities, the US by the end of the Cold War was the only Arctic state to maintain substantial forces in the region. Throughout the past two decades it has actively moved to their upgrade. In detail, it has announced the construction of 62 built Virginia class (SSN-774) of attack submarines[100] to complement the 43 Los Angeles (SSN-688) and three Seawolf (SSN-21) class ice capable of attack submarines.[101] Nevertheless, the US Navy is facing a serious shortage in terms of its icebreaking capability, since it had reduced its icebreakers fleet to three and the construction of new ones is still under discussion by the Congress.[102] 

Difficulties also have arisen regarding with its Air Force modernization. Throughout the post-Cold War era it had deployed an F-15 C[103] fleet based at the Elmendorf base (Alaska). However, due to a crash in November 2007 the entire fleet was grounded and replaced with Canadian CF-18s for almost two weeks.[104] According to the 2004 plan the F-15Cs were to be replaced by the new F-22 raptors.[105] A total of 183 aircrafts have been contracted of which approximately 36 will be based in Alaska.[106]  The US Congress has also approved the purchase of an F-35 fleet to complement the F-22 one.[107]

At the field of military exercises, apart from its participation in Cold Response exercises, since 1993 the US has launched an annual military exercise in Arctic named Northern Edge[108]. It is a joint training exercise which involves approximately 10000 soldiers, sailors, marines and airmen. Although the significant number of forces participating in Northern Edge, there is however a considerable disadvantage, since the exercise takes place during the summer period and the US forces do not have experience in winter weather conditions.[109]

Overall, the US Arctic strategy differs from those of its Arctic neighbours. Although, it is releasing policy statements, modernizing its military capabilities and conducting military exercises in the region, the US have set as their first priority national security instead of broader cooperation in Arctic. They are the only Arctic state that does not officially abide by the rules of the UNCLOS, evidence that the US do whatever serves better their national interest in the region. The latter assumption becomes obvious with the mutual agreement between the Bush administration and Hamper government, to put aside their dispute over the Northwest Passage in order to protect their Arctic interests against the assertiveness of the Russian policy in the broader Arctic sea region.

ARRIVAL OF NEW ACTORS

The melting of the Arctic ice cap, the opening of the Northeast Passage (new navigation routes) and the increasing global energy needs have caused the involvement of new actors in the Arctic affairs and its security regime.

EUROPEAN UNION   

The EU is one of the world’s largest oil and gas importers and a major player on the international energy market. It is linked to the Arctic by a combination of geographical, historical and economical bonds. Denmark one of the five Arctic nations is member state of the EU; Norway is member of the European Economic Zone; Canada, Russia and the US are strategic partners[110] of the EU; It is noticeable that Russia is EU’s main natural gas supplier.[111] However, the recent Russia – Ukraine crises (2006 and 2008) exposes the gaps in EU energy policies and the need for alternative and reliable suppliers. The Arctic energy resources provide the EU an opportunity to move further to this direction, since Denmark and Norway remain active in the Arctic energy rivalry.

  At the policy level, in March 2008, the European Commission published a paper stressing the need for an EU Arctic policy. The document states that “environmental changes are altering the geo-strategic dynamics of the Arctic with potential consequences for international stability and European security interests calling for the development of an EU Arctic policy”.  Furthermore, the paper details the EU policies in Arctic, which are related to the environment, support to indigenous people, research, energy resources, fisheries, transport, tourism and security issues. It is noteworthy that regarding the energy sector the paper clearly states that “Arctic resources could contribute to enhancing the EU’s security of supply concerning energy” and that the EU should provide support for the exploitation of Arctic hydrocarbon resources. The paper also underscores as EU’s main objectives to ensure security and stability in Arctic; strict environmental management; and sustainable use of the Arctic resources.[112]

 The EU opposes the idea of an Arctic Treaty, stating that “the full implementation of already existing obligations, rather than proposing new instruments should be advocated”.[113] Moreover, it has applied for a permanent observer status within the Arctic Council in order to enhance its presence in the Arctic affairs; however its request was vetoed by Canada.[114]

The EU’s strategic initiative on the Arctic affairs shows its will to open new cooperation perspectives with the Arctic states and establish its role as a stabilizing factor in the region. In fact, it conceptualizes the Arctic as a region with vital importance for its energy future and development. Thus, it systematically seeks a role in determining the political and security Arctic framework, as well as to benefit from the future exploitation of the Arctic resources, ensuring the preservation of the Arctic environment and the sustainable use of its energy reserves.

NATO

NATO’s presence in Arctic is not new; on the contrary throughout the Cold War was the rival of the Warsaw Pact in Arctic, as in the rest of the world. Currently the Alliance has reinforced its military presence in Arctic, responding to the call of its members, so as to alleviate the risen tensions and promote mutual confidence among the Arctic nations. Nevertheless, NATO’s past actions in Arctic still trigger suspicion to Russia regarding its come back in the region. To many Russians the military presence of NATO in Arctic means nothing less than its intention to ensure the lion’s share of the mineral reserves for its member-states. [115] Such a suspicion could drive Russia towards an aggressive foreign policy and a dominant military presence in the region, since both President Medvedev and Prime Minister Putin have declared Arctic of crucial importance for Russia’s development. In fact, this is an issue that is been treated by the NATO-Russia Council.

The new challenge for NATO is to “maintain a military presence in the area that is sufficient to act as a stabilizing factor in conceivable crisis scenarios but without undermining stability through provoking short-term and long-term countermeasures and ensuing escalation of general tension”.[116]

Furthermore, of NATO’s interest is to ensure energy security in Arctic. In a world struggling for energy, the Arctic energy resources bring High North closer to the EU’s and NATO’s preoccupations, considering the report on NATO’s role in Energy Security[117] at its 2008 Summit in Bucharest. 

Beyond security and energy issues, the Alliance is currently taking action in search and rescue missions for stranded vessels and emergency response to ecological disasters as the opening up of frozen shipping lanes has increased the risk of accidents. Exercises such as “Arctic-Sarex 96”[118] in cooperation with Russia take place in a regular basis. In August 2009 NATO and Russia also moved to a joint search and rescue of a cargo vessel.[119] Furthermore, the Alliance systematically promotes cooperation among the Arctic states in the combat against drug trafficking, illicit weapons trade, and terrorism.

Although NATO, as the US opposes to a Nuclear Free Arctic, it focuses on promoting cooperation among the Arctic nations, both in high and low politics issues. In doing so, it aspires to make them realise how much more they have to benefit from a peaceful settle of the territorial disputes and the future exploitation of the natural resources, as well.

CHINA

China is going through an unprecedented growth and is struggling for natural resources such as oil and gas. China has a lack of adequate domestic energy resources and will require secure access to them from foreign suppliers. Experts estimate that by 2020 China will need to boost energy consumption by 150% to maintain its economic growth,[120] while it is projected that the growth of the Chinese economy will be in the range of 9% per year until 2020.[121] 

China’s appetite for access to energy resources strongly influences its foreign policy and encourages the Chinese government to build up relationships with countries that can supply its energy needs. It is noticeable that twenty years ago China was East Asia’s largest oil exporter, whilst today it is the world’s second largest importer.[122]

The opening of China to the Arctic nations is inevitable. Although, Chinese officials publicly declare that “China does not have an Arctic strategy” the actions of the Chinese government show the opposite.[123] In July 2004 China established its first Arctic research station, Huanghe (Yellow River), at Ny-Alesund in Norway’s[124] Svalbard archipelago.[125] In early 2008 China requested for a permanent observer status in the Arctic Council.[126] China has also the world’s largest non-nuclear icebreaker (Xuelong), which in October 2009 decided to support with the purchase of new ones. [127] The latter developments raise concerns over the intentions of China in Arctic.

Even though China lacks of direct access to the Arctic region, it sees great opportunities for its economy from the future opening of the Arctic sea. The opening of the North East Passage will create new shipping routes and will shorten the journey for goods and raw materials from China to the European markets by 40 per cent.[128] To date, China is the world’s third largest economy[129] and such a potential could give a considerable advantage to its exporters[130].

 

China is preparing for the opening of Arctic by applying a low profile foreign policy in order not to disturb the Polar states. Thus, China is enhancing its trade relations with the Arctic states. In October 2008 signed an agreement with Russia for an oil pipeline from Tayshet to Daiqing via Skovorodino, which will cover the 4 per cent of China’s daily consumption.[131] Another energy project between Russia and China is the Altai natural gas pipeline from the Tyumen Fields in Siberia to China which was launched in 2006.[132]

Furthermore, China has had bilateral trade talks with Canada and Norway. In April 2005, PetroChina signed a Memorandum of Understanding with Enbridge to build a $2.5 billion pipeline from Alberta to a port on the west coast of British Columbia where it will be shipped by tanker to China.[133] China is also in negotiation on a free trade agreement with Norway.[134]

Beyond no doubt, China’s presence in the Arctic affairs is gradually increasing. The prospect of the exploitation of the Arctic energy reserves along with its vast energy needs, necessitate the establishment of its presence in the Region. So far the Chinese Arctic policy keeps a low profile, enhancing its trade and energy ties with the Arctic nations. It is most unlikely that China will engage in a military conflict with the Arctic nations over the Arctic resources, despite the purchase of new icebreakers and its tremendous military power, since it seeks clearly to cooperate with them.

The newly Arctic security environment is a multidimensional scene. Each and all of its actors have issued policy statements regarding their strategy in the region. On the frontline of their agenda is to maintain the peaceful status quo of Arctic and broaden cooperation among them. This is because all realize as their upmost interest to cooperate in order to benefit from the exploitation of Arctic’s energy reserves and the new opportunities that arise from the opening of new shipping routes. On the one hand the Arctic nations beyond their territorial disputes work closely in order to put aside mutual distrust, both diplomatically with the Ilulissat Declaration and practically by participating in common military and rescue missions in the region. On the other hand the new actors are trying to establish their presence in Arctic both by broadening their trade relations with the Arctic states and enhancing their presence as trustee of peace and cooperation in Arctic.

The increase of military capabilities in Arctic discloses the rationality of policy making in the region. It is imperative when a state enhances its military power the other states to respond in kind, so as to avoid a change in the balance of power. The possibility of a military conflict in the region is little or minimal; however if the balance of power change then the cost of war for the most powerful state lowers, increasing the possibility for such a strategic choice. Thus, the militarization of Arctic is not disturbing as long as the balance of power remains unchanged. Overall the Arctic states and all the actors involved in the Arctic affairs not only verbally have stated their will to cooperate in order to ensure security and transparency in the region, but also actively collaborate and interact with each other both within international institutions and bilaterally, building mutual trust and a tensions free Arctic. 

BY PANAGIOTIS I. PSYLLOS AND ELPINIKI KARAKOSTA

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[1] See Young, Oran, (1992), Arctic Politics: Conflict and Cooperation in the Circumpolar North, Hanover: University Press of New England.

[2] The potential of missile launches from North Korea was enough to keep the US missile defence active in the broader Arctic region (Fort Greely, Alaska). See US, Missile Defence Agency, For Your Information, Missile Defence Agency Emplaces First Interceptor at Fort Greely, (22^nd July 2004), Available at: http://www.mda.mil/global/documents/pdf/04fyi0012.pdf Accessed on: 2010-09-10.

[3] Young, Oran, Governing the Arctic: From Cold War Theatre to Mosaic of Cooperation, Global

Governance, Vol. 11, (2005), P. 9-15.

[4] Carnaghan Matthew and Goody Allison, Canada Arctic Sovereignty, PRB 05-61E, Ottawa:

Parliamentary Information and Research Service, (26^th January 2006), P. 11, Available at: http://www2.parl.gc.ca/content/lop/researchpublications/prb0561-e.pdf Accessed on: 2010-08-30.

[5] kakonen, Jyrki, Green Security or Militarized Environment, Millennium - Journal of International Studies, (March 1995), Vol. 24, P. 158-9.

[6] United States Government Accountability Office (GAO), Russian Nuclear Submarines: US Participation in the Arctic Military Environmental Cooperation Program Needs Better Justification, GAO-040924, (14^th September 2004), Available at: http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04924.pdf Accessed on: 2010-08-30.

[7] Bøøhmer Nils, Nikitin  Aleksandr, Kudrik Igor, Nilsen Thomas, Zolotkov Andrey,and McGovern H. Michael, The Arctic Nuclear Challenge, Bellona Report, Vol. 3, (1^st June 2001), Available at: http://www.bellona.org/reports/The_Arctic_Nuclear_Challenge Accessed on: 2010-08-30.

[8] Huebert, Rob, New Directions in Circumpolar Cooperation: Canada, the Arctic Environmental

Protection Strategy and the Arctic Council, Canadian Foreign Policy, Vol. 5, No.2, (Winter 1998), P. 37-58.

[9] Huebert, Rob, The Newly Emerging Arctic Security Environment, Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute, (2010), P. 4. Available at: http://www.cdfai.org/PDF/The%20Newly%20Emerging%20Arctic%20Security%20Environment.pdf Accessed on: 2010-09-02.

[10] Huebert, Rob, The Newly Emerging Arctic Security Environment, Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute, (2010), P. 5. Available at: http://www.cdfai.org/PDF/The%20Newly%20Emerging%20Arctic%20Security%20Environment.pdf Accessed on: 2012-10-08.

[11] Ibid

[12] CBC News website, Tories Plan to Bolster Arctic Defence, (22^nd December 2005), Available at: http://www.cbc.ca/story/canadavotes2006/national/2005/12/22/elxn-harper-dfens.html             Accessed on: 2012-10-08.

[13] Canada, National Defence and the Canadian Forces, Canada First Defence Strategy, (May 2008), Available at: http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/pri/first-premier/index-eng.asp Accessed on: 2010-09-02.

[14] Huebert, Rob, (2010), The Newly Emerging Arctic Security Environment, Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute, P. 6. Available at: http://www.cdfai.org/PDF/The%20Newly%20Emerging%20Arctic%20Security%20Environment.pdf Accessed on: 2012-10-08.

[15] Canada, National Defence and the Canadian Forces, Canada First Defence Strategy, (May 2008), Available at: http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/pri/first-premier/index-eng.asp Accessed on: 2012-10-08.

[16] Canada, Government of Canada, Canada’s Northern Strategy, (21^st December 2009), Available at: http://www.northernstrategy.ca/index-eng.asp Accessed on: 2012-10-08.

[17] Ibid

[18] McKay Peter, News Release, Government of Canada Announces Location of Satellite Reception Ground Stations for Polar Epsilon, (30^th March 2009), Available at: http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/news-nouvelles/news-nouvelles-eng.asp?cat=02&id=2930  Accessed on: 2012-10-08.

[19] Huebert, Rob, (2009), Canada and the Changing International Arctic: At the Crossroads of Cooperation and Conflict, in Frances Abele, Thomas J. Courchene, F. Leslie Seidle and France St-Hilaire, Northern Exposure: Peoples, Powers and Prospects for Canada’s North, Montreal: IRPP, P. 100-2, Available at: http://www.irpp.org/books/archive/AOTS4/huebert.pdf Accessed on: 2012-10-08.   

[20] The request to industry for proposals regarding the six to eight Arctic Offshore patrol vessels has still not gone out, as well as the build of the John G. Diefenbaker icebreaker, announced on 28^th August 2008, is in doubt. See Canada Department of Defence, Commodore Peter Ellis, Director General Maritime Force Development, Arctic/Offshore Patrol Ship (AOPS), Presentation to Standing Senate Committee on Fisheries and Oceans, (27^th October 2009), and Canada, Office of the Prime Minister, PM Announces New Polar Class Icebreaker Project to be named after Former PM John G. Diefenbaker, (28^th August 2008), Available at: http://pm.gc.ca/eng/media.asp?id=2251 Accessed on: 2012-10-08.

[21] The primary design was the Joint Support Ships to have the capability to travel in first-year ice up to one metre thick, as well as to be double-hulled and therefore compliant with the Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act. Instead the new design provides that “the primary role of the (JSS) will include supply of fuel, ammunition, spare parts, food, and water. The( JSS) will also provide a home base for the maintenance and operation of helicopters, a limited sealift capability, and logistics support to forces deployed ashore.” See Canada, National Defence and Canadian Forces, Government of Canada to Acquire the Joint Support Ships, (14^th July 2010), Available at: http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/news-nouvelles/news-nouvelles-eng.asp?cat=00&id=3463 Accessed on: 2012-10-08.

[22] Canada, National Defence, Assistant Deputy Minister – Material, Joint Support Ships (JSS), (27^th July 2009), Available at: http://www.forces.gc.ca/admmat/jointsupportshipjss-projetdunaviredesoutieninterarmeesnsi-eng.asp#psca Accessed on: 2012-10-08.  

[23] Canada, Canada News Centre, Bidders Fail to Meet Budget Requirements, (22^nd August 2008), Available at: http://news.gc.ca/web/article-eng.do?crtr.sj1D=&mthd=tp&crtr.mnthndVl=&nid=416189 Accessed on: 2012-10-08.

[24] Canada, National Defence and Canadian Forces, Government of Canada to Acquire the Joint Support Ships, (14^th July 2010), Available at: http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/news-nouvelles/news-nouvelles-eng.asp?cat=00&id=3463 Accessed on: 2012-10-08.  

[25] Canada, National Defence and Canadian Forces, CC-177 Globemaster III – Strategic Airlift, (12^th March 2010), Available at: http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/pri/2/pro-pro/globemaster-eng.asp

Accessed on: 2012-10-08.

[26] MCpl Derek Styan, Canada, Canada’s Air Force, CC-130 J’s Squadron Introduces New Squadron Patch, (10^th June 2010), Available at:  http://www.airforce.forces.gc.ca/8w-8e/nr-sp/index-eng.asp?id=10635 Accessed on: 2012-10-08.  

[27] Pakistan Defence, Canada Purchases 15 CH-47F Chinook Heavy-Lift Helicopters, (10^th August 2009), Available at: http://www.defence.pk/forums/military-forum/31438-canada-purchases-15-ch-47f-chinook-heavy-lift-helicopters.html Accessed on: 2012-10-08.  

[28] Canada, Canada’s Air Force, CP-140A Arcturus, (26^th March 2007), Available at: http://www.airforce.forces.gc.ca/v2/equip/cp140a/index-eng.asp Accessed on: 2010-09-03.

[29] Canada, Canada’s Air Force, CF-188 Hornet, (26^th March 2007), Available at: http://www.airforce.forces.gc.ca/v2/equip/cf18/index-eng.asp Accessed on: 2010-09-03.

[30] Canada, Canada’s Air Force, CC-138 Twin Otter, (26^th March 2007), Available at: http://www.airforce.forces.gc.ca/v2/equip/cc138/index-eng.asp Accessed on: 2010-09-03.

[31] Canada, National Defence, Canada First Defence Strategy, (May 2008), P. 17, Available at: http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/pri/first-premier/June18_0910_CFDS_english_low-res.pdf Accessed on: 2010-09-03.

[32] Huebert, Rob, (2010), The Newly Emerging Arctic Security Environment, Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute, P. 8. Available at: http://www.cdfai.org/PDF/The%20Newly%20Emerging%20Arctic%20Security%20Environment.pdf Accessed on: 2010-09-03.

[33] At present, the Rangers count 4100 members. See Canada, Office of the Prime Minister, Backgrounder - Expanding Canadian Forces Operation in the Arctic, (10^th August 2007), Available at: http://pm.gc.ca/eng/media.asp?id=1785 Accessed on: 2010-09-03.

[34] CBC News, MacKay Makes Arctic Army Reserve Unit Official, (17^th August 2009), Available at: http://www.cbc.ca/canada/north/story/2009/08/17/mackay-yellowknife-reserve.html Accessed on: 2010-09-03.

[35] The RadarSat II was launched on 14^th December 2007 and is fully operational as of July 2009.

[36] Radarsat-2, RadarSat -2 Successfully Launched, (14^th December 2007), Available at: http://www.radarsat2.info/outreach/innews/2007/12142007_gsi.asp Accessed on: 2010-09-03.

[37] Arctic Focus, Canada’s Northern Watch program Under Way Again in Arctic, (3^rd November 2009), Available at: http://arcticfocus.com/2009/11/03/canadas-northern-watch-program-underway-again-in-arctic/ Accessed on: 2010-09-03.

[38] Huebert, Rob, Renaissance in Canadian Arctic Security, Canadian Military Journal, Vol.6, No.4, (Winter 2005-2006), P. 17-29, Available at: http://www.journal.forces.gc.ca/vo6/no4/doc/north-nord-eng.pdf Accessed on: 2010-09-03.

[39] Huebert, Rob, (2010), The Newly Emerging Arctic Security Environment, Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute, P. 9. Available at: http://www.cdfai.org/PDF/The%20Newly%20Emerging%20Arctic%20Security%20Environment.pdf Accessed on: 2010-09-04.

[40] Danish Defence Agreement 2010-2014, Copenhagen, (24^th June 2009), Available at: http://merln.ndu.edu/whitepapers/Denmark2010-2014English.pdf Accessed on: 2010-09-04.

[41] Ibid. P.1, 12.

[42] The Copenhagen Post Online, Arctic Rivalry Heating Up, (15^th July 2009), Available at: http://www.cphpost.dk/news/national/88-national/46275-arctic-rivalry-heating-up.html Accessed on: 2010-09-04.

[43] Huebert, Rob, (2010), The Newly Emerging Arctic Security Environment, Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute, P. 10. Available at: http://www.cdfai.org/PDF/The%20Newly%20Emerging%20Arctic%20Security%20Environment.pdf Accessed on: 2010-09-04.

[44] The Knud Ramussen class offshore patrol vessel has two 12,7 mm Heavy Machine Guns (M/01) and can quickly accept a 76 mm main gun, a sea sparrow missile launcher and antisubmarine torpedo tubes, whenever the Danish government decides to. See Danish Naval History, Knud Rasmussen Class (2008 - ), Available at:  http://www.navalhistory.dk/english/theships/classes/knudrasmussen_class(2007).htm Accessed on: 2010-09-04.

[45] Balsved, E. Johnny, Danish Naval History, New Patrol Ships: Three New Large Frigate Sized Patrol Ships for the RND Granted, (24^th June 2006), Available at: http://www.navalhistory.dk/English/NavyNews/2006/0622_PatrolShips.htm Accessed on: 2010-09-04.

[46] In detail, the Thetis (F357) and Triton (F358) were commissioned in 1991, and Vaedderen (F359) and Hvidbjornen (F360) in 1992.

[47] Naval - Technology.Com, The Website for the Defence Industries – Navy, Thetis Class Frigates, Denmark, (2010), Available at: http://www.naval-technology.com/projects/thetis/ Accessed on: 2010-09-04. 

[48] Hans Island is a small uninhabited island/rock between Greenland and Ellesmere Island. See Huebert, Rob, (2005), Return of the “Vikings”: The Canadian-Danish dispute over Hans Island – new challenges for the Control of the Canadian North, in Fikret Berkes, Rob Huebert, Helen Fast, Micheline Manseau and Alan Diduck, Breaking Ice – Renewable Resource and Ocean Management in the Canadian North, Calgary: University of Calgary Press, P. 319-334.

[49] Huebert, Rob, (2010), The Newly Emerging Arctic Security Environment, Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute, P. 11. Available at: http://www.cdfai.org/PDF/The%20Newly%20Emerging%20Arctic%20Security%20Environment.pdf Accessed on: 2010-09-04.

[50] Ibid.

[51] Naval - Technology.Com, The Website for the Defence Industries – Navy, Flyvefisken Class (SF 300) Multi – Role Vessels, Denmark, (2010), Available at: http://www.naval-technology.com/projects/fly/ Accessed on: 2010-09-04.

[52] Naval - Technology.Com, The Website for the Defence Industries – Navy, Absalon Class Combat/Flexible Support Ship, Denmark, (2010), Available at: http://www.naval-technology.com/projects/absalon/ Accessed on: 2010-09-04.

[53] Defence Talk: Global Defence and Military Portal, Denmark F-35 Fighter Decision Postponed,

(29^th April 2009), Available at: http://www.defencetalk.com/denmark-f-35-fighter-jet-decision-18247/ Accessed on: 2010-09-04.

[54] Huebert, Rob, (2010), The Newly Emerging Arctic Security Environment, Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute, P. 12. Available at: http://www.cdfai.org/PDF/The%20Newly%20Emerging%20Arctic%20Security%20Environment.pdf Accessed on: 2010-09-05.

[55] Norway, Office of the Prime Minister, The Soria Moria Declaration on International Policy,

(2^nd April 2007), Available at:  http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/smk/documents/Reports-and-action-plans/rapporter/2005/The-Soria-Moria-Declaration-on-Internati.html?id=438515                      Accessed on: 2010-09-05.

[56] Norway, Office of the Prime Minister, The Soria Moria Declaration on International Policy,

(2^nd April 2007), Available at:  http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/smk/documents/Reports-and-action-plans/rapporter/2005/The-Soria-Moria-Declaration-on-Internati.html?id=438515                      Accessed on: 2010-09-05.

[57] Norway, Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The Norwegian Government’s High North Strategy, (1^st December 2006), P. 5, 7, Available at: http://www.regjeringen.no/upload/UD/Vedlegg/strategien.pdf Accessed on: 2010-09-05.

[58] Huebert, Rob, (2010), The Newly Emerging Arctic Security Environment, Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute, P. 12. Available at: http://www.cdfai.org/PDF/The%20Newly%20Emerging%20Arctic%20Security%20Environment.pdf Accessed on: 2010-09-05.

[59] Defence Processionals, Capable and Ready for Action Norway’s Armed Forces 2010 - speech by the Norwegian Defence Minister to Olso Military Society, (4^th January 2010), Available at: http://www.defpro.com/news/details/12437/ Accessed on: 2010-09-05.

[60] Norway, Norwegian Ministry of Defence, Norwegian Defence 2008, (June 2008), P. 5, Available at:  http://www.regjeringen.no/upload/FD/Dokumenter/Fakta2008_eng.pdf Accessed on: 2010-09-05.

[61] According to the paper, “Norway’s position as a significant energy exporter and as a country responsible for the administration of important natural resources extending over large sea areas, has an important bearing on security policy. We must be able to uphold our sovereignty and our sovereign rights, and to exercise authority in a proper way in areas under Norwegian jurisdiction. Even though the day-to-day challenges we face in the north are linked with economic factors, the administration of natural resources and regard for the environment, the Armed Forces play an important role by virtue of their operational capabilities with the emphasis on maintaining a presence and upholding national sovereignty in the North. A robust Norwegian military presence represents a security policy threshold and ensures a capacity for good crisis management, so contributing importantly to the creation of stability and predictability in the region”. See Norway, Norwegian Ministry of Defence, Norwegian Defence 2008, (June 2008), P. 7, 8, Available at: http://www.regjeringen.no/upload/FD/Dokumenter/Fakta2008_eng.pdf Accessed on: 2010-09-05.

[62] Jeff Head, Aegis and Aegis-like Vessels of the World, Norway Nansen Class FFG, (28^th May 2007), Available at: http://www.jeffhead.com/aegisvesselsoftheworld/nansen.htm Accessed on: 2010-09-05.

[63] Doug, Thomas, (Fall 2007), Warship Developments: Arctic/Offshore Patrol Ships, Canadian Naval Review, Vol. 3, No. 3, P.37, Available at: http://naval.review.cfps.dal.ca/archive/4973979-1054336/vol3num3art9.pdf Accessed on: 2010-09-05.

[64] Naval - Technology.Com, The Website for the Defence Industries – Navy, Skjold Class Missile Fast Patrol Boats, Norway, (2010), Available at: http://www.naval-technology.com/projects/skjold/ Accessed on: 2010-09-05.

[65] Huebert, Rob, (2010), The Newly Emerging Arctic Security Environment, Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute, P. 14. Available at: http://www.cdfai.org/PDF/The%20Newly%20Emerging%20Arctic%20Security%20Environment.pdf Accessed on: 2010-09-05.

[66] Giovanni de Briganti, Defense-Aerospace.com, Norway’s JSF Price Tag is $3.2 Billion and Rising, (6^th December 2008), Available at: http://www.defense-aerospace.com/article-view/feature/100347/norway’s-jsf-price-tag-is-$3.2-billion-and-rising.html Accessed on: 2010-09-05.

[67] Hoyle, Graig, Eurofighter @ Starstreak.Net, Norway Backs JSF Selection, Rejects Gripen NG, (21^st November 2008), Available at: http://typhoon.starstreak.net/forum/viewtopic.php?f=13&t=1689 Accessed on: 2010-09-05.

[68] Airforce-Technology.com, The Website for the Defence Industries – Air Force, F-35 Lightning II Joint Strike Fighter (JSF), International, (2010), Available at: http://www.airforce-technology.com/projects/jsf/ Accessed on: 2010-09-05.

[69] Barents Observer.Com, Cross-Border News, Large NATO Exercise Starts In Northern Norway, (18^th February 2010), Available at:  http://www.barentsobserver.com/large-nato-exercise-starts-in-northern-norway.4749025.html Accessed on: 2010-09-05. 

[70] Russia is the world’s largest natural gas exporter, the second largest oil exporter and the third largest energy consumer. See EIA, U.S. Energy Information Administration, Independent Statistics and Analysis, Russia Energy Profile, (1^st August 2010), Available at: http://www.eia.doe.gov/country/country_energy_data.cfm?fips=RS Accessed on: 2010-09-06.

[71] OilWeek, Canada’s Oil and Gas Authority, Medvedev Says Arctic Resources Crucial for Russia’s Economic Future, (17^th Sept 2008), Available at: http://www.oilweek.com/news.asp?ID=18679 Accessed on: 2010-09-06.

[72] Global Security.Org, Military Industry under Putin, (9^th November 2008), Available at: http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/russia/industry-putin.htm Accessed on: 2010-09-06.

[73] Ibid

[74] Morozov, Yuri, Carnegie Council, The Voice for Ethics in International Affairs, The Arctic: The Next “Hot Spot” of International Relations or a Region of Cooperation? (16^th December 2009), Available at: http://www.cceia.org/resources/articles_papers_reports/0039.html                        Accessed on: 2010-09-06.

[75] Ibid

[76] According to the speech of the Russian Defence Minister Sergei Ivanov delivered at the Russian Duma (7^th February 2007), the Program determines new parameters, where 60% of the 5 trillion Roubles fund allocated till 2015, is to be spent on procurement of modern weapons systems and equipment, 20% is planned to be used for the maintenance and servicing and 20% on R&D. See Warfare.Ru, Russia’s Military Budget, (2010), Available at: http://warfare.ru/?linkid=2279&catid=239 Accessed on: 2010-09-06. See also Bear Rising, Tracking Russia’s Military Events, State Armament Program 2007-2015, (8^th September 2007), Available at: http://bearrising.blogspot.com/2007/08/state-armament-program-2007-2015.html Accessed on: 2010-09-06.

[77] Russia RSS, RIA Novosti, Russian Navy to Receive Severodvinsk Nuclear Submarine in 2010, (19^th November 2008), Available at: http://en.rian.ru/russia/20081119/118404317.html                     Accessed on: 2010-09-06.

[78] Barents Observer.Com, Cross-Border News, Modernized Nuclear Sub to be Delivered in January, (12^th January 2010), Available at: http://www.barentsobserver.com/modernized-nuclear-sub-to-be-delivered-in-january.4683986-58932.html Accessed on: 2010-09-06.

[79] The vessel took almost 18 years to complete and “it has an overall length of 159m, a width of 30m, a draught of 11m and a depth of 17.2m. Its displacement is 25,840t. The ship can break through ice up to 2.8m deep and is classified under Russian LL1 class”. See Ship-Technology.Com, The Website for the Cruise and Shipbuilding Industry, 50 Years of Victory-Arktika Class Icebreaker, (2010), Available at: http://www.ship-technology.com/projects/fiftyyearsofvictoryi/ Accessed on: 2010-09-06.

[80] Kipp, W. Jacob, The Jamestown Foundation, Information Without Political Agenda, from Eurasia, China and the World of Terrorism, The Russian Navy Recalibrates Its Oceanic Ambitions, Eurasia Daily Monitor, Vol. 6, Issue 200, Available at: http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=35677&tx_ttnews[backPid]=7&cHash=e48e898db8 Accessed on: 2010-09-06.

[81] Russia RSS, RIA Novosti, Russia to Set Up Naval Infrastructure in Arctic-Patrushev, (6^th August 2012), Available at: http://en.rian.ru/mlitary_news/20120806/175015455.html Accessed on: 2012-10-08.

[82] Russia RSS, RIA Novosti, Russia to Develop New Strategic Bomber by 2017, (23^rd December 2009), Available at: http://en.rian.ru/russia/20091223/157335991.html Accessed on: 2010-09-07.

[83] Russia RSS, RIA Novosti, Russia to Base Mig-31 Interceptors in Arcti, (25^th September 2012), Available at: http://en.rian.ru/mlitary_news/20120925/176212312.html Accessed on: 2012-10-08.

[84] Stoll Alex, Fighter-Planes.Com, Mikoyan Project 1.44/MiG 1.42 MFI, Available at: http://www.fighter-planes.com/info/mig142.htm Accessed on: 2010-09-07.

[85] On 17^th August 2007 the Russian President Vladimir Putin ordered the resumption of 14 bomber aircrafts on a long-range flight over the Arctic Ocean. See BBC News, Russia Restarts Cold War Patrols, (17^th August 2007), Available at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/6950986.stm Accessed on: 2010-09-07.

[86] On 14^th July 2008 the Russian Navy announced that its fleet has "resumed a warship presence in the Arctic." These Arctic naval patrols include the area of the Spitsbergen archipelago that belongs to Norway, a NATO member. Russia refuses to recognize Norway’s right to a 200-nautical-mile exclusive economic zone around Spitsbergen. Russia deployed an anti-submarine warfare destroyer followed by a guided-missile cruiser armed with 16 long-range anti-ship cruise missiles designed to destroy aircraft carriers. See RIA Novosti, World RSS, Russian Navy Resumes Military Presence near Spitsbergen, (14^th July 2008), Available at: http://en.rian.ru/world/20080714/113914174.html  Accessed on: 2010-09-07.

[87] On 13^th – 14^th July 2009 the Russian Navy sent two Delta IV class nuclear-powered submarines into Arctic waters where carried out test launches of two Sineva intercontinental ballistic missiles. It is noteworthy that the US was unable to detect the presence of the Russian strategic submarines in the region before the test-launched. See RIA Novosti, Defense RSS, Russia Outwitted U.S. Strategic Defenses with Missile Test, (15^th July 2009), Available at: http://en.rian.ru/mlitary_news/20090715/155530936.html Accessed on: 2010-09-07.

[88] According to the Canadian Minister of Defense, the last week of July 2010, Russian TU-95s bombers flied near the Canadian airspace, but the Russian Officials in Ottawa are saying that was nothing more than a routine flight. It is noticeable that annually both the US and Canada monitor 12 to 18 Russian flights close to their airspace. See Pugliese David and Minsky Amy, Calgary Herald, Russia Bombers Attempt to Probe Canadian Airspace, (30^th July 2010), Available at:  http://www.calgaryherald.com/news/Russian+bombers+attempt+probe+Canadian+airspace/3342849/story.html Accessed on: 2010-09-07.

[89] European Voice.Com, Wi(l)der Europe, Defence Training Gets Warm Response from Nordic States, (26^th March 2009), Available at: http://www.europeanvoice.com/article/imported/defence-training-gets-warm-response-from-nordic-states/64414.aspx Accessed on: 2010-09-08.

[90] Daily Times, A New Voice for a New Pakistan, Russia Plans to Deploy Troops in Arctic, (28^th March 2009), Available at: http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2009\03\28\story_28-3-2009_pg4_1 Accessed on: 2010-09-08.

[91] RT, Politics, NATO Interference into Arctic Debate Could be Dangerous, (7^th April 2009), Available at: http://rt.com/Politics/2009-04-07/_NATO_interference_into_Arctic_debates_could_be_dangerous_.html Accessed on: 2010-09-08.

[92] Huebert, Rob, (2010), The Newly Emerging Arctic Security Environment, Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute, P. 18. Available at: http://www.cdfai.org/PDF/The%20Newly%20Emerging%20Arctic%20Security%20Environment.pdf Accessed on: 2010-09-08.

[93] It is noticeable that the 1994 Presidential Arctic Directive had ranked the need to meet national security as the last of six priorities of the 1994 policy. See US Department of State Dispatch (26^th December 1994), Fact Sheet, US Arctic Policy, Available at: http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m1584/is_n52_v5/ai_16709524/ Accessed on: 2010-09-09.

[94] Huebert, Rob, The United States Arctic Policy: The Reluctant Arctic Power, University of Calgary, The School of Public Policy: SPP Briefing Papers Focus on the United States, Vol. 2, No. 2, (May 2009), P. 1, Available at: http://policyschool.ucalgary.ca/files/publicpolicy/SPPBriefing-HUEBERTonline.pdf Accessed on: 2010-09-09.

[95] Huebert, Rob, (2010), The Newly Emerging Arctic Security Environment, Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute, P. 19. Available at: http://www.cdfai.org/PDF/The%20Newly%20Emerging%20Arctic%20Security%20Environment.pdf Accessed on: 2010-09-09.

[96] The White House, National Security Presidential Directive NSPD-66 / HSPD-25, January 9, 2009, Available at: http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nspd/nspd-66.htm Accessed on: 2010-09-09.

[97] Blunden, Margaret (2009), The New Problem of Arctic Stability, Survival, Routledge, Vol.51, Issue 5, P.129.

[98] The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, National Security Presidential Directive/NSPD 66 – Homeland Security Presidential Directive/HSPD 25 – Subject: Arctic Region, (9^th January 2009), P. 2, Available at: http://media.adn.com/smedia/2009/01/12/15/2008arctic.dir.rel.source.prod_affiliate.7.pdf Accessed on: 2010-09-10.  

[99] In July 2010 the Obama administration moved Arctic science policy oversight to a White House council. See KTVA, Obama Assigns Arctic Science Policy to White House, (23^rd July 2010), Available at: http://www.ktva.com/ci_15585693?source=pkg Accessed on: 2010-09-10.

[100] The Virginia class is designed for a broad spectrum and Open Ocean and littoral missions, as well as able to operate in the Arctic sea. See NAVY.mil, Official Website of the United States Navy, United States Navy Fact File, Attack Submarines – SSN, (10^th September 2010), Available at: http://www.navy.mil/navydata/fact_display.asp?cid=4100&tid=100&ct=4 Accessed on: 2010-09-10. See also Cole William, Honolulu Advertiser.Com, USS Texas Pays Icy Visit to Arctic, (8^th November 2009), Available at: http://the.honoluluadvertiser.com/article/2009/Nov/08/ln/hawaii911080383.html Accessed on: 2010-09-10.

[101] Ibid

[102] Ronald O’Rourke, Congressional Research Service, Coast Guard Icebreaker Modernization: Background, Issues, and Options for Congress, CRS Report for Congress RL 34391, (2^nd September 2010), Available at: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/RL34391.pdf Accessed on: 2010-09-11.

[103] FAS, F-15 Eagle Overview, (11^th September 2010), Available at: http://www.fas.org/programs/ssp/man/uswpns/air/fighter/f15.html#f15c Accessed on: 2010-09-11.

[104] CBC News, Canadian fighter jets temporarily fill in for US air defences, (27^th November 2007), Available at: http://www.cbc.ca/canada/north/story/2007/11/27/fighter-jets.html                           Accessed on: 2010-09-11.

[105] CBC News, Canadian fighter jets temporarily fill in for US air defences, (27^th November 2007), Available at: http://www.cbc.ca/canada/north/story/2007/11/27/fighter-jets.html                           Accessed on: 2010-09-11.

[106] Dewitte Lieven, F-16.net, F-22 Raptor News, F-22 Raptors Begin Operational in Alaska, (8^th August 2007), Available at: http://www.f-16.net/news_article2468.html%5D Accessed on: 2010-09-11.

[107] Hoffman Michael, Air Force Times, AF Leaders: F-22 Cuts a Matter of Priorities, (14^th April 2009), Available at: http://www.airforcetimes.com/news/2009/04/airforce_F22_oped_041309w/ Accessed on: 2010-09-11.

[108] US Air Force, Elmendorf Air Force Base, Northern Edge History, (30^th October 2007), Available at: http://www.elmendorf.af.mil/library/factsheets/factsheet.asp?id=10444 Accessed on: 2010-09-11.

[109] Ibid

[110] The EU closely cooperates with Canada, Russia and the US either multilaterally within the framework of international organizations – the IMF, the World Bank, the WTO, the Northern Dimension, and the Euro-Barents Council – or bilaterally.

[111] EurActiv.Com, Geopolitics of EU Energy Supply, (10^th January 2007), Available at: http://www.euractiv.com/en/energy/geopolitics-eu-energy-supply/article-142665                             Accessed on: 2010-09-11.

[112] Europa, EUR-Lex, COM(2008) 763 Final, Communication From the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, The European Union and the Arctic Region, (20^th November 2008), Available at: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:DKEY=483680:EN:NOT                      Accessed on: 2010-09-12.

[113] Ibid

[114] Canada opposed the EU’s request to join the Arctic council due to the EU’s proposal to ban the import of seal products. See CBC News, Canada against EU Entry to Arctic Council Because of Seal Trade Ban, (29^th April 2009), Available at: http://www.cbc.ca/world/story/2009/04/29/cda-eu-arctic-seal.html Accessed on: 2010-09-12. See also Bjorn Bjarnason, New Arctic Policies, (4^th May 2009), Sigtuna, Sweden, Available at: http://www.bjorn.is/greinar/nr/4944 Accessed on: 2010-09-12.

[115] Gallis, Paul, NATO and Energy Security, in CRS Report for Congress RS 22409, (21^st December 2006). See also International Herald Tribune, US Senator urges use of NATO defense clause for energy, (28^th November 2006), Available at: www.iht.com Accessed on: 2010-09-12.

[116] Holtsmark G. Sven, Towards Cooperation or Confrontation? Security in the High North, Research Paper, Research Division-NATO Defense College, Rome, No.45, February 2009, P.11, Available at: http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Digital-Library/Publications/Detail/?ots591=0C54E3B3-1E9C-BE1E-2C24-A6A8C7060233&lng=en&id=97586 Accessed on: 2010-09-12.

[117] NATO, Bucharest Summit (April 2008), Report on: NATO’s Role in Energy Security, Available at: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_49208.htm?selectedLocale=en Accessed on: 2010-09-12.

[118] NATO, Partnership for Peace Exercise Arctic-Sarex 96 Khabarovsk (Far Eastern Region of Russia) 16^th to 20^th September 1996, (16^th September 1996), Available at:    http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news_24865.htm?selectedLocale=en Accessed on: 2010-09-12.

[119] RIA NOVOSTI, Russian Envoy Praises NATO Role in Search for Arctic Sea Ship, (20^th August 2009), Available at: http://en.rian.ru/russia/20090820/155870209.html Accessed on: 2010-09-12.

[120] National Intelligence Council, NIC 2004-13, Mapping the Global Future, Report of the National Intelligence Council’s 2020 project, Based on Consultations With Nongovernmental Experts around the World, (December 2004), P.62, Available at: http://www.foia.cia.gov/2020/2020.pdf Accessed on: 2010-09-12.

[121] Zweing David and Jianhai Bi, China’s Global Hunt for Energy, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 84, No. 5, (September/October 2005), Available at: http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/61017/david-zweig-and-bi-jianhai/chinas-global-hunt-for-energy Accessed on: 2010-09-12.

[122] Only in 2004 China accounted for 31% of global growth in oil demand. See Zweing David and Jianhai Bi, China’s Global Hunt for Energy, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 5, No. 84, (September/October 2005), Available at: http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/61017/david-zweig-and-bi-jianhai/chinas-global-hunt-for-energy Accessed on: 2010-09-12.

[123] Ning, Xiao-night, “地球未来的缩影—外交部部长助理谈“北极研究之旅” [A microcosm of the Earth’s Future—Assistant Foreign Minister Hu Zhengyue on “Arctic Research Trip”], (translated by Google), World Expo (2009), Vol. 349, No. 19, P. 58, Available at: http://www.feidubook.com/HtmlMagaArticleText.aspx?FileName=BLSJ200919039                Accessed on: 2010-09-12.

[124] It is noteworthy that the Norwegian government assumes the scientific presence of China in Svalbard archipelago as a “big asset”. See Larsen, Gry, Common Security Concerns of Norway and China, Conference with SIPRI, Norway, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, (1^st March 2010), Available at: http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/ud/aktuelt/taler_artikler/taler_og_artikler_av_ovrig_politisk_lede/statssekretar-gry-larsen/2010/common_security_concerns.html?id=594935 Accessed on: 2010-09-12.

[125] Xinhuanet  News, ‘北极地区’ [Arctic region], (translated by Google), (13^th  June 2006), Available at: http://news.xinhuanet.com/ziliao/2006-07/13/content_4826007.htm Accessed on: 2010-09-12.  

[126] The Chinese request was turned down by the Arctic Council’s foreign ministers meeting in Tromso 2009. See Bjorn Bjarnason, New Arctic Policies, (4^th May 2009), Sigtuna, Sweden, Available at: http://www.bjorn.is/greinar/nr/4944 Accessed on: 2010-09-12.

[127] The New York Times, China’s Arctic Ambitions, Week in Review, (24^th May 2010), Available at: http://ideas.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/05/24/chinas-arctic-ambitions/ Accessed on: 2010-09-12.  

[128] Krauss Clifford, Myers Lee Steven, Revkin C. Andrew and Romero Simon, The Big Melt: As Polar Ice Turns to Water, Dreams of Treasure Abound, The New York Times, Science, (10^th October 2005), Available at: http://www.nytimes.com/2005/10/10/science/10arctic.html?pagewanted=all Accessed on: 2010-09-13.

[129] Larsen, Gry, Common Security Concerns of Norway and China. Conference with SIPRI, Norway, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (1^st March 2010) Available at: http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/ud/aktuelt/taler_artikler/taler_og_artikler_av_ovrig_politisk_lede/statssekretar-gry-larsen/2010/common_security_concerns.html?id=594935 Accessed on: 2010-09-13.

[130] It is noticeable that between the years 2000 and 2008 the value of imports and exports between China and the EU rose from €101 billion to €326 billion. See Willis, Andrew: China lies at heart of Europe’s recovery, says Brussels, EU Observer.Com, (19^th May2009), Available at:

http://euobserver.com/884/28156 Accessed on: 2010-09-13.

[131] Menon, Rajan, The China-Russia Relationship: What It Involves, Where It Is Headed, And How It Matters for the United States, A Century Foundation Report, The Century Foundation, (2009), Washington D.C. P. 36, Available at: http://www.tcf.org/publications/internationalaffairs/Menon.pdf Accessed on: 2010-09-13.

[132] Ibid

[133] All Business, Enbridge and PetroChina Sign Gateway Pipeline Cooperation Agreement, (14^th April 2005), Available at:  http://www.allbusiness.com/transportation/pipeline-transportation-oil-gas/5082289-1.html Accessed on: 2010-09-13.

[134] Yan, Norway, China Expect to Sign FTA Accord this Year: Minister, Xinhuanet  News, (14^th January 2010), Available at: http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2010-01/14/content_12805586.htm Accessed on: 2010-09-13.